Trustees of the N.e.c.a./local 145 I.b.e.w. Pension Plan v. Linda K. Mausser, individually and d/b/a QCA ELECTRIC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 30, 2024 *
Decided November 1, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1472
TRUSTEES OF THE N.E.C.A./LOCAL
145 I.B.E.W. PENSION PLAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LINDA K. MAUSSER, individually and
d/b/a QCA ELECTRIC,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:18-cv-04045-SLD-JEH
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
The Trustees of the National Electrical Contractors Association and the Local 145
I.B.E.W. Pension Plan (jointly “the Plan”) operate as a fringe-benefit collection agent for
funds administered by the Association’s Quad Cities Chapter (“N.E.C.A.”) and the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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I.B.E.W. Local No. 145 (“Union”). The Plan sued Linda Mausser under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001–1461, asserting that Mausser,
the sole proprietor of an electrical company bound by a collective bargaining agreement
between N.E.C.A. and the Union, failed to make pension contributions required under
the agreement. The district court granted the Plan’s motion for summary judgment on
Mausser’s liability, and after a bench trial, the court determined the exact amount of
contributions she owed. We affirm.
Mausser and her husband own a sole proprietorship doing business as
QCA Electric, for which her husband also performs electrical work. QCA Electric
operates under a collective bargaining agreement negotiated with N.E.C.A. and the
Union. The agreement requires Mausser to make certain contributions to the Plan for
every hour of electrical work performed by her husband. The Plan is a “multiemployer
plan” regulated by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(a), designed to allow employees in
unionized industries to participate in standard benefit plans and to encourage
employers to share the administrative burden of meting out benefits.
In 2015, QCA Electric was selected at random for a contractor-compliance audit
authorized by the collective bargaining agreement. As part of the audit, Mausser
needed to produce documentation verifying the accuracy of the hours she reported and
her contributions to the Plan. She did not provide the requested documentation and
stated that she did not possess any relevant company records.
The Plan sued Mausser to enforce the agreement’s requirement to comply with
the audit, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and to pay any delinquent contributions, interest, liquidated
damages, and audit and attorney’s fees, id. § 1145.
The district court later granted the Plan’s motion for summary judgment and
ordered Mausser to comply with the audit. The court explained that there was no
dispute that Mausser was obligated to make contributions: She signed a letter of assent
binding her to the terms of the agreement, including compliance with the audit. The
court determined, however, that there were disputed facts over the amount of
delinquent contributions owed.
The court held a trial to resolve whether and in what amount Mausser was
delinquent in her contributions. At trial, the Plan presented a third-party auditor’s
formula that used Mausser’s tax returns to calculate contributions owed. The Plan
requested contributions consistent with that formula, along with interest, liquidated
damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. On cross-examination, Mausser asked the auditor

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No. 24-1472 Page 3
whether a more reasonable calculation would subtract material costs from the gross
revenue reported on her tax returns (since pension contributions are due only for labor,
and QCA Electric’s gross revenue also included income from selling materials to clients,
not just labor). The auditor agreed that subtracting material costs would be more
reasonable. At the trial’s end, the court issued an order that set forth its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court agreed with Mausser that the auditor’s formula was
not a just and reasonable estimation of delinquent contributions, and that it would be
unjust to award contributions without subtracting the cost of materials from the gross
revenue. The court thus ordered the Plan to submit the auditor’s updated calculations
incorporating the subtraction of material costs.
After the Plan provided the auditor’s updated calculations, the court made
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. It ultimately approved the
auditor’s formula as a “just and reasonable” approximation of the contributions owed.
Further, the court determined that interest, audit costs, court costs, and attorney’s fees
were justified under ERISA’s terms. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B), (D), (E). In total, the court
awarded nearly $40,000 in unpaid contributions plus nearly $30,000 in interest,
liquidated damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.
Mausser moved for reconsideration and argued that the Plan’s introduction
during discovery of an exhibit—labeled as an amendment to the collective bargaining
agreement—was prejudicial and misleading. She maintained that the amendment had
not been adopted as part of the collective bargaining agreement, and that it was unfair
for the auditor and the court to rely on its suggested formula for calculating
contributions owed. The Plan conceded that the amendment should be stricken from
the record. (The amendment was one that another plan had used, expressly allowing
trustees to use a formula similar to the formula used by the auditor here.)
The district court denied Mausser’s motion to reconsider. The court discounted
Mausser’s arguments as “quibbles” over the auditor’s formula, though it agreed to
strike the amendment from the case.
On appeal, Mausser first challenges the summary judgment, disputing that she
was obligated to maintain records on her husband’s hourly work. She asserts that the
Internal Revenue Service does not require sole proprietorships like QCA Electric to
keep payroll records and that revenue is reported on personal income tax returns.
Mausser, however, misunderstands her obligations under ERISA and the
collective bargaining agreement. ERISA requires an employer to “maintain records with

