Jalam Vantroy Smith v. Lutheran University Association, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024*
Decided December 13, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1710
JALAM VANTROY SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Hammond Division.
No. 2:21-CV-178-TLS
Theresa L. Springmann,
Judge.
O R D E R
After Jalam Smith sued the Lutheran University Association, Inc. (also known as
Valparaiso University) for racially discriminating against him while he was a student at
the university, Valparaiso moved for summary judgment. In opposing that motion,
Smith failed to comply with the local rules, and the district judge entered summary
judgment for Valparaiso. On appeal, Smith contests the entry of summary judgment
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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and other procedural rulings. Because Smith did not properly dispute the facts that
mandate summary judgment, and his additional challenges lack merit, we affirm.
We construe the record in favor of Smith, the non-moving party. See Vesey v.
Envoy Air, Inc., 999 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2021). Smith, who is Black, attended
Valparaiso for one semester in 2019. He enrolled in five courses. In his social-work
course, Smith often turned in assignments late, and his work was rated subpar, leading
his professor to talk to Smith about his poor performance and tardiness. Smith believes
that he was graded unfairly because of his race, and the professor harassed him with
emails about his inadequate performance. Later, Smith stopped attending the course,
Valparaiso denied Smith’s request to withdraw from it, and he ultimately failed it.
Smith also struggled in his chemistry course. He eventually withdrew from it upon his
professor’s recommendation. In Smith’s view, he was again unfairly graded because of
his race and harassed about his inadequate performance in that course.
Smith complained to no avail to Valparaiso and the Office of Civil Rights of the
United States Department of Education, precipitating this suit. In his verified complaint,
he alleges that Valparaiso discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; violated his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and conspired to violate those rights
based on his race, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He also sued Valparaiso for violations of Indiana
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Valparaiso later moved for summary judgment on all claims and filed a
Statement of Material Facts in compliance with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and local rules. See N.D. IND. L.R. 56-1(a)(3). Local rules required Smith to file
a response to Valparaiso’s statement along with his own statement of any additional
material facts, and to cite supporting evidence in the record. See id. 56-1(b)(2)–(3). Smith
filed a “Statement of Undisputed Genuine Issues of Material Fact,” but it did not
respond to Valparaiso’s statement, identify facts he disputed, or properly cite the record
for evidence supporting the arguments that he included.
The district judge ruled that Smith had failed to dispute Valparaiso’s Statement
of Material Facts properly, accepted the facts from Valparaiso as admitted (which we
recounted above), and entered summary judgment for Valparaiso. The judge also
explained that Smith lacked a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VI
because he cited no evidence that he was meeting Valparaiso’s legitimate educational
expectations or was treated worse than similar students of other races. The judge also

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ruled that Smith had abandoned his other claims by failing to address Valparaiso’s
arguments. Smith moved to amend the judgment, but the judge denied his motion.
On appeal, Smith contests the summary judgment, a decision that we review
de novo. Vesey, 999 F.3d at 461. According to Smith, the district judge failed to hold
Valparaiso to its evidentiary burden of production and persuasion. He believes that
Valparaiso was required, but failed, to rule out the prospect of a jury finding in his
favor on each claim.
Smith’s argument inverts the burdens at summary judgment. Contrary to
Smith’s assertion, Valparaiso was not required to support its motion with evidence
negating Smith’s claims because Smith, not Valparaiso, bore the burden of proof on
each claim at trial. See Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 896 (7th Cir.
2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986)). Once Valparaiso
showed the district judge that no evidence supported Smith’s claims, Smith needed “to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of” the elements of his claims.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. To do so, he had to “designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial” on those elements. See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 896 (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). For his Title VI claim, these elements included meeting the
course’s legitimate educational expectations and receiving worse treatment compared
to similar students of different races. See Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908,
921 (7th Cir. 2007). But Smith did not designate any facts supporting these elements, as
the local rules required. That failure means that Valparaiso is entitled to summary
judgment.
We recognize that Smith submitted a verified complaint, and he correctly notes
that a verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary
judgment. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d
245, 246 (7th Cir. 1996)). But he did not cite any parts of his complaint in responding to
Valparaiso’s statement that no evidence supported his Title VI claim. Because of that
failure, the district judge reasonably deemed the facts in Valparaiso’s statement
admitted and, based on those facts, properly entered summary judgment. See Friend v.
Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d 707, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2015).
As for Smith’s other claims, he argues that the district judge wrongly ruled that
he had “abandoned” them. But even if we do not treat those claims as “abandoned,”
summary judgment was correct because on de novo review we conclude that, as with
his Title VI claim, Smith did not properly support them. His response to Valparaiso’s
motion alluded to discrimination, harassment, and violations of state law. But again, he

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did not identify in the record evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find for him
on those claims, thereby permitting the district judge to rule against him.
Smith raises procedural challenges to the summary judgment, but they all lack
merit. He first argues that the district judge took “judicial notice” of the factual
allegations in his complaint under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and thus
he did not need to cite evidence at summary judgment. He points to the judge’s
statement in its screening order assessing the legal sufficiency of his complaint, where it
stated that it would “accept his allegations as true.” But the judge was merely
explaining that courts assume the truth of allegations in a complaint for purposes of
reviewing the allegations for legal sufficiency. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669
(2009). This is not the same thing as taking “judicial notice” of facts. See FED. R.
EVID. 201(b). In any event, this review did not relieve Smith of his duty to obey the local
rules citing evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment.
Smith next argues that summary judgment was improper because the district
judge granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and
accepted his verified complaint. But Smith provides no explanation for why his IFP
status was relevant to summary judgment. And again, he did not tell the district judge
(nor does he tell us) which statements in his verified complaint created a genuine issue
of material fact. He thus gives us no reason to disturb the district judge’s judgment.
Smith also argues that summary judgment was improper because several of
Valparaiso’s employees that he mentioned in his complaint did not submit sworn
declarations in support of the motion for summary judgment. But as we explained
above, in moving for summary judgment a defendant need not submit any evidence,
including sworn declarations, negating the claims on which the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24.
Finally, Smith’s unpersuasively challenges the denial of his post-judgment
motion, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Vesey, 999 F.3d at 463 (citing
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 953 (7th Cir. 2013)). A motion under
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must introduce new but previously
unavailable evidence or demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact. Id. Smith argues
that, because he attached a new statement of facts opposing summary judgment, the
district judge unreasonably denied his motion. But Smith’s motion was simply an
attempt to relitigate summary judgment with a new statement of facts. Because Smith

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failed to explain why these facts were unavailable and did not offer any new evidence
or show a manifest error of law, the judge reasonably denied the motion.
AFFIRMED

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