CALVIN JACKSON and LATISHA BRADLEY v. Connor Giesler

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 11, 2024*
Decided September 13, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1304
CALVIN JACKSON and LATISHA
BRADLEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CONNOR GIESLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:21-cv-00074-MPB-CSW
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Calvin Jackson and Latisha Bradley, former romantic partners who share a child,
appeal the district judge’s entry of summary judgment rejecting their claims that
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1304 Page 2
Connor Giesler, an Indiana State Police Trooper, infringed upon their rights under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Jackson and Bradley, the
non-moving parties. See Navratil v. City of Racine, 101 F.4th 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2024). On
May 2, 2019, two local police officers responded to a reported domestic disturbance in a
vehicle outside a retirement home in Jasper, Indiana. Approximately ten minutes later,
Giesler was dispatched to the scene. Giesler and the officers arrived to find Jackson and
Bradley in the retirement home’s parking lot. Jackson and Bradley say they were
praying at the time, and that the officers told them to stop praying and exit their
vehicle.
After Jackson refused to identify himself to the officers, he was placed in
handcuffs. Jackson could not specify who placed him under arrest, but he stated in his
deposition that his arm was “twisted” in the process, and he was told that “they w[ere]
going to make the handcuffs tighter.” Jackson also says that one of the officers
commented, “you people,” which he understood as a reference to Black people.
Thereafter, the officers confirmed Jackson’s and Bradley’s identities and learned
that Bradley had a temporary protection order against Jackson. The officers informed
dispatch that Jackson had showed up unexpectedly at Bradley’s workplace to argue
about child custody; Jackson and Bradley, however, deny this representation. The
officers verified that both felt safe and allowed Bradley to leave. They released Jackson
next. Giesler was at the scene for about fifteen minutes.
In April 2021, Jackson and Bradley sued Giesler and the city of Jasper1 under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for infringing upon their right to free exercise under the First
Amendment, conducting an unreasonable seizure with excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, and denying them equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. They also brought state law claims for assault and battery.
Jackson personally served Giesler with the summons and complaint on July 9,
2021. On August 2, Giesler—mistakenly thinking that the answer was due that day—
moved to extend the time to file his answer. That same day, Jackson and Bradley moved
for default judgment, arguing that Giesler had not filed his answer within the requisite
21-day window under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district
judge granted Giesler’s motion for good cause (given the extensive nature of the
1 Jackson and Bradley have since settled with the city.

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No. 24-1304 Page 3
allegations and Giesler’s excusable neglect) and denied the plaintiffs’ motion as
premature.
Giesler then moved for summary judgment on the ground that Jackson and
Bradley failed to establish that he violated their constitutional rights. Jackson and
Bradley countered by again questioning the timeliness of Giesler’s answer. They also
challenged his submitted evidence: They asserted that (1) his exhibits failed to show
that a 911 call—allegedly coerced by Giesler—was made on the date of the incident, and
(2) any statements made at their depositions were not admissible because the
documents were not signed or certified.
The district judge granted Giesler’s motion for summary judgment because
Jackson and Bradley had not provided evidence that Giesler was personally involved in
any of the alleged constitutional violations. First, the judge concluded that the evidence
did not support a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim because no
reasonable jury could find that Giesler was the officer who handcuffed Jackson. The
judge also rejected Jackson’s excessive force claim because, even if Giesler had
handcuffed him, Giesler would be entitled to qualified immunity since there was no
indication that he inflicted unnecessary pain on Jackson. Second, the judge determined
that Jackson’s equal protection claim failed because he produced no evidence that
Giesler was the officer who made the “you people” comment, and regardless, that
statement alone was not enough to show purposeful discrimination. Finally, the judge
rejected the free exercise claim because there was no evidence that prayer was a
motivating factor in Giesler’s decision to act.
On appeal Jackson and Bradley maintain that the district judge should have
granted their motion for default judgment based on the untimeliness of Giesler’s
responsive pleading. They continue to insist that Giesler had to respond by July 31, and
his failure to do so entitled them to judgment in their favor.
Denial of their motion, however, was appropriate. Default judgment is a drastic
sanction that is an unsuitable remedy for mere mistakes or inadvertence. See e360
Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2011). Judges have “wide
latitude,” Nartey v. Franciscan Health Hosp., 2 F.4th 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2021), to
assess whether a delay amounts to excusable neglect by considering the extent of the
delay, the reason for the delay, and any prejudice from a delay, as well as the movant's
good faith, see Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2012). Here the judge was
well within his discretion to excuse Giesler’s delay based on the minimal disruption
wrought by the missed deadline (one day) and Giesler’s good faith effort to timely file.

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No. 24-1304 Page 4
Jackson and Bradley next generally challenge the judge’s handling of two pieces
of evidence of uncertain significance. First, they assert that the exhibits provided at
summary judgment failed to include evidence of the 911 call—purportedly coerced by
Giesler—that led to the officers’ dispatch to the scene. Second, Jackson and Bradley
argue that the judge improperly relied on unsigned and uncertified depositions
provided by Giesler, and that the depositions contained unspecified mistakes that
created a genuine dispute of material fact. Although we construe pro se filings liberally,
we will not entertain undeveloped arguments. F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8); see Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED

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