Tony Chaney v. Chicago Housing Authority

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024*
Decided November 12, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1303
TONY CHANEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 23 C 3279
Harry D. Leinenweber,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tony Chaney sued the city agency that administered his housing subsidy for
failing to provide him a hearing after he was evicted from his apartment. The district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1303 Page 2
court dismissed the case because Chaney failed to plead that the agency was directly
responsible for any wrong. We affirm.
We accept the well-pleaded facts in Chaney’s amended complaint as true and
draw all inferences in his favor. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th
Cir. 2023). In 2022, Chaney benefitted from subsidized housing through a program
administered by the Chicago Housing Authority (“CHA”). Under this program, which
is funded by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”), CHA provides vouchers that subsidize beneficiaries’ rent payments.
Using CHA subsidies, Chaney leased an apartment on Chicago’s North Side. In
July 2022, his landlord’s property manager issued an eviction notice to him. Believing
that CHA had terminated his subsidy, Chaney filed a request with CHA for an informal
hearing concerning benefits termination. CHA has a policy of granting beneficiaries an
informal hearing whenever it intends to terminate a subsidy, C HI . HOUS . A UTH ., HOUS .
C HOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM A DMIN . PLAN § 12-II.D, as required by federal regulations,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); 24 C.F.R. § 966.52. CHA initially approved Chaney’s request
for a hearing, but later a CHA employee called Chaney to tell him that the request had
been denied.
In May 2023, Chaney sued CHA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it for failing to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Chaney then amended the complaint to assert violations of, as relevant
here, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the City of Chicago’s
Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, C HI ., I LL., C ODE ch. 5-12 (1986).
The district court dismissed the amended complaint for failing to state a claim
and entered judgment against Chaney.1 With respect to Chaney’s claim under the
City’s Residential Landlord and Tenance Ordinance, the court explained that § 1983
does not afford relief for violations of state law. As for his due process claim, the court
concluded that he failed to allege that any deprivation of his right to a hearing under
the voucher program was caused by the municipal agency’s policy, custom, or
widespread practice—the first requirement of a claim under Monell v. Department of
1 The court’s order states that the dismissal was “without prejudice,” a disposition that may
deprive us of appellate jurisdiction. See Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). But the court
also entered a judgment under Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which we conclude
that the district court was finished with the case and its order final. See FED . R. C IV. P. 58(a); Thornton v.
M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2015).

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No. 24-1303 Page 3
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694 (1978). Because Chaney could not state a claim of
municipal liability under Monell, the court saw no need to assess his due process claim.
See Orozco v. Dart, 64 F.4th 806, 827 (7th Cir. 2023).
On appeal, Chaney challenges only the district court’s decision to dismiss his due
process claim for failing to meet Monell’s pleading requirements. But the court’s
decision was correct. Even if Chaney had been denied due process, Monell shields the
agency from liability unless the harm was caused by a policy or custom that
demonstrates municipal fault. Id. at 823–24 (“[I]t is not sufficient for [plaintiff] to merely
demonstrate a valid due process violation. He must go a step further and show the
municipality itself is liable for the harm he suffered.”). A “policy or custom” includes an
express policy that created the deprivation, a practice so widespread that it effectively
has the force of a policy, or the decision of a final policymaker that causes the
constitutional injury. See Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir.
2023). Here, Chaney’s complaint failed to sufficiently allege actions on the part of CHA
that would plausibly support the existence of a municipal policy that deprived him of a
hearing required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chaney’s reference to a single incident
in which CHA failed to provide him an informal hearing is not enough to allege a
policy or custom under Monell.
We have considered Chaney’s remaining arguments, and none have merit.2
AFFIRMED
2 The dissent would remand to allow Chaney to seek leave amend his complaint. We note that
Chaney did not accept the district court’s invitation post-judgment to seek leave to amend, see, e.g., FED R.
C IV. P. 15(a)(2); Crestview Vill. Apartments v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 557–58 (7th Cir.
2004), nor did he move to modify the judgment, see, e.g., FED . R. C IV. P. 59(e), 60(b); Runnion ex rel.
Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir. 2015). Even on appeal,
Chaney does not suggest any desire to amend his complaint. The dissent, in effect, proposes to grant
Chaney a form of relief he has not requested. It is not our duty to devise a party’s litigation strategy and
then grant the relief that allows him to pursue it. See Kiebala v. Boris, 928 F.3d 680, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2019).

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No. 24-1303 Page 4
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority that
Chaney’s complaint fails to meet Monell’s pleading requirements. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, given the mixed signals the district court gave
to Chaney, a pro se plaintiff, and his continued efforts to pursue his claims in district
court, I believe the better course of action would be to remand. Although the majority is
correct that Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2015), holds that a
Rule 58 judgment signals the finality necessary for an appeal, that case did not grapple
with the mixed signals at issue here.
The chronology of the case docket shows the mixed signals Chaney received
about whether the district court was finished with the case and its order was final. On
January 23, 2024, the court dismissed Chaney’s case without prejudice and entered
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. About two weeks later, on
February 6, Chaney filed two motions. The first motion sought attorney representation.
The second motion, although it acknowledged “the court’s decision to render
judgment” and incorrectly cited Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(1), sought an
extension to file a motion and supporting memorandum “for a rehearing of plaintiff’s
complaint.” On February 8, the court denied Chaney appointed counsel but invited him
to seek leave to file an amended complaint, despite its earlier Rule 58 judgment, which
it did not reference.
The majority contends that Chaney did not accept the district court’s invitation to
seek leave to amend or suggest any desire to do so. See ante at 3 n.2. But the court’s
invitation came after the court had already entered a Rule 58 judgment. That Rule 58
judgment was issued on January 23, so if the judgment truly was final, Chaney had only
a couple of weeks left before losing his appeal rights. We have no way of knowing if
Chaney filed this appeal rather than accepting the court’s invitation to amend his
complaint in order to preserve his appeal rights.
Moreover, Chaney did continue to advance his claims before the district court
after entry of the Rule 58 judgment. Sure, he did not identify the correct rule he needed
to use to overcome the court’s Rule 58 judgment (that is, Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)), but
he asked to file a memorandum “for a rehearing of plaintiff’s complaint.” See Crestview
Vill. Apartments v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2004);
Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 521
(7th Cir. 2015).

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For these reasons, I would remand the case, thereby allowing Chaney, should he
choose to do so, to accept the district court’s invitation to seek leave to amend his
complaint.

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