Kathy Browne v. Jennifer Waldo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 7, 2024*
Decided November 8, 2024
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1497
KATHY BROWNE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JENNIFER WALDO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:20-CV-196 JD
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). We therefore deny Browne’s
motion for oral argument.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1497 Page 2
O R D E R
Invoking diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Kathy Browne sued Jennifer
Waldo and her attorney, Anna Hearn, alleging that they had her arrested unlawfully.
After Browne and Hearn signed a settlement agreement to dismiss Browne’s claim
against Hearn, Browne argued that the agreement was invalid because of mistake,
duress, and unconscionability. Hearn moved to enforce the agreement, and the district
court granted Hearn’s motion, rejecting Browne’s defenses to enforcement. The court’s
findings that the settlement contract was valid were not clearly erroneous, and because
the district court reasonably enforced the settlement, we affirm.
This case stems from a long-running feud between Browne and Waldo that
culminated in settlement discussions. Browne and Waldo had both acquired intimate
images of each other. Waldo later asked Browne to send her the intimate images of
Waldo, and when Browne did so, Waldo told Browne that Browne had just committed a
felony. The Valparaiso Police Department arrested and charged Browne with
distributing an intimate image. Later, those charges were dismissed, and Browne sued
Waldo, Hearn (Waldo’s attorney), and others. After lengthy and expensive litigation,
Hearn offered to settle Browne’s claims against her. Browne’s attorney, Andrea
Ciobanu, urged Browne to accept the settlement offer, explaining that Browne owed
substantial money to Ciobanu and that Ciobanu would seek to withdraw from the case
if Browne did not pay those debts. The next day, Browne (through her counsel) filed a
notice stating that she and Hearn had resolved all pending matters between them.
Browne signed the settlement agreement on March 24, 2022. Governed by
Indiana law, the agreement states that Hearn would mail the settlement payment by
check to Ciobanu’s law firm, the check would be made out to Ciobanu and Browne, and
Browne would then dismiss Hearn from the suit. Ciobanu withdrew as Browne’s
counsel the following day. Hearn signed the settlement agreement four days later. After
Browne received the copy signed by Hearn, Browne asked Hearn to sign a new version
that required Hearn to remove Ciobanu’s name from the check and changed the
delivery address. Hearn refused, stating that she had already signed the agreement.
Hearn sent the settlement check to Ciobanu’s firm, who then forwarded the check to
Browne. The check was returned as undeliverable because the address that Browne had
provided Ciobanu was incorrect. Ciobanu then deposited the check in her law firm’s
trust account.

