United States of America v. Chandler E. Saso

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024
Decided October 23, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHANDLER E. SASO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 21-CR-30019-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Chandler Saso drove an underage girl across state lines to have sex with her in
2021. Upon Saso’s arrest, law enforcement discovered sexually explicit videos of the
victim on Saso’s cell phones. He pleaded guilty to coercing the victim into sexual
conduct for the purpose of producing a digital video. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Saso appeals,
but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve,
and Saso has responded to counsel’s motion. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because counsel’s
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1041 Page 2
analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to subjects that counsel and Saso
discuss. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We conclude that Saso
has no arguable issues on appeal, and we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Saso’s conviction and sentence arose out of events in 2021, when Saso picked the
victim up in Sorento, Illinois, and drove her to Nebraska. Law enforcement located Saso
and the victim at a Nebraska rest stop and arrested Saso. The victim stated that she and
Saso had sex twice before Saso was arrested. Saso’s cell phones revealed sexually
explicit videos of the victim, including a video in which Saso coerced the victim into
sexual conduct. While Saso was initially charged only with transporting a minor with
intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the government later
added a charge for coercing the victim into sexual conduct in order to produce a digital
video, id. § 2251(a). In compliance with a plea agreement (which included an appeal
waiver), Saso pleaded guilty to the § 2251(a) charge in exchange for the dismissal of the
§ 2423(a) charge. Before sentencing, Saso moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that for
two reasons his plea was not knowing and voluntary: First, he argued that had he
known of a certain out-of-circuit case, he would not have pleaded guilty. The case is
United States v. Sanders, 966 F.3d 397, 406–07 (5th Cir. 2020), which Saso said holds that
the government must prove that a § 2251(a) defendant knew that the victim was a
minor. Second, he argued that he had not slept in the few days before the plea hearing
and was not thinking straight. The court rejected Saso’s arguments and sentenced Saso
to a below-guidelines prison term of 300 months and a within-guidelines life term of
supervised release.
Counsel first tells us that, although Saso wishes to challenge the validity of his
plea (and thus his appeal waiver), he cannot plausibly do so. As counsel correctly
concludes, Saso could not reasonably argue that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. See United States v. Chavers, 515 F.3d 722,
724 (7th Cir. 2008). We begin with Saso’s assertion in his motion to withdraw that he
was disoriented and sleep-deprived when he entered his plea. During that plea
colloquy, he swore that he was unimpaired and competent to plead guilty. We would
presume those statements to be the truth. See United States v. Logan, 244 F.3d 553, 558
(7th Cir. 2001). And Saso provided no “credible factual support” to rebut that
presumption or show that he lacked sleep or was confused when he pleaded guilty.
United States v. Milquette, 214 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2000). We recognize that the district
court did not confirm during the plea colloquy that Saso knew he did not have to plead
guilty. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B). But that omission could not have affected Saso’s
substantial rights, for Saso “knew he could plead not guilty because he previously had

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No. 24-1041 Page 3
pleaded not guilty.” United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 717 (7th Cir. 2020). Likewise, in
his plea agreement he acknowledged that he was waiving the right to plead not guilty.
See United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988).
Counsel also properly concludes that Saso could not plausibly contend that the
district court abused its discretion in rejecting Saso’s argument that he would not have
pleaded guilty had he known about the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sanders. First, unlike
Sanders, our precedent “contains no requirement” that the government must prove that
a defendant charged under § 2251(a) knew that the victim was a minor. United States v.
Johnson, 376 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 2004). Therefore the district court reasonably
concluded that Saso’s knowledge of Sanders would not have influenced his decision to
plead guilty. Second, “lawyers need not inform their clients of every possible defense,
argument, or tactic” for a guilty plea to be voluntary. St. Pierre v. Walls, 297 F.3d 617, 635
(7th Cir. 2002). Finally, and in any event, the district court did not clearly err—the
standard for reviewing findings “about the existence of a fair or just reason to withdraw
the plea,” see Chavers, 515 F.3d at 724—in finding that under Sanders the evidence
established that Saso knew the victim was a minor. As the court noted, Saso admitted in
a recorded interview that he knew the victim was born in 2005; thus he knew in 2021
that she was a minor.
Counsel next correctly discerns that any challenge to Saso’s sentence would be
fruitless because in his plea agreement he “waive[d] the right to … contest any aspect
of[] the conviction or sentence in any type of proceeding.” We do not review a sentence
in the face of an appeal waiver (which, as we said above, is valid) unless the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum or the record suggests that the court relied on a
constitutionally impermissible factor such as race. See Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d
1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999). Because neither of those exceptions is present, we may not
review Saso’s sentence.
Finally, in his response to counsel’s motion, Saso takes issue with his trial
counsel. He contends that counsel talked him into taking a plea and that his counsel
was otherwise deficient. These issues about the adequacy of trial counsel are best
reserved for collateral review, where a more fulsome evidentiary record can be
developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v.
McClinton, 23 F.4th 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2022).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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