Justin Schimandle v. DEKALB COUNTY SHERIFF ’ S OFFICE and JOSH DUEHNING

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2151
JUSTIN S CHIMANDLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEKALB C OUNTY S HERIFF ’ S O FFICE
and JOSH DUEHNING,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:21-cv-50477 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 18, 2024 — DECIDED A UGUST 28, 2024
____________________
Before R IPPLE, BRENNAN , and S CUDDER , Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Circuit Judge. Justin Schimandle, a high-school
administrator, forcibly restrained a student at school. After an
investigation, Detective Josh Duehning of the Dekalb County,
Illinois Sheriff’s Office submitted affidavits to support an ar-
rest warrant against Schimandle for battery. An Illinois state
magistrate judge issued the warrant, and Schimandle turned
himself in. The criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. After

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2 No. 23-2151
the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed find-
ing, which the trial court granted, and Schimandle was found
not guilty.
Schimandle then sued the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office
and Duehning, alleging false arrest. The defendants moved
for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court granted
that motion, dismissing Schimandle’s claims. The court found
that there was probable cause to arrest Schimandle and that
Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity. Arguable prob-
able cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, so we affirm the
district court.
I
We view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party—here, Schimandle—on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th
470, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). But where video recordings are referenced in the
complaint and central to the claims, we may view those vid-
eos in addition to the facts alleged in the complaint. See Scott,
550 U.S. at 378; Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 679 (7th
Cir. 2024); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013).
The facts of this case are disputed. Three videos recorded
the incident. Most of the specifics of the encounter cannot be
seen on the videos, and the videos do not contain audio. Be-
low, we take Schimandle’s description as true, deviating only
where the videos contradict Schimandle or to add infor-
mation that Schimandle does not include.
A. The Underlying Incident
Schimandle was the Dean of Students at Kishwaukee Ed-
ucation Consortium, a high school in Malta, Illinois.

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No. 23-2151 3
Kishwaukee offers vocational classes to juniors and seniors
with non-violent disciplinary issues from neighboring high
schools.
On September 26, 2019, during school hours, Kishwaukee
students reported to Schimandle that another student, “C.G.,”
was in a school bathroom using a vaping device. Schimandle
went to the “Commons” area to investigate the report. He
searched C.G.’s bag and found a vaping device. Schimandle
alleges that as he retrieved the device, C.G. ran up to him,
grabbed his wrist, took the bag, and ran off. Schimandle then
went to the office to notify his superiors.
Later that day, Schimandle saw C.G. in the Commons area
again. Schimandle asked C.G. to come to his office so that he
could explain why he had searched C.G.’s bag. C.G. re-
sponded with profanity and refused to speak with Schiman-
dle. Schimandle went to his office to call C.G.’s guardian to
inform him that C.G. would be suspended because of the in-
cident.
Schimandle returned to the Commons area to notify C.G.
of the suspensions. When Schimandle told C.G. about the sus-
pension, C.G. responded, “let me tell you something man to
[expletive] man. How would you like it if I searched you?”
C.G. also moved toward Schimandle, grabbed Schimandle’s
pants, and pulled Schimandle toward him. C.G. then tried to
reach into Schimandle’s pants. Schimandle grabbed one of
C.G.’s arms, fearing he would be struck with C.G.’s free arm,
and told C.G., “do not touch me again.” C.G. ignored the
warning, tried to reach into Schimandle’s pants again, became
more aggressive, and yelled profanity.

