United States of America v. Darren Hall

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2024
Decided October 4, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1239
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DARREN HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:18-CR-30058-DWD
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Darren Hall appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised
release. But his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant counsel’s motion
and dismiss Hall’s appeal.
A defendant who appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified
constitutional right to counsel, so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 24-1239 Page 2
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–90 (1973). Even so, our practice is to apply them.
See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the
nature of the appeal and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be
expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Hall did not
respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In 2023, Hall violated the conditions of his supervised release after serving time
in prison for conspiring to structure financial transactions, see 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3);
18 U.S.C. § 371, and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
He admitted to (1) making false statements, (2) unlawfully possessing marihuana, (3)
leaving the judicial district without permission, (4) failing to submit written monthly
reports, and (5) failing to notify his probation officer of a change of employment. The
district judge sentenced him to two consecutive sentences of 22 months in prison,
totaling 44 months, with no supervised release to follow.
After consulting with Hall, counsel represents that Hall does not wish to
challenge the basis for revocation. Counsel thus properly refrains from discussing
whether Hall’s admissions were knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Wheaton,
610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010).
Counsel considers whether Hall could raise any non-frivolous challenge to the
calculation of the sentence imposed at his revocation hearing. We review the
reasonableness of a revocation sentence under a “highly deferential” standard,
overturning it only if the sentence was “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39
F.4th 941, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022). And we agree with counsel that Hall’s sentence was
not procedurally unreasonable. The judge correctly determined that Hall’s most serious
violation—unlawful possession with intent to distribute marihuana—was a Grade A
violation, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1), which mandated revocation of supervised release,
see id. § 7B1.3(a)(1). For a defendant with a Grade A violation and a criminal history
category of V, the guideline range is 30 to 37 months. See id. § 7B1.4(a). But the statutory
maximum capped the sentence at 24 months because Hall’s original offenses, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and conspiracy to structure financial
transactions, were Class C and D felonies, respectively. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3),
3559(a)(3)–(4). The judge also appropriately exercised his discretion to impose
consecutive prison terms upon revoking Hall’s concurrent terms of supervised release.
See United States v. Deutsch, 403 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2005). And counsel rightly
concludes that Hall did not stand to benefit from any of the recent amendments to the

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 24-1239 Page 3
Guidelines, such as Amendment 821 (which requires judges to add only one point—
instead of two—to the criminal history score of a defendant like Hall who committed an
offense while under a criminal justice sentence, see U.S.S.G. A MEND. 821 (U.S. S ENT' G
C OMM ' N 2023); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e)), given that Hall’s sentence is limited by the
24-month statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Finally, counsel evaluates whether Hall could advance a non-frivolous argument
regarding the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence. We agree with counsel that
the judge adequately considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are
relevant to revocation proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court properly assessed
Hall’s history and characteristics (coming from a more advantaged background than
most defendants), the need for deterrence (supervised release failed to deter Hall from
continuing to deceive others), the need to protect the public (he was not a physical
danger to society), and Hall’s rehabilitation (not making use of supervised release or
maintaining lawful employment). Although the judge also alluded to promoting
“respect for the law,” a § 3553(a) factor not included in 18 U.S.C. § 3583, his remarks in
context reflect that he relied primarily on the enumerated factors. United States v. Clay,
752 F.3d 1106, 1108–09 (7th Cir. 2014).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 3 of 3 --