Xena Ames v. Federal Express Corporation

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024*
Decided December 19, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1804
XENA AMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21-cv-02652-MPB-KMB
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Xena Ames, a Black woman over the age of 40, sued Federal Express Corporation
after her resignation from the company in 2021. Ames accused FedEx of failing to
accommodate her disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117; subjecting her to sex- and race-based harassment, in violation
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is frivolous. FED .
R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1804 Page 2
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; declining to promote her
because of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–634; and retaliating against her for filing a lawsuit alleging workplace
discrimination, in violation of Title VII. The district judge granted FedEx’s motion for
summary judgment. The judge concluded that claim preclusion barred Ames’s
disability claim, and that her other claims failed for lack of proof.
On appeal, Ames—now proceeding pro se—has submitted an opening brief that
does not engage with the district court’s reasoning. Instead, she recounts in detail the
harm she alleges has been caused by FedEx’s conduct. Although Ames is pro se, she
must still comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
requires her to file a brief with her “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations
to the authorities and parts of the record on which [she] relies.” F ED. R. A PP . P.
28(a)(8)(A); see Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). And while we
construe pro se filings generously, “we must be able to discern cogent arguments in any
appellate brief, even one from a pro se litigant.” Anderson, 241 F.3d at 545. Her reply
brief hints at new arguments undeveloped in her opening brief, but arguments
appearing for the first time in a reply brief are waived. See Porco v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.,
453 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2006).
DISMISSED

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