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4 No. 23-2151
As Schimandle tells it, in response and out of fear for his
own safety, he bear hugged C.G. and began walking him out
of the Commons area. Holding C.G. in that manner, Schiman-
dle walked with him into the foyer through a set of doors.
When they moved into the foyer, Schimandle and C.G. fell to
the ground, with Schimandle landing on top of C.G. After fall-
ing, Schimandle continued holding C.G. on the ground.
Schimandle alleges he did so because C.G. continued to strug-
gle and curse, and he feared that releasing C.G. would esca-
late the incident. Schimandle told C.G., “I can let you go when
I feel safe to do so.” At that point, a Kishwaukee employee,
referred to in Schimandle’s complaint as “Mr. Peek,” and a
school resource officer arrived to assist in restraining C.G.
Once the others arrived, Schimandle retreated from the alter-
cation.
B. The Investigation
The day after the incident, the Associate Principal of Kish-
waukee, Matthew Pierce, called the Sheriff’s Office to report
what happened. The Sheriff’s Office opened an investigation
and assigned the case to Duehning. In the course of the inves-
tigation, an officer obtained school video surveillance and a
cell phone video, which Duehning viewed.
The videos confirm much but not all of Schimandle’s story
because they do not depict the entire encounter and do not
have audio. They show Schimandle approaching C.G.
through the Commons area. C.G. was seated in a classroom
next to a partially-open room divider which separated the
classroom from the Commons area. Schimandle and C.G.
talked. During the conversation, C.G. stood up to leave, but
Schimandle reached for him to stop him. In doing so,
Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room divider, which gave

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No. 23-2151 5
way. When Schimandle finally grabbed C.G., he placed him
in a bear hug. Schimandle then walked with C.G. in front of
him in that position and at times seemed to drag C.G. across
the Commons area and through a double set of doors. They
passed into a foyer and Schimandle and C.G. fell to the
ground. The videos end with Schimandle lying on top of C.G.
and holding C.G. under control while on the ground.
Duehning interviewed Schimandle and other Kishwaukee
employees involved in the incident, including Peek and
Pierce. Schimandle also gave Duehning a written timeline of
the incident. Duehning interviewed three additional Kish-
waukee employees who witnessed the incident. The record
does not state whether C.G. was interviewed.
In a report Duehning later prepared about the events, he
described these interviews. He wrote that “Schimandle’s ac-
count was similar to his written statement of events” and
noted it is “consistent to what the surveillance video depicts.”
He made this same notation about Peek’s, Pierce’s, and three
other employees’ statements.
C. Schimandle’s Arrest, Trial, and Finding of Not Guilty
On November 26, 2019, Duehning submitted four affida-
vits in support of an arrest warrant for Schimandle. Those af-
fidavits supported charges of criminal battery. Specifically,
they alleged that Schimandle caused bodily harm to C.G. and
made physical contact of an insulting and provoking nature
to C.G. while (1) carrying C.G. and falling on top of C.G. with
his body weight, and (2) carrying C.G. and using C.G.’s body
to open a door, striking C.G.’s head and side into the door.

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6 No. 23-2151
They do not mention exculpatory facts, such as evidence of an
affirmative defense for Schimandle’s actions.1
Relying on Duehning’s affidavits, a Dekalb County mag-
istrate judge found the battery charges were supported by
probable cause and issued an arrest warrant for Schimandle.
Schimandle turned himself in to the Sheriff’s Office, where he
was handcuffed and detained. Shortly after, the school district
placed Schimandle on administrative leave, and eventually
his employment with Kishwaukee was terminated.
Schimandle’s criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. Af-
ter the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed
finding. The trial court granted Schimandle’s motion, and he
was found not guilty.
D. Schimandle’s Lawsuit and District Court Dismissal
As relevant to this appeal, Schimandle brought a claim un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest in violation of his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as an Illinois state
law claim for malicious prosecution. He sought to hold liable
Duehning and the Sheriff’s Office, the latter under the doc-
trines of respondeat superior and indemnification. The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
Schimandle failed to state a cause of action for false arrest
against Duehning and that Duehning was entitled to qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motion. The
1 On appeal, Schimandle argues Duehning should have known dur-
ing his investigation that Schimandle had an affirmative defense under
105 I LL . COMP. S TAT. 5/24-24. That statute allows teachers to use reasonable
force against students in self-defense. Nothing in the record indicates that
Duehning was aware of this statute or that Schimandle made him aware
of it.

