United States of America v. James B. Hanson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 7, 2024*
Decided December 17, 2024
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES B. HANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 4:09CR40003-006-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Hanson, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because the district court did not
abuse its discretion, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Hanson moved for release 15 years after he pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), 846. He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment and a 10-year term of
supervised release. In 2023, with six years left on his prison term, Hanson moved for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He advanced five reasons: (1) his
enhanced risk of contracting coronavirus and experiencing serious illness from having
one kidney and no spleen; (2) the harsh conditions of his confinement arising from the
prison’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic; (3) the non-retroactive reductions to the
law under which he was sentenced; (4) the disparity between his sentence and his
codefendants’; and (5) his “good record of rehabilitation”—no discipline for six years
and participation in programming and education courses. The government replied that
Hanson’s assertions were unsubstantiated or inadequate reasons for early release and,
in any case, the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against his release.
The district court denied Hanson’s motion for two reasons. First, it agreed with
the government that Hanson had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling
reasons for his release. Second, even if he had, the § 3553(a) factors weighed against his
release because Hanson’s 12 prior convictions and 14 disciplinary infractions while
incarcerated showed a high risk of recidivism and danger to others if released.
On appeal, Hanson renews his argument that he presented extraordinary and
compelling reasons warranting his release. Before addressing those arguments, we
pause briefly to note that this court earlier questioned the timeliness of Hanson’s notice
of appeal. The government has since waived the time limit for Hanson to appeal; thus
we may proceed with this appeal. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005). We
review the denial of a compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion,
United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021), and any underlying fact
findings for clear error, United States v. Gamble, 969 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2020).
Hanson argues that the district court wrongly rejected his contention that his
medical status and the prison’s conditions are extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release. We disagree. First, the district court reasonably found, based on his medical
records, that the prison was adequately mitigating Hanson’s medical risks. Second,
prisoners like Hanson seeking compassionate release based on the dangers from
coronavirus must show that they cannot medically benefit from vaccines or that, even if
vaccinated, they would be safer outside prison. See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595,
597 (7th Cir. 2021). Hanson has not done so. Third, mitigation measures that the prison

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No. 23-3088 Page 3
used to respond to COVID-19, which Hanson contends created harsh conditions of
confinement, are not a basis here for early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
See United States v. Bridgewater, 995 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 2021). Rather, a suit under the
Eighth Amendment is the proper way to challenge conditions of confinement. See id.
Next, the district court properly ruled that any disparity between Hanson’s
sentence and his codefendants’, or changes to law under which he was sentenced, were
not extraordinary and compelling reasons for early release. To begin, arguments about
sentencing errors belong on direct appeal, which Hanson did not pursue, or on
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; they are not extraordinary or compelling
reasons for compassionate release. See United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir.
2022). In any event, no unwarranted sentencing disparity occurred. A “district court is
required by statute to tailor its sentence to the particular defendant before it.”
United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 2018). Hanson’s sentence of 262
months in prison was at the low end of his guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, and a
within-guidelines sentence complies with the requirement to avoid unwarranted
disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). See United States v. Clay, 50 F.4th 608, 613
(7th Cir. 2022). Finally, as the district court noted, Hanson’s offense warranted a 262-
month prison term not only because of his role as the cook in a conspiracy to make
methamphetamine, but also his criminal history, which was longer than his
codefendants’.
Hanson’s remaining arguments for early release are also meritless. He contends
that the district court should have treated his record of rehabilitation as an
extraordinary reason for release. We disagree. Although a prisoner’s rehabilitation,
coupled with other factors, can support extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release, “rehabilitation alone cannot serve as a basis for early release
under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2022).
Regardless, the district court properly ruled that Hanson’s 14 disciplinary infractions
while incarcerated did not reflect adequate rehabilitation. Hanson also argues that
recent lockdowns and his family’s circumstances warrant early release. But he did not
present these arguments to the district court; thus we need not consider them.
See United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 945 (7th Cir. 2021).
We observe a second and independent basis for affirming. Hanson does not
challenge the district court’s ruling that, even if he had shown extraordinary and
compelling reasons for release, the court in its discretion would deny release based on
its evaluation of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Applying those factors, the court

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reasonably ruled that Hanson’s 12 prior criminal convictions and 14 disciplinary
infractions while incarcerated created a high risk of recidivism and public danger that
weighed against release. The district court needed only “one good reason” for denying
Hanson’s motion, see Ugbah, 4 F.4th at 598 (7th Cir. 2021), and its reasonable assessment
under § 3553(a) of the seriousness of his crimes, his substantial disciplinary infractions
while in prison, and his risk of recidivism suffices.
Finally, we note a development occurring after the district court denied Hanson’s
motion for compassionate release, but it does not alter the outcome of this appeal. In
late 2023, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to expand the list of
“extraordinary and compelling reason[s]” that may warrant a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) to include some non-retroactive changes in the law. See § 1B1.13(b)(6). To
qualify, the defendant must have received an “unusually long sentence,” served at least
10 years of his term of imprisonment, and show “a gross disparity between the sentence
being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” Id.
Hanson does not argue that the amendment to § 1B1.13(b)(6) applies to his case. Also,
he filed his motion, and the district court denied it, before the amendments became
effective in November 2023. Finally, and in any case, the district court’s independent
reliance on the § 3553(a) factors to deny relief renders the amendments irrelevant.
Hanson's recently filed motion for a status update on this appeal is DENIED as
unnecessary.
AFFIRMED

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