Ricardo Pittman v. United States Postal Service

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 20, 2024 *
Decided September 24, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1088
RICARDO PITTMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-1433
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ricardo Pittman sued the United States and others, alleging that they negligently
handled his mail, defamed him, and wrongly banned him from entering part of a post
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1088 Page 2
office. The district court correctly dismissed Pittman’s suit because Pittman did not state
a claim for which relief could be granted; thus, we affirm.
We recount the facts from Pittman’s operative complaint, accepting all well-
pleaded facts as true and drawing all inferences in his favor. Huri v. Off. of the Chief
Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2015). In March 2019,
Pittman went to Evergreen Park’s post office and complained that he was not receiving
mail. The supervisor there reported to the police that Pittman was harassing customers
and employees. Because of the harassment, the supervisor told Pittman that he could
access his own mailbox at Evergreen’s location, but he could not enter the main office or
receiving area. She also warned him that she would pursue complaints against him for
trespass if he did not comply. Pittman responded by filing police reports of his own,
accusing the supervisor of discrimination and the United States Postal Service of
ignoring his complaints.
This suit came next. As relevant on appeal, Pittman asserted that, by interfering
with his mail and banning him from a post office (allegedly because he is black), the
defendants violated his right to due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violated his right to
non-discrimination in a place of public accommodation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and
defamed him. After he failed to follow orders that he show proof of proper service on
one defendant (the supervisor), the district court dismissed her. The court then granted
a motion to dismiss from the other defendants, concluding that Pittman did not state a
claim under § 1983 (because it applies only to state actors) or § 2000a (because the post
office is not a place of public accommodation). The court allowed Pittman leave to
amend his complaint to assert tort claims about federal employees that conformed to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679. Pittman amended his complaint,
repeating his §§ 1983 and 2000a claims and adding tort claims against the United States,
federal employees, and the United States Postal Service.
The defendants successfully moved to dismiss the case. The court repeated that
the supervisor remained dismissed for improper service and that claims under § 1983
failed because the defendants were federal, not state, actors. It also explained that,
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Pittman could bring tort claims against only the
United States, not persons or agencies, and Pittman’s asserted torts did not fall within
the limited waiver of the United States’s sovereign immunity. Finally, the court again
dismissed Pittman’s § 2000a claim. Pittman timely appealed.

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No. 24-1088 Page 3
We begin our analysis with a threshold issue. The Federal Tort Claims Act
requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before suing in federal court,
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), and, as the government argued in the district court, the record
suggests that Pittman failed to do so here. But the district court bypassed the issue, and
we may do so as well. The Act’s exhaustion requirement “is not jurisdictional” and “can
be waived or forfeited, or otherwise forgiven.” Glade ex rel. Lundskow v. United States,
692 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779,
786–87 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional
prerequisite but “condition precedent to the plaintiff’s ability to prevail”). Because the
merits are straightforward, we proceed to them.
We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, Huri, 804 F.3d at 829, and begin
with Pittman’s tort claims. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the sole remedy for
“the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1); see also
Duffy v. United States, 966 F.2d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 1992) (The Act applies both to negligent
acts and intentional torts.). The only proper defendant under the Act is the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; see Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 509–10 (2013). When
federal employees are sued, the Attorney General is empowered to substitute the
United States as a defendant in place of the federal employees after certifying that the
employees acted within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).
Certification was unnecessary here, however, because Pittman named the United States
in his operative complaint. See Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2008). Still,
the United States was the only proper defendant, and so the court rightly dismissed
claims against other defendants for any alleged official-act torts. See id.
The tort claims against the United States (encompassing alleged liability for the
Postal Service, see 39 U.S.C. § 409(c); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 483–84
(2006)), also fail. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity unless it is waived.
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 484–85. And the United States has not waived its immunity for the
torts Pittman alleges: He asserts that federal employees did not deliver his mail and
defamed him by reporting him to the police and banning him from part of a post office.
But the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act excludes any
“claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter” and any “claim arising out of … libel, slander, [or] misrepresentation.”
28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), (h).

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No. 24-1088 Page 4
Next, we address Pittman’s claim under § 1983 for a violation of his right to due
process. As the district court ruled, § 1983 applies only to state actors, see District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973), and the defendants are all federal actors.
Besides, the due process clause is not an independent source of relief against public
actors for their unauthorized torts. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700–01 (1976).
Finally, we address Pittman’s claim that the supervisor excluded him from part
of Evergreen’s post office because of his race. The Federal Tort Claims Act is not a
source of relief because it applies only to state-law torts, see F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 477–78 (1994), not federal substantive law. Pittman does not contend that racial
discrimination is tortious under the common law of Illinois. Pittman cited federal
substantive law—the public-accommodations provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. But he
does not respond to the argument that a federal post office is not a place of public
accommodation under that law. Section 2000a(b) defines a “public accommodation” as
a place of lodging, eating, or entertainment. Because Pittman does not provide us with a
meaningful basis to disagree with the district court’s analysis, we will not disturb its
judgment. We are mindful that Pittman is a pro se litigant, but it is not our role to craft
parties’ arguments for them. See Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
We have considered Pittman’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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