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No. 23-2151 7
defendants answered Schimandle’s First Amended Com-
plaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c), again raising the same two defenses.
The district court granted the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and entered judgment for the defendants. The court
found that probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle and
that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity for his ac-
tions. For probable cause, the court found, “[t]he allegations
taken in the light most favorable to Schimandle as well as the
video recordings, overwhelming[ly] establish the existence of
probable cause.” In reaching this conclusion, the court em-
phasized that Schimandle admitted to putting C.G. in a bear
hug, which satisfies the physical contact element of battery
under Illinois law. The court also disagreed with Schiman-
dle’s argument that Duehning knew or should have known
that Schimandle had authority to restrain C.G., so Duehning
must have lied about his knowledge or omitted a potential af-
firmative defense from the affidavits for an arrest warrant.
Rather than credit that contention, the court found that
Duehning’s affidavits did not contain false statements or ma-
terial omissions. On qualified immunity, the court concluded
that “[e]ven assuming probable cause did not exist,” “arguable
probable cause existed” supporting Schimandle’s arrest. This
appeal followed.2
II
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lisby, 74 F.4th at 472.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same
2 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367,
and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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8 No. 23-2151
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v.
City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). A com-
plaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to demon-
strate a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555−56 (2007); see Reed v. Palmer, 906
F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018).
On appeal, Schimandle claims the district court erred by
ruling first, that probable cause existed to arrest him for bat-
tery, and second, that Duehning was entitled to qualified im-
munity. Whether there was “probable cause to arrest
[Schimandle] is separate from the question relating to quali-
fied immunity.” Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874,
879 (7th Cir. 2012); see Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782,
791–92 (7th Cir. 2022). We place to the side the first question
and address the second, although the qualified immunity
analysis requires us to consider the issue of arguable probable
cause. Both issues can be extensive, and the latter is disposi-
tive here.
A
Qualified immunity requires the court to determine: (1)
whether the record evidences the violation of a federal statu-
tory or constitutional right; and if so (2) whether the right
violated was clearly established at the time the violation oc-
curred. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63
(2018); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pierner-Lytge v.
Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2023); Fosnight v. Jones, 41
F.4th 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2022). “If either inquiry is answered in
the negative,” qualified immunity protects the defendant of-
ficial. Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014); see Pear-
son v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737

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No. 23-2151 9
(7th Cir. 2021). Qualified immunity provides “’ample room
for mistaken judgments’ and protects all but the ‘plainly in-
competent and those who knowingly violate the law.’”
Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
Schimandle bears the burden of demonstrating that the
right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation
occurred. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017).
To be clearly established, the right must be “sufficiently clear
that every reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577
U.S. 7, 11 (2015)); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104
(2018) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has frequently cau-
tioned at this step not to define that law at too high a level of
generality. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citing Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also City of Tahlequah v. Bond,
595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam); Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104.
Although the plaintiff need not point to an identical case
finding the alleged conduct unlawful, he must point to prec-
edent placing the “statutory or constitutional question be-
yond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft, 563
U.S. at 741); see also Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County, 993 F.3d 981,
988 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)). Otherwise, the plaintiff must persuade the court that
the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, notwith-
standing the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable of-
ficer could have thought he was acting lawfully. See Wheeler,
539 F.3d at 639.
“There is no question that [Schimandle’s] constitutional
right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly
established at the time of the incident.” See Fleming, 674 F.3d

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10 No. 23-2151
at 879 (collecting cases reiterating the constitutional right to
be free from arrest without probable cause).
But an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity in a
false arrest case when “’a reasonable officer could have mis-
takenly believed that probable cause existed.’” Id. at 880
(quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir.
1998)). This inquiry is sometimes referred to as “arguable
probable cause.” Id. Although closely related, for qualified
immunity purposes, a determination of actual probable cause
is separate and distinct from arguable probable cause. Id. at
880.
Arguable probable cause is established when “a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing
the same knowledge as the officer in question could have
reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of
well-established law.” Id. (cleaned up). Whether arguable
probable cause “supports qualified immunity ‘is a pure
question of law’ to be decided by the court.” Cibulka v. City of
Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Thayer v.
Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012)) (finding in false-
arrest case that officers had arguable probable cause to arrest
appellant for disorderly conduct where he admitted to
actively resisting officers). And to decide it, we look to the
totality of the circumstances. See id. at 638; see also Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–33 (1983); Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th
874, 880 (7th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).
Turning to this case, the underlying charge for which
Schimandle claims he was falsely arrested is battery in viola-
tion of 720 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/12-3(a). Count I of the indict-
ment charged Schimandle under the first prong of that stat-
ute, which provides: “A person commits battery if he or she

