United States of America v. Jessica Arong O’brien

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2024*
Decided October 2, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2267
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESSICA ARONG O’BRIEN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JUDGES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM and
STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,
Parties-in-Interest.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17 CR 239-1
Thomas M. Durkin,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2267 Page 2
O R D E R
Jessica O’Brien appeals the district court’s approval of the government’s motion
to turn over assets from her retirement accounts to satisfy her restitution debt. The court
properly ruled that, consistent with her sentencing judgment, it could order O’Brien to
satisfy her restitution by turning over those retirement assets; thus we affirm.
This dispute stems from O’Brien’s convictions for mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, which we affirmed. United States v. O’Brien, 953 F.3d
449 (7th Cir. 2020). After O’Brien was released from her prison term, the government
moved for an order that O’Brien’s two state retirement accounts turn over a lump sum
of about $117,000 to apply to her outstanding restitution judgment. That judgment
required her to pay the restitution amount of $660,000 in a “lump sum” within 30 days
“after release from imprisonment,” consistent with the court’s payment plan. The plan
scheduled monthly installments of “at least” 10% of her net monthly income.
O’Brien objected to the motion on three grounds. First, she characterized it as an
improper modification of her restitution judgment, which she interpreted as limited to
10% of her net monthly income, without regard to her available assets. Second, she
argued that accessing the retirement funds would impose a heavy tax obligation on her
and deprive her family of their survivorship rights in the accounts. Finally, she
contended that she had a right to a hearing on the matter.
The district court rejected these arguments and granted the motion. It explained
that O’Brien’s restitution debt obligated her to pay as much as she can now and the
government can access any nonexempt assets, including retirement savings, to satisfy
that debt. Moreover, tax liability and the potential future property interest of O’Brien’s
family did not affect the government’s entitlement to her retirement funds. Finally,
because the court did not change her judgment, O’Brien had no right to a hearing.
We pause to comment on two matters outside the scope of this appeal. First, in
the district court, O’Brien moved to reconsider the turnover order and, before the court
ruled, appealed it. We stayed proceedings in this court while the district court resolved
her motion to reconsider. Once it did, O’Brien never filed a fresh appeal of the district
court’s denial of any motion for reconsideration. Because her notice of appeal addresses
only the district court’s original grant of the government’s turnover motion, we do not
address the motion to reconsider. See Fogel v. Gordon & Glickson, P.C., 393 F.3d 727, 731
(7th Cir. 2004). Second, many of O’Brien’s arguments on appeal dispute the calculation
of restitution and relitigate her charges by alleging prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective

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No. 23-2267 Page 3
assistance of counsel, and government suppression of evidence. This appeal, though,
concerns only whether the government may reach O’Brien’s retirement assets to satisfy
the restitution judgment. Any challenges to O’Brien’s conviction or how the sentencing
court computed the restitution amount are beyond this appeal.
O’Brien’s only relevant contention on appeal is unpersuasive. She argues that the
government waived a right to her retirement accounts because her accounts are not
listed in the restitution order as sources of repayment; thus the district court modified
the judgment impermissibly through the turnover order. But she cites no authority for
her assertion that a criminal judgment must specify all assets from which the
government may satisfy restitution. Nor could she, for 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) specifies that
an order of restitution is a “lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights
to property of the person fined.” See Stacy v. United States, 70 F.4th 369, 377 (7th Cir.
2023). This entitles the government to seek a lump-sum distribution from retirement
funds. United States v. Sayyed, 862 F.3d 615, 619–20 (7th Cir. 2017). Given this authority,
and the judgment’s decree that O’Brien pay restitution from available assets in a lump
sum 30 days after her release from prison, the court’s order that O’Brien’s retirement
accounts turn over assets was thus a proper exercise of its power to enforce the
restitution debt of $660,000. With O’Brien developing no further, relevant challenges to
the turnover order, we have no reason to disturb it.
AFFIRMED.

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