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23-2924•Anthony A. Massie v. Lashonda Gray†
23-2924Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitDec 20, 2024
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024 *
Decided December 20, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2924
ANTHONY A. MASSIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LASHONDA GRAY†
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-cv-1348
Stephen C. Dries,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
† Sergeant Gray’s first name does not appear anywhere in the record, but we have updated the
caption based on publicly available information. Counsel for the defendant shall alert the court by motion
if the defendant is misidentified. We also remind counsel that litigating under a pseudonym is not
permitted without leave of court and requires an extraordinary justification. See Doe v. Trustees of Indiana
Univ., 101 F.4th 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2024).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1
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No. 23-2924 Page 2
Anthony Massie appeals the judgment against him based on failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies properly before suing jail officials for violating his
constitutional rights as a pretrial detainee. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the record shows
that Massie did not properly follow the jail’s grievance procedures as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1997(e), we affirm.
We construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Massie, the
nonmoving party. Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2019). On August 16,
2021, while Massie was jailed at the Kenosha County Detention Center, another inmate
threw scalding coffee at Massie through the bars of his cell, burning his face. Sergeant
Gray, the supervisory officer on duty, witnessed the attack on a video feed. Sergeant
Gray did not take Massie to the medical unit or direct anyone else to do so.
The Kenosha County Sheriff’s Department, which operates the jail, has a
detainee grievance system. It requires prisoners to submit a written grievance within 7
days of the incident that is the subject of the complaint, and officials must respond
within 7 days of receipt. Grievances that do not comply with procedure are rejected. An
inmate must appeal an unfavorable response within 72 hours of receiving it. These rules
are posted in the housing units, and an explanation of the grievance and appeal process
is played daily throughout the jail on closed-circuit televisions. The rules are also
available on the tablet issued to each inmate.
On August 17, Massie submitted a handwritten grievance form recounting that
he had reported another inmate for hoarding pills and giving them to other inmates,
which led to the hot-coffee attack as retribution. Massie asked for a “justice response
and due process investigation.” He also stated that he had not been able to speak with
Sergeant Gray, who wrote the incident report, and that she had not escorted him to the
medical department. The complaint form was rejected and returned to him with red
writing telling him to resubmit the grievance through the electronic kiosk. Another
handwritten notation stated: “What are you grieving?”
Massie submitted a new grievance dated August 18 in which he requested an
investigation into the coffee-throwing incident and stated: “I asked to see the nurse but
was not removed from my cell at all.” An officer logged the grievance electronically,
and Massie received a response exonerating Gray on August 19, with the rationale that
staff from the health services unit had come to Massie’s cell to assess him. The response
stated that Massie could administratively appeal the decision within 72 hours. Massie
states that he appealed, but the jail has no record of receiving any appeal.
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No. 23-2924 Page 3
Over his time at the jail, Massie submitted numerous handwritten grievances
about the kiosk being defective and about the jail’s failure to accept or respond to
handwritten grievances. These grievances were rejected and returned to him: some
explaining that he was making a request, not stating a grievance, some asking for
clarification of the subject of the grievance, and some concluding that his complaints
could not be addressed through the grievance system. See WIS . A DMIN. C ODE DOC
§ 310.10(6). None of these grievances related to Gray’s alleged failure to get medical
attention for Massie on August 16, 2021.
Massie filed this suit under § 1983 against the county sheriff and multiple
correctional officers. After screening the complaint, the district judge allowed Massie to
proceed on a claim against Gray for ignoring his need for medical treatment after
getting scalded with coffee. The parties then consented to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Gray moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Massie had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The magistrate
judge entered summary judgment for Gray and rejected Massie’s argument that the
grievance process was unavailable to him.
On appeal, Massie argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because jail officials prevented him from
accessing the grievance process. We review de novo the grant of summary judgment
based on a failure to exhaust. Williams, 937 F.3d at 941.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires “proper” exhaustion of administrative
remedies before actions can be brought with respect to prison conditions. Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). This means that inmates must follow the facility’s grievance
process. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Exhaustion is not required, though, if a
grievance process is not “available.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). However,
“when the prisoner causes the unavailability of the grievance process,” such as by not
filing a grievance in a timely manner, “the process is not unavailable but rather
forfeited.” Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Because failure to exhaust is
an affirmative defense, the defendant must show that administrative remedies were
available to Massie. Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2022).
Here, the judge properly concluded that Massie did not exhaust his
administrative remedies. Strict compliance with the grievance process is required for
proper exhaustion, and so Massie had to complete each step prescribed by the jail’s
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No. 23-2924 Page 4
regulations, even if that was not his preferred method. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. The
response to Massie’s August 17 complaint told him to submit the grievance
electronically and instructed him to clarify the nature of his complaint. There is no
evidence that Massie resubmitted this grievance using the kiosk system or that he
clarified his grievance as directed. Therefore, Massie did not exhaust the August 17
grievance.
Massie also did not exhaust the August 18 grievance because he failed to appeal
its denial. WIS . A DMIN. C ODE DOC §§ 310.05, 310.09. The prison put forth evidence that it
did not receive any appeal of the denial of the August 18 grievance. Massie asserts on
appeal that he submitted an appeal and never got an answer, but this assertion is not
supported by the record. In his declaration, Massie attested to submitting an appeal
(though it is not clearly linked to the August 18 grievance) that was rejected but not that
he re-submitted it. Therefore, Massie did not raise a dispute as to whether he appealed
the denial of the August 18 grievance at each required level.
Nor does Massie demonstrate that remedies were unavailable. He contends that
the kiosks were frequently inaccessible (such as when Massie was in segregation) or
malfunctioning, as demonstrated by his frequent written complaints about this to jail
staff. But he did not attest that those problems with the kiosk thwarted any attempt to
submit grievances or appeals related to the coffee-throwing incident. Moreover, the jail
responded to the August 18 grievance even though it was handwritten, and Massie
admits that he received the response.
As to other grievances that Massie hand-wrote and says were ignored, he does
not contend that any of them related to the subject matter of this lawsuit. His general
frustration with the kiosk system did not make the process unavailable. He did not
establish that the system (1) could not provide relief or (2) was so opaque as to be
incapable of use; or that (3) officials actively prevented inmates from using it. Ross, 578
U.S. at 643; see Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 2020). Indeed, the responses to
both the August 17 and August 18 grievances instructed Massie about what to do next,
and he did not follow the instructions either time.
AFFIRMED
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