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No. 23-2151 11
knowingly without legal justification by any means, (1)
causes bodily harm to an individual … .” 720 I LL. C OMP . S TAT.
5/12-3(a)(1).3 Counts II and III of the indictment charged him
under the second prong. That prong criminalizes “physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature.” 720 I LL. C OMP .
S TAT. 5/12-3(a)(2).
Each element of battery is supported here. First, Schiman-
dle had physical contact with C.G. The video and Schiman-
dle’s admissions depict him grabbing C.G. and placing C.G.
in a bear hug. Second, that physical contact could have caused
bodily harm to C.G. Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room
divider, placed C.G. in a bear hug, and walked with C.G. in
front of him through the Commons area and a double set of
doors. And Schimandle, a much bigger man, fell on top of
C.G., a child, after moving through the doors. Third, Schiman-
dle’s contact with C.G. was of an insulting and provoking na-
ture. He carries and drags C.G. as C.G. struggles to get away.
Plus, after the fall, Schimandle lays on top of C.G. to pin him
down. Last, Schimandle intended to make this contact with
C.G. Schimandle admitted he sought out C.G. and placed him
in a “bear hug.”
Given the videos capturing the physical altercation, the
multiple eyewitness interviews, and Schimandle’s own ad-
missions, a reasonable officer considering the same circum-
stances could have reasonably believed probable cause
3 Per Illinois Jury Instruction 11.05, the phrase “without legal justifi-
cation” is used “whenever an instruction is to be given on an affirmative
defense contained in Article 7 of Chapter 38.” Because Schimandle had an
affirmative defense, but the case proceeded as a bench, not a jury, trial, we
note this caveat but leave the phrase in the text above.

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12 No. 23-2151
existed for each of those charges. See Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48
F.4th 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2022).
The conclusion that there was at least arguable probable
cause to arrest is supported by precedent. In many respects,
the analysis here is similar to a recent decision from this court.
In Gaddis v. DeMattei, the plaintiff complained of false arrest.
This court held that the officer there had a reasonable belief
that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for an Illinois
disorderly conduct violation. 30 F.4th 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2022).
The officer interviewed bystanders, who discussed the dis-
turbance plaintiff caused and plaintiff’s pattern of disruptive
behavior. Based on those interviews, the officer made his own
assessment. After the investigation, the officer concluded that
the plaintiff posed a risk to others and arrested him. Id. In the
court’s analysis, it noted that the facts were “gleaned
firsthand” by the officer and cited our precedent on arguable
probable cause. Id.
Here, like the officer in Gaddis, Duehning had firsthand in-
formation from interviews about a disturbance. He even had
corroborating video showing the altercation. Both the inter-
views and videos confirmed that Schimandle grabbed C.G.,
placed him in a bear hug, and pushed him through a double
set of doors, supporting an inference Schimandle caused bod-
ily harm to C.G. and showing that he had physical contact
with C.G.
Unlike in Gaddis, Duehning did not believe Schimandle’s
conduct was ongoing or a problem beyond this isolated inci-
dent. Also unlike that case, Schimandle told Duehning that he
placed C.G. in a bear hug. Thus, Schimandle admitted to some
of the elements of Illinois battery, while the plaintiff in Gaddis
did not admit to the elements of a crime. The information

