United States of America v. Jerry L. Boyce

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024*
Decided December 13, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2350
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JERRY L. BOYCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 18-CR-29-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jerry Boyce, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his most recent motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because the district judge did not
abuse his discretion, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2350 Page 2
Boyce moved for release six years after he pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs
Act robbery and one count of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b); one
count of discharging a firearm in connection with the attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).1 Boyce was sentenced to 45 months’ imprisonment for the
robbery and gun possession convictions and a consecutive 120 months’ imprisonment
for the § 924(c) conviction, for a total of 165 months’ imprisonment.
In February 2024, roughly 5.5 years before his projected release date, Boyce filed
a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)—his third such
motion. He advanced four reasons, which he asserted were extraordinary and
compelling, for his early release. First, Boyce argued that the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), constituted an intervening, non-retroactive
change in the law that left him with a grossly disparate sentence. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6).2 The Supreme Court held in Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery
does not qualify as a predicate “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at 857–
60. Second, Boyce cited Part C of Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which
gave district judges discretion to depart downward from a defendant’s criminal history
category if the defendant received criminal history points from a sentence for
possessing marijuana for personal use. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 cmt. n.3. Third, Boyce
asserted that the alleged physical abuse inflicted on him by a correctional officer
warranted his release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4), (5). Fourth, Boyce argued that he had
been rehabilitated through prison programming. Boyce also stated that the factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed in favor of a reduction.
The district judge denied Boyce’s motion, concluding that Boyce had not
demonstrated any extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. And regardless,
the judge explained, the factors under § 3553(a) weighed against Boyce’s release
because of the violent nature of his crimes (wielding a firearm during the attempted and
completed robberies and firing the gun at a store owner).
1 Beginning with the indictment, many documents in the record (including the
plea agreement, judgment, and PSR) refer to § 924(a)(2) as the applicable penalty
provision. But § 924(a)(8) is the provision that applies to violations of § 922(g).
2 The government preserves its argument that the Sentencing Commission
exceeded its authority in enacting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). We do not address that
argument here.

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No. 24-2350 Page 3
We review the denial of a compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion,
United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021), and any underlying factual
findings for clear error, United States v. Gamble, 969 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2020). For a
compassionate-release motion to be successful, the defendant must have an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence, and early release must be
consistent with the applicable § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023) (explaining that § 3553(a) is an “independent
basis” for resolution of a compassionate-release motion).
On appeal, Boyce first faults the district judge for not considering the
extraordinary and compelling reasons he raised in his first two motions for
compassionate release along with the new reasons he raised in the third motion.
Previously Boyce had argued that his medical and mental health conditions put him at
a high risk amid the COVID-19 pandemic. He had also argued that certain non-
retroactive changes in the law entitled him to relief, though the law of the circuit
foreclosed that reason for relief. See United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir.
2021). Here, nothing required the district judge to look back to the prior motions he had
denied already. Yet, although the judge told the government to respond only to new
arguments in the third motion, the judge analyzed all grounds Boyce ever presented,
alone and in combination: “Even considering together all of these bases for relief,
Defendant’s prior bases for relief that the Court previously adjudicated … and
Defendant’s rehabilitation and programming while in prison, the Court is not
persuaded that Defendant has proffered an extraordinary and compelling basis for
relief.” Boyce’s argument therefore rests on a faulty premise.
And we need not address Boyce’s challenge to the conclusion that he was
ineligible for relief because the judge reasonably denied the motion in his discretion
under § 3553(a). The judge appropriately considered the violent nature of Boyce’s
crimes in concluding that early release would not promote the goals of deterrence,
public protection, and continued rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). The
judge needed only “one good reason” for denying Boyce’s motion under § 3553(a),
see United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021), and his reasonable assessment
of the seriousness of Boyce’s crimes was sufficient.
Finally, Boyce maintains that the district judge abused his discretion in
concluding that, despite the enactment of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), the non-retroactive
changes in the law that Boyce cited could not provide an extraordinary and compelling

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No. 24-2350 Page 4
reason for relief and then not considering those changes in the § 3553(a) analysis. But
legal developments are not part of Boyce’s history and characteristics, the nature and
circumstances of his offenses, or any other pertinent sentencing factor listed in the
§ 3553(a). And district judges have “wide discretion” over what they consider
“relevant” to the § 3553(a) analysis. See Williams, 65 F.4th at 346.
AFFIRMED

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