United States of America v. Harrison R. King

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 7, 2025*
Decided January 7, 2025
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2303
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HARRISON R. KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 93-30010-001
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Harrison King, a federal prisoner, moved to compel production of the grand jury
materials underlying his indictment. The district court denied his request on the merits.
But the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the motion, which was in
substance an unauthorized successive collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2303 Page 2
Therefore, we vacate the decision and remand with instructions to dismiss King’s
motion for lack of jurisdiction.
In January 1993, a grand jury returned an indictment charging King with
offenses including murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise and
distribution of powder and crack cocaine. After a trial, a jury found King guilty of the
seventeen counts that remained (one was dismissed during the trial), and the district
court sentenced him to life in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on
appeal. See United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326 (7th Cir. 1996). Since then, King has filed
two motions to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), which were denied, and
multiple unsuccessful motions for a sentence reduction.
In May 2024, King moved to compel the production of grand jury materials
under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In his motion, he stated his
intent to move to dismiss his 1993 indictment because, he asserted, the grand jury
existed “longer [than] its statutorily provided term,” and the prosecutor suppressed
evidence, committed perjury, and made unlawful arguments to the grand jury. The
government responded that the materials were “simply not relevant” because the time
for challenging any defect had long passed. The district court denied the motion on the
merits. The court explained that King had been represented by counsel throughout his
criminal case and direct appeal, and he provided “no evidence in the record that is
indicative of any Grand Jury issue or misconduct” that would warrant the disclosure of
secret material. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii).
King appeals the district court’s decision, and now the government argues (for
the first time) that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the
motion at all. Subject-matter jurisdiction “may be inquired into at any time, with or
without a motion, by any party or by the court itself.” Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d
872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008). We agree with the government that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to substantively rule on King’s motion.
Once a criminal case ends in a sentence, the district court’s jurisdiction lapses
unless a rule or statute specifically authorizes the court to act. United States v. Goode,
342 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996)). Or, if
a post-judgment motion is filed “preliminarily to or in connection with” another judicial
proceeding, the court has ancillary jurisdiction to consider the request. FED. R. C RIM. P.
6(e)(3)(E)(i); see also United States v. Scott, 414 F.3d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983)). Otherwise, a court does not have authority to
entertain the motion and must dismiss it. Scott, 414 F.3d at 816.

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No. 24-2303 Page 3
There was no basis for jurisdiction here. There was no ongoing judicial
proceeding to supply ancillary jurisdiction. Nor did any rule or statute authorize the
district court to rule on a purported Rule 6(e) motion, because—in substance—the
motion sought to collaterally attack King’s conviction.
Under Scott, any post-judgment motion in a criminal case is subject to the rule of
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005): it must be treated as a collateral attack if, in
substance, it challenges the validity of the conviction or sentence. Scott, 414 F.3d at 816
(extending Gonzalez to motions other than those under FED. R. C IV. P. 60(b)). A post-
judgment motion to disclose grand jury materials is not always a collateral attack—for
example, when a prisoner requests them for “academic interest.” Id. But when, in that
motion, the prisoner admits he is challenging the indictment’s validity—as in Scott, and
as King does here—he seeks collateral relief and must meet the requirements of § 2255.
Id. One such requirement is that a prisoner must obtain authorization from this court
before bringing a collateral attack for a second or successive time, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h); otherwise, the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
See United States v. Lloyd, 398 F.3d 978, 980 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Here, King did not obtain permission before he filed his motion, in which—just like the
defendant in Scott— he admitted he was challenging the validity of his indictment.
Therefore, the district court should have dismissed his motion for lack of jurisdiction.
See Scott, 414 F.3d at 816.
Moreover, were we to interpret King’s brief as a request for authorization to
bring a successive § 2255 petition, he has not satisfied the criteria in § 2244(b)(2), and so
we deny the request. See Scott, 414 F.3d at 816.
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion to compel, we
need not address King’s other arguments. The district court’s judgment is VACATED,
and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.

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