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No. 23-2151 13
provided to and collected by Duehning in his investigation
made it reasonable for him to believe probable cause existed
to arrest Schimandle for battery.
Moreover, the magistrate judge’s approval of the arrest
warrant bolsters the officer’s reasonable belief that probable
cause supported the warrant and the application of qualified
immunity. Cf. Fleming, 674 F.3d at 881 (explaining the fact that
the officer had consulted with the District Attorney prior to
arresting the plaintiff-arrestee “goes a long way toward solid-
ifying his qualified immunity defense”); see also Johnson v. My-
ers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1070 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022) (same); Burritt v.
Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 251 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). The Su-
preme Court has noted that “[w]here the alleged Fourth
Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant
to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a
warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an
objectively reasonable manner or … in ‘objective good faith.’”
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (citing
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)); see also Socha
v. City of Joliet, 107 F.4th 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2024). We heed that
direction and give credence to the magistrate judge’s determi-
nation here.
Last, Schimandle agrees that his Illinois state law claim for
malicious prosecution stands or falls on the existence of
arguable probable cause for his arrest. See Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellant at 23, Schimandle v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No.
23-2151 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023), ECF No. 9. Other than this
concession, the parties do not discuss this claim. Given this
lack of development, and our conclusion that arguable prob-
able cause existed here, we do not disagree with this conces-
sion.

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14 No. 23-2151
B
Schimandle lodges two additional arguments. He con-
tends that even if there was at least arguable probable cause,
Duehning is not entitled to qualified immunity because he fal-
sified information and intentionally omitted material, excul-
patory evidence from the warrant affidavits.
Falsifying the factual basis for a warrant violates the
Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978) (holding a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is
unreasonable if the affidavit supporting the warrants contains
deliberate “falsity or reckless disregard” for the truth); see also
Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019); Hart v.
Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2015). This rule applies
equally to material omissions. See United States v. Glover, 755
F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879
(“[A]n official violates the Fourth Amendment by intention-
ally or recklessly omitting from a warrant application infor-
mation that is material to determining probable cause.”).
Schimandle provides little information as to what those
false statements or material omissions were.4 Viewing his ar-
guments in their best light, he seems to contend that the falsi-
fications or omissions were: (1) that Duehning noted
Schimandle’s testimony was “consistent” with the video yet
still signed affidavits for an arrest warrant; and (2) that
Duehning knew about and omitted Schimandle’s claimed af-
firmative defense under 105 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/24-24 (a statute
permitting teachers and other qualified individuals in schools
4 At oral argument, we inquired as to the nature of the omissions, but
Schimandle’s counsel did not offer an explanation. See Oral Arg. at 6:10–
7:28.

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No. 23-2151 15
to use “reasonable force” to maintain safety in some situa-
tions). Neither argument has merit.
First, Schimandle states that Duehning reported,
“Schimandle’s account was similar to his written statement of
events and is consistent to what the surveillance video de-
picts.” This argument has two parts. The court should con-
clude that Duehning believed Schimandle’s description of the
incident matched what the surveillance videos showed. So,
Duehning must have falsified information on the affidavits by
determining Schimandle committed battery because the
video did not depict a battery.
The problem is that the videos only show clips of the al-
tercation between Schimandle and C.G. Duehning had no ev-
idence of what happened before the altercation began. The
videos started too late, and the witnesses did not see anything
until Schimandle already had C.G. in a bear hug. Addition-
ally, there is no audio recording of the conversation between
Schimandle and C.G., so there is no way to tell what Schiman-
dle and C.G. are saying, if anything. Duehning had to make
his own conclusions and could not have fully adopted
Schimandle’s version of events because he had no evidence
beyond Schimandle’s account of the conversation occurring
during the altercation. Duehning would have also gleaned
additional facts from the videos that are not reported in
Schimandle’s version of events. These additional facts are
consistent with Schimandle’s version of events but provide
further support for the elements of battery. One example is
the portion of the video showing Schimandle pushing C.G.
through the room divider in Schimandle’s attempt to grab
C.G. and stop him from fleeing. Schimandle did not discuss
this part of the altercation, but Duehning would have seen it

