Armin Wand, Iii v. Textbehind

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2025*
Decided January 27, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1076
ARMIN WAND, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TEXTBEHIND,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-1392
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Armin Wand III and Marcellous Walker, both Wisconsin prisoners, jointly sued
TextBehind, a mail vendor for the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, alleging that
TextBehind violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to process and
destroying prisoner-to-prisoner mail related to legal matters. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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district court denied Wand’s motion to sever his case from Walker’s and granted
TextBehind’s motion for summary judgment. Wand appeals, and we affirm.
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections implemented a new mail policy in
November 2021. The policy included contracting with TextBehind—a third-party mail
processing vendor—to receive, scan, copy, and forward to the correct facilities all “non-
legal” incoming prisoner mail, including inmate-to-inmate correspondence. From
November 2021 to February 2022, when TextBehind inadvertently received privileged
(legal or medical) mail, TextBehind would stamp the mail as undeliverable and return it
to its sender. After a policy change in February 2022, TextBehind began forwarding any
privileged mail to the correctional institution where the prisoner is incarcerated.
Wand and Walker—who were both incarcerated at the Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility—sued TextBehind, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, and
several Department officials, alleging that this policy violated their constitutional rights.
The district court screened their amended complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and
dismissed the Department and certain Department officials from the suit. Later, the
district court granted the remaining Department officials’ motion for summary
judgment and dismissed them as well.1 The court did, however, allow Wand and
Walker to proceed on their claim that TextBehind “has a policy of refusing to process
documents related to legal matters that inmates mail to each other and instead destroys
them despite having no valid penological reason for doing so.”
Practical challenges arose early concerning the prisoners’ ability to jointly litigate
the case. Walker moved for an order permitting him and Wand to meet three times a
week to work on the case, as they were housed in separate prison units. The district
court denied Walker’s motion, stating that it would strain the prison’s resources and
create security concerns. Further, the court reminded Walker and Wand that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) required both of them to sign every pleading, motion, and
paper, and that subsequent filings that did not comply with Rule 11(a) would be
stricken. The court acknowledged that “this requirement is difficult and costly for
prisoner plaintiffs to comply with,” and noted that if Wand and Walker found it too
challenging to litigate jointly, they could move to sever their claims into separate suits.
1 Wand does not challenge the district court’s screening order or its decision
granting the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The Department and its officials
thus are not parties to this appeal.

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No. 24-1076 Page 3
Seven months later, TextBehind moved for summary judgment and submitted
proposed findings of fact. Rather than respond to the motion, Wand filed a motion to
sever his case from Walker’s, stating that he had been transferred to a different facility,
and it had become “even more difficult to litigate this case” at separate institutions.
TextBehind opposed the motion, arguing that dividing the case would be costly and
inefficient. The district court denied Wand’s request, concluding that it came “too late”
because severance at that stage would “multiply the time and resources needed to
resolve” TextBehind’s motion and would be highly prejudicial to TextBehind. The court
granted Wand and Walker an extension to oppose TextBehind’s motion and warned
that response materials not signed by both plaintiffs would be stricken.
Wand objected to the denial of his motion to sever. He contended that he and
Walker had been “unfairly prejudiced” by the decision and that the court had impeded
their ability to litigate their claims. The district court overruled Wand’s objection and
again extended the time to respond to the summary judgment motion. The court once
more reminded Wand that materials not signed by both plaintiffs would be stricken,
and it warned that, if it did not receive response materials by the extended deadline, it
would “decide the motion without Plaintiffs’ input.” Wand and Walker did not respond
to the summary judgment motion.
After the response deadline had passed, the court granted TextBehind’s
summary judgment motion. Because Wand and Walker did not respond to
TextBehind’s proposed findings of fact, the court deemed the proposed facts to be
admitted. The court concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that TextBehind
“has a policy of processing all inmate-to-inmate mail even if related to legal matters and
that [TextBehind] has never destroyed any document for any reason.” Moreover, the
court noted that, concerning specific items of mail identified in the amended complaint,
TextBehind presented evidence that it “promptly processed each item after it received it
and that any delays were not” TextBehind’s fault.
After timely filing a notice of appeal, Wand submitted a motion to this court
requesting relief pending appeal, citing a new mail processing policy that was
implemented months after the court entered summary judgment. The motion sought to
raise new claims against the Department and prison administrators—parties that were
long ago dismissed from this case. We denied the motion without prejudice to renewal
after Wand first presented the request to the district court. Wand did so, and the district
court denied the motion.

