Trent Nelson v. Ursa Major Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 20, 2024*
Decided November 20, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1211
TRENT NELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
URSA MAJOR CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-cv-0654-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Trent Nelson, a truck driver who suffers from polyneuropathy and diabetic
neuropathy, sued his former employer, Ursa Major Corporation, for violations of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–2654, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–12213. The district court entered summary
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1211 Page 2
judgment against Nelson, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Ursa
violated his rights under either act. We affirm.
We begin with a word about this case’s procedural background. At summary
judgment, the district court accepted Ursa’s version of the facts because Nelson failed to
comply with Rule 56 of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
See Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021). He did not, for instance, file a
brief in opposition to Ursa’s motion for summary judgment, nor did he respond to
Ursa’s proposed statement of facts. We likewise rely on Ursa’s factual narrative to the
extent it is supported by admissible evidence. See Gosey v. Aurora Med. Ctr., 749 F3d.
603, 605 (7th Cir. 2014). We do, however, present those facts in the light most favorable
to Nelson, the nonmoving party. See Moore v. W. Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir.
2023).
Nelson was diagnosed with polyneuropathy and diabetic neuropathy before
being hired as a truck driver for Ursa in 2017. He drove for the company 65 hours a
week with the aid of an accessory knob on his steering wheel that helped alleviate
symptoms. In mid-2019, Nelson, needing medical leave because of his condition, had a
physician prepare a request that he be permitted to work limited hours and take
intermittent leave over the next two to three months. From June 7 to August 11, 2019,
Ursa permitted Nelson to take 48 days of unpaid leave. When he returned to work, his
hours were reduced consistent with his doctor’s recommendation.
Apart from his doctor’s documented request, Nelson asked his manager to let
him start work 90 minutes later every day so that he could exercise. Nelson’s manager
agreed, but Nelson says that his manager (and others) berated him for tardy arrivals,
leading him to ask for his manager’s approval in writing. His manager agreed to do so,
but Nelson was fired later that day, before the notation could be added. Ursa justified
Nelson’s discharge on a pattern of driving mishaps and behavioral problems, including
a collision with another trailer and complaints from a dispatcher about Nelson’s angry
outbursts.
Nelson then sued Ursa for violating the FMLA and ADA by unlawfully
interfering with the exercise of his rights, retaliating against him, and failing to provide
him with reasonable accommodations. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–2654; 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 12101–12213.

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No. 24-1211 Page 3
Ursa moved for summary judgment and notified Nelson of his right to respond
to the summary-judgment motion and the consequences for failing to do so. See E.D.
WIS. CIVIL L.R. 56(a)(1)(A)–(B). Nelson, however, did not file any response, leaving the
district court to adopt Ursa’s facts and undisputed evidence, see E.D. WIS. CIVIL
L.R. 56(b)(4), and conclude that Ursa accommodated Nelson’s condition and fired him
for disciplinary reasons, not his disability.
Nelson’s brief on appeal recounts the deterioration of his medical condition and
his version of events. We are mindful of Nelson’s status as a pro se litigant, but that
does not excuse him from following the court’s rules. See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm,
541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)).
Nelson also points to no evidence in the record calling into question the court’s
conclusion that no reasonable trier of fact could find in his favor on any of his claims.
For substantially the reasons stated by the district court, we affirm.
AFFIRMED

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