Mattie T. Lomax v. Richard Jardin, d/b/a GOOD ENERGY HOLDINGS

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 28, 2024 *
Decided August 28, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3320
MATTIE T. LOMAX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD JARDIN, d/b/a GOOD
ENERGY HOLDINGS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-07277
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-3320 Page 2
O R D E R
Mattie Lomax brought this suit against her landlord. The district court dismissed
it after Lomax ignored orders designed to correct defects in her complaint, despite
warnings from the court that ignoring the orders would lead to dismissal. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case, we affirm.
Lomax’s initial federal complaint against her landlord contained several
problems. To start, the filing was titled “Motion to Remove,” but it cited 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (the statute authorizing a change of venue). The opening paragraph likewise
states that Lomax wished to “remove this matter to the Northern District of Illinois.”
Despite the reference to removal, Lomax did not file the state-court documents that
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) requires in removal cases. In addition, the only federal law
mentioned was the Fair Housing Act, but Lomax did not assert how the landlord
violated that statute. Lomax accompanied her complaint with a request to proceed in
forma pauperis.
Given the confusion of Lomax’s filing, the district court gave her a roadmap for
proceeding, and warned her that a “failure to comply will lead to dismissal.” First, the
court gave Lomax an opportunity to amend her complaint, which she filed along with a
motion for summary judgment. The amended complaint sought relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 because, Lomax alleged, her landlord had sexually assaulted her. Next, the court
reviewed Lomax’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and ruled that it was
incomplete because Lomax did not adequately state her employment history. It granted
Lomax “leave to file an updated application to proceed in forma pauperis, and an
amended complaint,” warning that failure to submit these two documents by the
deadline it set “will lead to dismissal.” The court also denied Lomax’s motion for
summary judgment as premature.
Lomax did not heed the court’s warning. Although she updated her application
to proceed in forma pauperis, her filing did not include her amended complaint. The
court concluded that Lomax lacked the financial resources to pay the filing fee, but it
dismissed the case because Lomax did not comply with its order to file both the
application and amended complaint. Lomax moved to reconsider. The court stated that
it would consider reopening the case once Lomax submitted her amended complaint.
Again, Lomax did not comply with the court’s order. Instead of filing an amended
complaint, she filed another motion to reconsider the court’s denial of her application to
proceed in forma pauperis—even though the court had told her that the problem was

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No. 23-3320 Page 3
not her financial status, but rather that she failed to file an amended complaint. The
court then dismissed the case because Lomax failed to follow its order.
Lomax appeals the district court’s dismissal of her case, but she does not raise
any discernable arguments for reversal. Instead, she argues that the court should have
granted her motion for summary judgment. Although she is pro se, Lomax is required
to comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure by, among other
things, developing an argument explaining why the district court’s decision was
incorrect. See Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022). Because Lomax does not
do so, we could dismiss the appeal. But we prefer to decide cases on the merits when
we can, see id., and we do so here.
The district court has inherent power to manage its docket, and with that power
comes the discretionary authority to dismiss a case for failure to obey reasonable orders.
Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1104 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the district court did not abuse
its discretion. It twice ordered Lomax to submit her amended complaint: first, it ordered
her to do so along with her updated application to proceed in forma pauperis; second, it
told her to file the amended complaint when it concluded that Lomax met the financial
requirements to proceed in forma pauperis. Lomax twice failed to do so, despite the
warning that failure will lead to dismissal. She filed her updated application without
the amended complaint. And then she moved to reconsider the court’s ruling on her
application (even though the court accepted that she lacked the financial resources to
pay the filing fees upfront) still without submitting her amended complaint. We are
mindful of Lomax’s status as a pro se litigant, but she is still required to follow the
court’s orders. See DJM Logistics, Inc. v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 39 F.4th 408, 415
(7th Cir. 2022). We also recognize that Lomax had filed an amended complaint earlier in
the case. But judges are permitted to order litigants to resubmit or cite key documents
rather than have to root out the documents themselves. See Gross v. Town of Cicero,
619 F.3d 697, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2010).
We close by noting that even if the district court had reviewed the amended
complaint that Lomax filed earlier in the case, it would not have survived screening
because it fails to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In the amended
complaint, Lomax alleges that her landlord violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by sexually
assaulting her. But a § 1983 defendant must be one who allegedly acts “under color of
state law.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). Lomax’s
landlord appears to be a private person, and she did not contend, either in the district
court or in her brief on appeal, that he acted under color of state law. The amended

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complaint also names a police officer as a defendant, but Lomax alleges only that the
officer was called to speak to her; she does not allege what the officer did wrong, let
alone that he violated a constitutional right. This is fatal because a suit under § 1983
requires an allegation that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right protected by
federal law. See Jones v. Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

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