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On appeal, Wand first challenges the denial of his motion to sever, alleging that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the prejudice to Wand and
Walker in proceeding jointly. We disagree. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 “gives
the court discretion to sever any claim and proceed with it separately if doing so will
increase judicial economy and avoid prejudice to the litigants.” Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v.
Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting 6 C HARLES A LAN WRIGHT
& A RTHUR R. M ILLER , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1591 (1st ed. 1971)). The
district court explicitly recognized (on several occasions) the challenges prisoner
plaintiffs face in joint litigation, informing Wand and Walker early on that they could
move to sever their claims if proceeding jointly proved too difficult. But by the time
Wand sought severance—after TextBehind had moved for summary judgment—the
district court determined that it would be highly prejudicial to TextBehind, delay
resolution of the case, and expend significant resources. We discern no abuse of
discretion in the court’s conclusion that Wand’s motion to sever came too late.
Next, Wand contends that the district court impeded his right, under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, to access the courts by preventing him from filing
submissions without Walker’s signature. This argument is unavailing. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(a), which states that unrepresented parties must sign “[e]very
pleading, written motion, and other paper” submitted to the court, is “mandatory when
triggered.” Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 628–30 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Wand is not a
lawyer, he cannot represent anyone but himself; thus, both Wand and Walker were
required to sign every filing. See AsymaDesign, LLC v. CBL & Assocs. Mgmt., Inc.,
103 F.4th 1257, 1258–59 (7th Cir. 2024). The district court therefore did not err when it
refused to accept noncompliant filings. This is particularly so where the court twice
granted Wand and Walker lengthy extensions to file a compliant response to
TextBehind’s motion for summary judgment.
Wand also contests the district court’s entry of summary judgment, arguing that
the court improperly granted the motion by relying only on the papers provided by
TextBehind. This claim, too, falls short. Local Rule 56 for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin provides that the party opposing a summary judgment motion must respond
and identify factual disputes including “specific references to the affidavits,
declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” E.D. WIS .
C IV. L.R. 56(b)(2). Wand and Walker failed to dispute TextBehind’s proposed facts, so
the court properly “deem[ed] uncontroverted statements of material fact admitted.”
Id. 56(b)(4). Where, as here, the district court—in the absence of disputed facts
presented by the opposing party—deems true all supported facts presented by the

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movant, “we consider, still in the light most favorable to [the opposing party], only the
facts (and inferences drawn from them) presented in accordance with” Local Rule 56.
Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015).
On this record, the district court correctly concluded that TextBehind is entitled
to summary judgment. The undisputed evidence shows that TextBehind diligently
processed (and never destroyed) mail sent to or from Wand and Walker, and that any
delays in receiving mail were caused by third parties, like the United States Postal
Service. Wand asserted in a declaration he submitted with his complaint that during the
period in which TextBehind returned privileged mail to its sender, he received a notice
that a letter sent to him by a prospective expert witness was returned to the sender as
undeliverable. The undisputed evidence reveals that the letter was indeed flagged as
privileged and returned to the sender, but TextBehind shortly thereafter revised its
policy and began forwarding privileged mail to each correctional institution for further
processing. After the policy change, no other mail sent to or from Wand was returned.
A single isolated instance of disrupted mail delivery is insufficient to sustain a First
Amendment claim. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)) (First Amendment claim properly
dismissed where prisoner failed to allege “continuing pattern or repeated occurrences”
of disrupted mail).
Finally, Wand raises challenges related to the district court’s denial of his motion
seeking relief pending the outcome of this appeal. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 8(a). But because
we affirm the district court’s judgment, there is no basis for relief.
AFFIRMED

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