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16 No. 23-2151
in the video and been able to draw his own conclusion based
on such information. Therefore, this argument does not
support the contention that Duehning falsified information
because the video and Duehning’s attestations did not contra-
dict the affidavits for an arrest warrant.
Second, Schimandle argues that Duehning knew or
should have known about Schimandle’s claimed affirmative
defense under 105 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/24-24 and that Duehning
purposely omitted it from the affidavits supporting Schiman-
dle’s arrest warrant.
We are far from certain that statute provides an affirma-
tive defense in this type of action. Even assuming that it could
apply, once a law enforcement officer discovers sufficient
facts to establish probable cause, he has no constitutional ob-
ligation to conduct any further investigation in the hope of
discovering exculpatory evidence or possible defenses. See
Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Madero
v. McGuinness, 97 F.4th 516, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2024). An officer
“‘may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the ex-
istence of an affirmative defense,’” but the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes no duty to investigate whether a valid defense
exists. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061
(7th Cir. 2004)); see also Madero, 97 F.4th at 523; Doe v. Gray, 75
F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023).
Moreover, the existence and validity of an affirmative de-
fense does not necessarily negate probable cause to arrest. See
Humphrey, 148 F.3d at 724 (validity of affirmative defense is
irrelevant to whether police officer sued for false arrest had
probable cause to make arrest). The “[p]olice are entitled to
leave to the criminal process the full examination of potential

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No. 23-2151 17
defenses[,]” Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2012),
and “[a] person’s ability to explain away seemingly damning
facts does not negate the existence of probable cause, even
though it might provide a good defense should the case go to
trial.” Deng v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 552 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.
2009).
Plus, there is no evidence that Duehning knew teachers
could use force against students in certain situations.
Schimandle does not allege that he told Duehning about his
authority to restrain C.G. or that anyone else told Duehning.
He just asserts that Duehning “knew or should have known”
about the defense. After viewing the videos, questioning
Schimandle and other witnesses, and reasonably determining
probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle for battery,
Duehning did not need to investigate possible defenses and
their potential application. See Madero, 97 F.4th at 523.
Even if Duehning should have investigated possible
affirmative defenses and included that information in the af-
fidavits, it would not have changed the probable cause deter-
mination. Again, only omitting material facts violates the
Fourth Amendment. See Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879; Glover, 755
F.3d at 820. “[A]n omitted fact is material if its inclusion
would have negated probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596
F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010). We weigh materiality by asking
“whether a hypothetical affidavit that included the omitted
material would still establish probable cause.” Hart, 798 F.3d
at 593.
Information about the claimed affirmative defense was ul-
timately immaterial. Duehning would have had to consider
whether Schimandle’s use of force was reasonable, one way
or the other.

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18 No. 23-2151
An objectively reasonable officer could still find probable
cause in the face of Schimandle’s affirmative defense.
Schimandle admitted to placing C.G. in a bear hug, and the
video shows Schimandle moving with C.G. through a door-
way, then Schimandle later falling on top of C.G. That could
be enough to show willful and wanton conduct that may not
fall under the affirmative defense Schimandle raised. So even
assuming omission, that omission does not negate probable
cause and is immaterial. See, e.g., id. at 592–93 (omission of ex-
culpatory information from affidavit was immaterial because
the omitted information did not change the probable cause
determination). Duehning was not required to include
Schimandle’s affirmative defense in the affidavits for an arrest
warrant.
* * *
“Rarely do we see qualified immunity awarded at the
pleading stage.” Roldan v. Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 337 (7th Cir.
2022); see Reed, 906 F.3d at 548. That is because whether qual-
ified immunity applies “most often depend on facts a plaintiff
is not required to plead at the outset of litigation to avoid
dismissal.” Roldan, 52 F.4th at 337. But here, the district court
appropriately analyzed videos of the incident, witness testi-
mony, and reports incorporated in Schimandle’s pleadings.
That substantial evidence allowed the district court—and us
now—to consider and recognize qualified immunity at this
stage.
III
We conclude by noting that despite this prosecution end-
ing with Schimandle’s vindication—he is not guilty of the
charged offense—Schimandle lost his job and endured

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No. 23-2151 19
prosecution and scrutiny. Notwithstanding the difficulties
Schimandle faced, the law of qualified immunity compels an
affirmance here. Because arguable probable cause supported
Schimandle’s arrest, entitling Duehning to qualified immun-
ity and barring Schimandle’s malicious prosecution claim, we
A FFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Schimandle’s com-
plaint.

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