United States of America v. Emerson Brooks

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2024 *
Decided December 4, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2207
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EMERSON BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 2:16-cr-20012-SLD
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Emerson Brooks appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the motion after
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2207 Page 2
determining that the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against a sentence reduction.
Because the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.
Brooks pleaded guilty in 2017 to possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute,
see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)–(C), and unlawfully carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1)(A)(i). He was sentenced to
150 months’ imprisonment and 8 years’ supervised release. In the years that followed,
he filed multiple unsuccessful motions to obtain a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582. 1
On March 14, 2024, Brooks filed his seventh motion for compassionate release
under § 3582. A district court may grant a motion for compassionate release if
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduced sentence, the reduction is
consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, and the reduction is
appropriate in light of the § 3553(a) factors. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Williams,
65 F.4th 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2023). Brooks argued that his sentence had been wrongly
enhanced by two state drug convictions that we have since determined not to be
predicate felony drug offenses. See Ruth, 966 F.3d at 650. He also cited several
alternative bases for compassionate release, including his worsening mental health,
see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(iii), age, see id. § 1B1.13(b)(2), and efforts toward
rehabilitation, see id. § 1B1.13(d).
Chief Judge Darrow, who had been reassigned the case, denied the motion. She
cited recent orders in which she had rejected Brooks’s reliance on this same argument,
adding that she repeatedly had found a sentence reduction not warranted under the
§ 3553(a) factors, particularly given the seriousness of his offense, the need to promote
respect for the law, and the need to provide adequate deterrence.
1 In his first motion, for which he was represented by counsel, Brooks sought early release based
on his health conditions, which, he said, increased his risk of serious injury or death from COVID. He
filed six later motions pro se, arguing in each that his sentence was unlawful because it was wrongly
enhanced under the standard announced in United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 2020). These
later motions, besides raising a Ruth-related argument, also invoked other arguments, including
improper application of the § 3553(a) factors (third motion), a challenge based on the not-yet-passed
Equal Act (fourth motion), racial disparities in crack-cocaine sentencing (fifth motion), and new
amendments to the Guidelines (sixth motion). Brooks also filed three additional motions, not under
§ 3582, each raising the same Ruth-related argument. The district court gave appropriate reasons for
denying all these motions and informed him after his fifth motion that a motion for compassionate
release is an improper vehicle to challenge the validity of his sentence.

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No. 24-2207 Page 3
On appeal, Brooks maintains that his sentence was unlawful because it was
enhanced by his prior drug convictions that can no longer qualify as predicate offenses
for the enhancement. But as the district court correctly stated in response to one of his
prior motions, compassionate release is not the proper vehicle through which to
challenge a sentence. United States v. Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023).
Section 3582(c)(1) does not provide a basis for Brooks to assert that he was sentenced
unlawfully, United States v. Williams, 62 F.4th 391, 392 (7th Cir. 2023), even if he lacks
any other means of pressing that argument, see United States v. Wyatt, 672 F.3d 519, 524
(7th Cir. 2012) (although petitioner would likely receive substantially lower sentence if
sentenced today, “there is no longer any judicial procedure to remedy the situation”).
Brooks also asserts on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by
giving insufficient weight to the requirement that the sentence must not be greater than
necessary to meet the § 3553(a) factors. But the court did consider the § 3553(a) factors
and found that early release would frustrate specific deterrence, undermine the
seriousness of Brooks’s conduct, and fail to promote respect for the law. The court
needed to identify “just one good reason” for denying his motion, United States v.
Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022), and its summation of the § 3553(a) factors,
together with its orders denying Brooks’s other compassionate release motions, were
more than enough.
Brooks has filed six motions under § 3582 that are largely duplicative and assert
an argument foreclosed by our precedent. See Von Vader, 58 F.4th at 371. We note that a
recent amendment to § 1B1.13 now allows nonretroactive changes in the law to be
considered for purposes of determining whether a defendant presents an extraordinary
and compelling reason, so long as, among other things, the defendant has served at
least ten years of his sentence. § 1B1.13(b)(6). (We do not comment on the Sentencing
Commission’s authority to issue this change in its policy statement.) Brooks has not yet
served ten years of his sentence, so he may not yet seek compassionate release based on
a nonretroactive change in the law. We now warn him that he risks monetary sanctions
and a filing bar under Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312 (7th Cir. 1997), if he
persists in prematurely seeking a sentence reduction that challenges the validity of his
sentence.
AFFIRMED

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