United States of America v. Alfredo Longoria

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2024*
Decided October 3, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALFREDO LONGORIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 01-cr-1115-6
Andrea R. Wood,
Judge.
O R D E R
Alfredo Longoria, a federal inmate, appeals the denial of his motion to reduce his
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 24-1012 Page 2
Guidelines. Because the district court correctly concluded that the amendment did not
reduce his sentencing range, we affirm.
In 2002, Longoria was convicted after a jury trial of one count of conspiring to
distribute more than one kilogram of phencyclidine (“PCP”), 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count
of distributing more than 100 grams of PCP, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and four counts of
possessing with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of PCP, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
At sentencing, the district court found that Longoria possessed at least 30
kilograms of PCP, and using the Drug Quantity Table in effect at the time, U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c) (2002), the court applied a base offense level of 38. The court then added four
offense levels for Longoria’s role as a “leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
more participants,” § 3B1.1(a), two levels for using a minor to commit the offenses,
§ 3B1.4, and two more levels for possessing a dangerous weapon, § 2D1.1(b)(1). This
resulted in a final offense level of 46 (capped at 43 in the Sentencing Table), and given
Longoria’s criminal history category of II, the Guidelines called for a life sentence. The
court imposed a life term for count one, and forty years for each remaining count, to
run concurrently. While Longoria’s direct appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
issued United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory. After a limited remand, see United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,
483–84 (7th Cir. 2005), we ordered resentencing.
On remand, the district court imposed a below-range sentence of 50 years’
imprisonment for count one. Longoria again appealed on grounds including that the
sentence was based on an improper judicial finding of the quantity of PCP. We
disagreed with that contention and ruled that under Booker, “judicial factual findings
that raise a guideline range do not violate the Sixth Amendment as long as the
sentencing court recognizes that the range is advisory.” United States v. Longoria, 229 F.
App’x 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2007). Rejecting Longoria’s remaining arguments, we affirmed
the sentence. Longoria next sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court
denied, and we, like the district court, declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
United States v. Longoria, No. 08-3671 (7th Cir. Apr. 28, 2009).
In November 2021, Longoria moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), which
reduced the offense levels under § 2D1.1 for each drug-quantity tier. He supplemented
the motion with letters to the court from two family members describing his
rehabilitation and the hardship his incarceration has caused his family.

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 24-1012 Page 3
The district court denied the motion, ruling that Amendment 782 did not change
Longoria’s sentencing range and that he is therefore ineligible for a sentencing
modification. Longoria appeals, and we review the denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Guerrero, 946 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2020).
Longoria’s three arguments do not persuade us that the district court abused its
discretion here. First, Longoria appears to argue that the district court erred during the
resentencing by making findings about the quantity of PCP. We already rejected this
argument on direct appeal, United States v. Longoria, 229 F. App’x 408, 411 (7th Cir.
2007), and that was the appropriate time to raise the issue. An appellant may not use a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion to challenge the original sentence. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 831 (2010).
Longoria next argues that we should interpret Amendment 782 to lower his base
offense level to 34. We understand him to argue that Amendment 782 amended the
Drug Quantity Table twice: first, by setting the offense level for between 30 and 90
kilograms of PCP at 36; second, by replacing the phrase “Level 36” with “Level 34.”
Longoria misreads the text. Amendment 782 simply shifted the offense level for his
drug-quantity range, 30 to 90 kilograms of PCP, down by two levels from 38 to 36.
From there, the upward adjustments that the district court applied raise the total
offense level to 44, and the Sentencing Table still prescribes a life sentence for that level
regardless of criminal history category. Therefore, although Amendment 782 lowered
the base offense level, it did not lower the final sentencing range. United States v.
McCarroll, 811 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 2016). Longoria is thus ineligible for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(2).
Next, Longoria describes personal circumstances that would be relevant to a
§ 3553(a) analysis, but we do not reach that step. A district court may consider the
§ 3553(a) factors only if the defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence. U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10; Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826–27. The district court correctly ruled that Longoria was
ineligible, so it is not appropriate to consider the discretionary factors under § 3553(a).
Finally, after briefing closed, Longoria moved for recruitment of appellate
counsel to assist him in arguing what he characterizes as complex issues. But Longoria
presented his arguments adequately, and under existing law, the issues are
straightforward. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). We
therefore deny the motion.

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 24-1012 Page 4
A final note: the government’s briefing relies on information that comes from the
presentence investigation report and resentencing hearing transcripts. When the
government filed its brief, those documents were not in the electronic record, which is
common in cases that originated before the CM/ECF system. Because the parties did not
supply these documents in an appendix, we had to order supplementation of the
record. Parties should be aware that obtaining hard-copy documents outside the
electronic record is not a simple task for this court. We remind the parties of their
responsibility under Circuit Rule 10(a)(3): “Counsel must ensure, within 21 days of
filing the notice of appeal, that all electronic and non-electronic documents necessary
for review on appeal are on the district court docket.” This is especially true when a
party bases its arguments on those documents, as the government did here.
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s motion to recruit
counsel, Doc. 25, is DENIED

-- 4 of 4 --