Syris T. Birkley v. KEVIN EADE and JOHN SCHAEFER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 7, 2025*
Decided January 8, 2025
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2261
SYRIS T. BIRKLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KEVIN EADE and JOHN SCHAEFER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-1313-pp
Pamela Pepper,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Syris Birkley conceded in a state prosecution that the police had probable cause
to arrest him, but after the prosecution ended, he nonetheless sued the officers, alleging
that they arrested him without probable cause. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
frivolous. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(A).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2261 Page 2
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, relying on his state-court concession. Birkley
does not contest the district court’s rationale for dismissal; thus we affirm the judgment.
Birkley alleges that he and two others were arrested for their involvement in an
armed robbery in the parking lot of a Target store in West Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The
district court took judicial notice of the docket in Birkley’s criminal case, and on appeal
Birkley does not contest that step; thus we recite the facts on which the district court
relied. Two men (one of whom was armed with a gun) approached a woman, grabbed
her purse, pushed her to the ground, and then drove away. Law-enforcement officers
reviewed a video recording of the incident and identified the getaway car. The officers
then went to the home associated with that car and arrested two people, both of whom
said that Birkley was at Target at the time of the robbery; one stated that Birkley
committed the armed robbery. Detective Kevin Eade obtained a warrant, and
Officer John Schaefer later arrested Birkley for the robbery. At his preliminary hearing,
Birkley conceded that the state had probable cause for his arrest and robbery charge.
Later, on the day of trial, the court dismissed the charge against Birkley.
After his criminal case was dismissed, Birkley filed this suit against Eade and
Shaefer, but the case was short-lived. He alleged that the officers falsified documents
and lied in the criminal complaint, leading to his arrest, search, and detention without
probable cause in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the state law
of defamation. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, which the court
granted. It ruled that Birkley failed to state a claim that the police lacked probable cause
for their actions because, among other problems with his claim, Birkley conceded at his
preliminary hearing that the police had such probable cause. The district court then
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Birkley’s state-law claim.
On appeal, Birkley does not contest the district court’s reasons for dismissing the
case, including its rationale that Birkley failed to state a claim because he conceded at
his preliminary hearing that the police had probable cause for their actions. “Probable
cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the Fourth Amendment
and section 1983.” Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 907 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). Because Birkley disputes neither his concession nor the court’s reliance on it to
dismiss his suit, he has waived any argument, including one about judicial estoppel,
see New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001), opposing the court’s conclusion
that his prior concession in state court defeats this case. See Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park,
59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). In his appellate brief, Birkley contends only that his
arrest was invalid because the arrest warrant did not observe that he is a “Moorish

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No. 24-2261 Page 3
National” and it was not signed by an “Article III judge.” These contentions are
frivolous, see, e.g., F ED. R. C RIM . P. 1(b)(4); 4(a)–(b), and require no further comment.
AFFIRMED

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