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No. 24-1497 Page 3
Settlement-enforcement proceedings came next. When Browne did not dismiss
her claims against Hearn, Hearn moved to enforce the settlement agreement, and
Browne cross-moved to void it. Raising three defenses, Browne argued that she
mistakenly signed the “wrong” version of the settlement, her counsel had coerced her
into accepting it, and the power imbalance between her and Hearn made the agreement
unconscionable. The court granted Hearn’s motion, denied Browne’s, and dismissed
(with prejudice) Hearn from the case. It reasoned that the general elements of a valid
contract had been met: Hearn presented evidence to establish offer, acceptance,
consideration, and meeting of the minds; Browne had not introduced sufficient rebuttal
evidence; and Browne’s defenses to enforcement were unavailing.
After the court enforced the settlement, the case drew to a close. Ciobanu filed a
notice of a lien on a portion of the settlement proceeds, asserting that Browne owed fees
and costs related to Ciobanu’s representation of Browne. Ciobanu mailed to the district
court’s clerk the entire settlement check to be held pending resolution of her lien
request. The district court concluded that Ciobanu’s lien was valid, and it directed the
clerk to disburse the requested portion of the settlement funds to Ciobanu and to send
the balance to Browne. All remaining claims were later dismissed.1
On appeal, Browne challenges the enforcement of the settlement agreement. We
review the district court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse of
discretion, see Sims-Madison v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, 379 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir.
2004), and the court’s subsidiary factual findings about the existence of a valid contract
for clear error, see Bauer v. Qwest Comms., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014). When,
as here, we review a case under diversity jurisdiction, we apply the choice-of-law rules
of the state in which the case was brought—here, Indiana. See NewSpin Sports, LLC v.
Arrow Elecs., 910 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2018). Indiana law favors enforcement of choice-
of-law provisions in contracts, see Allen v. Great Am. Rsrv. Ins., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162
(Ind. 2002), and the district court correctly determined that Indiana law governs here
because of the clause in the agreement selecting that state’s law.
Browne first contends that the district court wrongly rejected her argument that
she mistakenly signed the version of the settlement agreement requiring that the check
1 Although the district court never entered a separate judgment under Rule 58 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in dismissing all remaining claims the court
unambiguously stated that the case was “closed”; therefore the judgment is appealable.
See Law Offices of David Freydin, P.C. v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 24-1497 Page 4
be issued in both her and her lawyer’s names. We disagree for two reasons. To begin, a
party’s signature on an agreement “is sufficient” to conclude that the party intended to
be bound by it, Stardust Ventures, LLC v. Roberts, 65 N.E.3d 1122, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016), and Browne signed the version stating that the check would issue in her and her
attorney’s name. Second, Browne is essentially asserting that she misunderstood the
meaning of the version she signed. But a unilateral mistake in understanding the terms
of a signed contract does not void the contract “unless the mistake was induced by the
misrepresentation of the opposite party.” Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v.
Town of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). And
Browne does not argue, let alone substantiate, that her mistake resulted from any
misconduct by Hearn.
Next, Browne argues that the district court wrongly rejected her defense that she
signed the contract under duress. Browne’s evidence of duress is that Ciobanu urged
Browne to sign in order to resolve her debt to Ciobanu and to prevent Ciobanu from
withdrawing from the case. But contract-invalidating duress does not arise from a
party’s lawful indebtedness, see Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276,
282–83 (Ind. 1983), or a lawyer’s lawful warning that she might withdraw from
representation, see In re Paternity of K.R.H., 784 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Browne’s next contention is that the district court should have ruled that the
agreement was unconscionable based on, in her view, the disparity in bargaining power
between herself and Hearn’s counsel. Under Indiana law, a contract may be
unconscionable “when there is a great disparity in bargaining power which leads the
party with lesser power to sign a contract unwillingly and unaware of its terms.”
McAdams v. Foxcliff Ests. Cmty. Ass’n, 92 N.E.3d 1144, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citation
omitted). But Browne had counsel during settlement negotiations, and the presence of
counsel for Browne defeats her claim that the contract was unconscionable. See Precision
Homes of Ind. v. Pickford, 844 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (contract was not
unconscionable where the plaintiffs were “represented by counsel during the contract
negotiations” and they “and their counsel had every opportunity to read and
understand” the contract).
Browne presents other arguments that depend on us first overturning the
enforcement of the settlement agreement. For example, she challenges a pre-settlement
protective order and a ruling rejecting her allegations that Hearn defrauded the court
before settlement discussions began. The settlement agreement “resolve[d] all pending
matters between Browne and Hearn, including all pending discovery disputes between

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No. 24-1497 Page 5
Browne and Hearn.” Because we have determined that the district court appropriately
enforced the settlement agreement, we need not address these other arguments, which
are subsumed within the broad release. See Platinum Supplemental Ins. v. Guarantee Trust
Life Ins., 989 F.3d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 2021).
We end with the matter of sanctions. Hearn has moved for attorney’s fees and
costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, insisting that Browne’s appeal is
frivolous and that sanctions are justified. We acknowledge that Browne’s brief is
disorganized and advances some opaque arguments. But at the same time, “litigation
presents significant challenges for all pro se plaintiffs.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 660
(7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Further, this case involved “fact-specific inquiries” about
intent and defenses to contract that were not necessarily “a foregone conclusion.” SK
Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 852 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus sanctions are not
warranted here. We are also mindful that the district court has threatened Browne with
sanctions for filing meritless motions in its court. But our authority to impose sanctions
is limited to a litigant’s actions on appeal, and Browne’s behavior was different here.
See FED. R. A PP. P ROC. 38 (appeals court may award “damages and … costs to the
appellee” if it determines “that an appeal is frivolous” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless,
we admonish Browne that frivolous appeals or litigation in the future will result in
monetary sanctions.
We thus AFFIRM the judgment and DENY Hearn’s motion for attorney’s fees
and costs.

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