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respect to each of his employees sufficient to determine the benefits due or which may
become due to such employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1). And the collective bargaining
agreement requires an employer, as part of the audit to determine due benefits, to
provide “payroll records, reports, and other reasonably requested information necessary to
conduct a compliance audit” (emphasis added). In other words, Mausser had to maintain
sufficient records of her husband’s hours to determine expected benefits. Even if we
assume that sole proprietors are not required under the tax code to maintain payroll
records, Mausser cannot evade her obligations under ERISA and the collective
bargaining agreement to maintain records that are “reliable,” “contemporaneous,” and
“accurate.” Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Reinke Insulation Co., 347 F.3d
262, 264 (7th Cir. 2003); Laborers’ Pension Fund v. RES Env’t Servs., 377 F.3d 735, 739
(7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Because Mausser failed to provide any records during
the audit, the court properly determined that she was liable for delinquent
contributions under the agreement.
Next, Mausser asserts for the first time that she is not obligated to contribute to
the Plan because ERISA requires contributions only for employees, and her husband—a
working owner of a sole proprietorship—is not an employee under Title I of ERISA.
Mausser cites 29 CFR § 2510.3-3(c), which excludes from the definition of “employees” a
sole proprietor and her owner spouse. But she waived this argument by not raising it in
the district court.1 See Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2022). Waiver aside,
Mausser’s interpretation of § 2510.3-3(c) is incorrect. The Supreme Court held in
Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6, 20–21 (2004),
that ERISA applies to plans covering owners (including owner spouses) so long as the
plan also covers non-owner employees. Mausser argues that Yates is inapposite because
QCA Electric has no employees, only owners, but this mischaracterizes QCA Electric’s
status. QCA Electric participates in a multi-employer plan that, according to the collective
bargaining agreement, includes numerous other owners and employees. Yates therefore
1 Mausser denies making any waiver. In her reply brief, she points to her
assertions on direct and cross-examination that QCA Electric does not maintain payroll
or have W-2s—assertions that, she thinks, show that QCA Electric has no employees.
Significantly, however, she does not contend that she apprised the district court of any
argument that the absence of employees negates her obligation to make contributions
consistent with ERISA. Nevertheless, we liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants
and will touch briefly on the merits. See Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Plan. Dep’t, 755 F.3d
594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014).

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controls, and Mausser is bound under ERISA to make the contributions demanded by
the collective bargaining agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 1145.
Mausser lastly challenges the denial of her motion to reconsider based on the
Plan’s introduction of the amendment during discovery—an amendment that, she
asserts, was “fabricated, falsified, [and] forged” and tainted the trial proceedings.
See FED. R. C IV. P. 60(b)(3) (allowing for relief from a final judgment if opposing party
commits fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct). But the court appropriately
exercised its discretion here. Mausser needed to prove that the Plan engaged in
misconduct that prevented her from fully and fairly presenting her case, see Venson v.
Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 653 (7th Cir. 2014), yet she offers no specific evidence of fraud
or misrepresentation, much less any evidence that the admission of the amendment
prejudiced her. The Plan relied on the amendment only to lend credence to the formula
used by the third-party auditor to calculate delinquent contributions. Indeed, the court
clarified that the amendment, which was not mentioned at trial, “was never the basis
for [its] conclusions.”
AFFIRMED

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