Charles Miles v. Caleb Hallett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 7, 2024 *
Decided November 8, 2024
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2314
CHARLES MILES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CALEB HALLETT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-cv-2094
Colleen R. Lawless,
Judge.
O R D E R
Charles Miles, a former Illinois prisoner who had a broken leg, sued correctional
officer Caleb Hallett for deliberate indifference toward his physician-ordered mobility
restrictions, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2314 Page 2
court entered summary judgment against Miles, concluding that the record contained
no facts showing Hallett ignored or interfered with his medical treatment. We affirm.
We begin with a word about the procedural background of this case. At
summary judgment, the district court accepted Hallett’s version of the facts because
Miles—in responding to Hallett’s motion—failed to comply with Rule 7.1(D)(2) of the
Local Rules for the Central District of Illinois. He did not object to Hallett’s proposed
statement of undisputed material facts, nor did he put forth any additional facts of his
own. We likewise rely upon Hallett’s factual narrative to the extent it is supported by
admissible evidence. See Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr, 749 F.3d 603, 605 (7th Cir. 2014). We
do, however, present those facts in the light most favorable to Miles, the party opposing
summary judgment. Brown v. LaVoie, 90 F.4th 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 2024).
In 2019, Miles, then housed at the Danville Correctional Center, suffered a
broken right leg. He soon had surgery to repair the fractures. Thereafter, he was moved
to the infirmary and directed not to put weight on his right leg. To aid healing and
prevent blood clots, he also was told to move around with the use of crutches—advice
he at times resisted.
Officer Hallett, who was assigned to the infirmary at night, had frequent contact
with Miles, and the two quickly developed an unfriendly relationship. Hallett
sometimes made Miles walk to the other side of his cell to retrieve his food rather than
deliver it to him directly.
Miles sued Hallett for deliberate indifference. (Miles also sued several other
prison officials and medical personnel, but he does not challenge the district court’s
dismissal of those defendants, so we say no more about them.)
The district court later granted summary judgment for Hallett. Based on the
undisputed material facts (facts the court deemed admitted based on Miles’s
noncompliance with Rule 7.1(D)(2)), the court concluded that there was no evidence
that Hallett ignored or interfered with Miles’s physician-ordered treatment.
On appeal, Miles first challenges the district court’s determination that he failed
to properly object to Hallett’s undisputed material facts. He maintains that he objected
to “all assertions” in Hallett’s submissions when he wrote—in response to Hallett’s
summary-judgment motion—that “there are specific facts showing genuine issue of
material fact to support plaintiff’s case for trial.”

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No. 23-2314 Page 3
This misinterprets the local rule, which requires the party opposing summary
judgment to list by number each fact from the motion for summary judgment that he
wants to dispute. C.D. Ill. R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). “A failure to respond to any numbered fact
will be deemed an admission of the fact.” Id. at 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6). The court here was
entitled to “strictly enforce” its local rules, even against a pro se litigant, and to treat
Hallett’s facts as admitted. McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2
(7th Cir. 2019); see also Frakes v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2017).
Miles next argues that the district court overlooked a September 2019 grievance
report, which, he urges, calls into question Hallett’s motivation in forcing him to
ambulate on crutches. In Miles’s view, Hallett was motivated not by the medical
directives but something more pernicious—punishment for Miles’s insolence when
dealing with healthcare staff. Miles spotlights a statement in the grievance report in
which Hallett expresses his discontent with Miles’s “rude” treatment of staff:
Offender states that he was forced by Officer Hallett to walk on his broken
leg. Offender states that Officer Hallett made him get out of bed and walk
to the chuckhole. Internal Affairs Lt. Campbell states that Officer Hallett
was interviewed and stated he always is professional with Offender Miles.
Officer Hallett stated he does not threaten or mistreat Offender Miles.
Officer Hallett stated Offender Miles is rude when he talks [sic] Health Care
Staff so he addressed that with Offender Miles. Officer Hallett stated he has
no issue with Offender Miles.
Grievance Officer’s Report of September 17, 2019 (emphasis added).
But the grievance report does not support Miles’s deliberate indifference claim.
To show deliberate indifference toward his broken leg, Miles must point to evidence
that Hallett “ignored or interfered with a course of treatment prescribed by a
physician.” McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016). The report, however,
describes Hallett as saying only that he addressed the topic of rudeness with Miles, with
whom he otherwise had “no issue.” The report does not contradict the undisputed
medical records that Miles was encouraged to walk after his surgery.
AFFIRMED

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