Keon Lipscomb v. Global Tel Link

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2024*
Decided October 4, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3303
KEON LIPSCOMB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GLOBAL TEL LINK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-cv-1152
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Keon Lipscomb, an Illinois inmate, alleges he has been denied access to content
on an electronic tablet sold by the telecommunications company, Global Tel Link
(“GTL”). He invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued GTL and officials at the Illinois
Department of Corrections for constitutional violations in connection with the restricted
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3303 Page 2
content. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm
in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
We accept the facts alleged in Lipscomb’s complaint as true and review them in
the light most favorable to him. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522
(7th Cir. 2023). Lipscomb, who is incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center in
Chester, Illinois, bought an electronic tablet, which GTL advertised at the prison as
containing unlimited books, movies, songs, and applications. But when he tried to use
his tablet to access this content—for example, the Qur’an, a James Patterson book, and
various music—most of his requests resulted in a message stating “error” or
“restricted.” Lipscomb was particularly upset that his request for access to the Qur’an
was rejected as “restricted.” He filed grievances with the prison over the restrictions but
never received a remedy or an explanation.
Lipscomb then brought this suit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause,
Equal Protection Clause, and First Amendment. He also brought three claims under
state law.
The district judge screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it
for failure to state a claim. With regard to Lipscomb’s First Amendment claim, the judge
acknowledged that a similar claim filed by another prisoner in the Southern District of
Illinois had been allowed to proceed past screening. See Fejerang v. G.T.L., No. 23-CV-
01283-SMY, 2023 WL 6605476, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2023). The judge, however, stated
that he disagreed with the Southern District’s determination because a prisoner has no
constitutional right “to receive and consume various media by a specific method of a
prisoner’s choosing.”
From there, the judge read Lipscomb’s complaint as alleging only he could not
access the desired materials on the GTL tablet, not that any defendant or the Illinois
Department of Corrections imposed a broader denial on access to the Qur’an or any
other approved book, song, or film. As for Lipscomb’s claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the judge concluded the allegations did not support any theory of relief.
Finally, the court concluded the facts were clearly alleged, and allowing
amendment would be futile. The court then relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over
the state-based claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

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No. 23-3303 Page 3
On appeal, Lipscomb challenges the district judge’s dismissal of his complaint.
He asserts that the judge glossed over his constitutional claims, disregarded his rights
to access religious materials, and reached a decision on his First Amendment claim that
was inconsistent with the Southern District’s ruling in Fejerang.
We begin with Lipscomb’s First Amendment claim regarding restricted access to
content on his tablet. The First Amendment right to free speech generally includes the
right to read. See Miller v. Downey, 915 F.3d 460, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2019) (periodicals); King
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2005) (books); see also Brown v.
Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2015) (movies and video games); Lindell v. Frank,
377 F.3d 655, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2004) (picture postcards). But we cannot tell from
Lipscomb’s complaint whether he alleged an outright denial of access to materials like
the Qur’an (a claim that implicates the First Amendment) or instead whether his
complaint is that the GTL tablet did not contain the materials he expected it to contain
(a claim better understood as a matter of contract law).
Presuming the latter, the district court concluded that Lipscomb could not state a
First Amendment claim, and that further opportunity to amend would be futile. We
have stated, however, that it is “a somewhat unorthodox practice” to close a case at its
first dismissal, Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2008), and
in pro se prisoner cases, deficient pleadings should be dismissed “with leave to replead,
rather than … with prejudice.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2015); Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d
1014 (7th Cir. 2013). Under these circumstances, we believe that the case should be
remanded so that Lipscomb has an opportunity to amend his complaint and clarify the
nature of his First Amendment restricted-access claim.
Lipscomb next challenges the dismissal of his claim under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. But to state a free exercise claim, Lipscomb needed to
allege that his religious practice has been substantially burdened by the restrictions on
his tablet, see Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2013), and this he has not
done.
Lastly, we also agree with the district court that Lipscomb’s allegations did not
give rise to a claim under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

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No. 23-3303 Page 4
We therefore VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Lipscomb’s First
Amendment restricted-access claim, AFFIRM in all other respects, and REMAND for
further proceedings.

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