Chad B. Williams v. Multi-Color Corporation, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2025*
Decided January 27, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2263
CHAD B. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MULTI-COLOR CORPORATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 23-C-1643
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2263 Page 2
O R D E R
Chad Williams sued his former employer, Multi-Color Corporation, alleging that
the company fired him after he quarreled with a supervisor over a work request, as it
had previously fired similarly insubordinate workers. The district court dismissed
Williams’s amended complaint. Because the court correctly concluded that Williams
failed to state a claim under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), we affirm.
This is Williams’s second Title VII case against Multi-Color. In his first suit,
Williams alleged that in 2019 Multi-Color refused to promote him from the position of
“cutting operator” because of his race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The district court
granted Multi-Color’s motion for summary judgment because Williams did not present
evidence of discrimination, and we dismissed his appeal for failing to comply with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a).
Williams filed his second suit—the subject of this appeal—against Multi-Color in
2023 for “egregious acts of retaliation” that he says followed his first suit. The only
specific allegations in his amended complaint, which we take as true, see Williamson v.
Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2013), are that, in October 2022, Williams heatedly
quarreled with his supervisor about whether his job required him to maintain a
machine that he operated. The supervisor repeatedly asked Williams whether he knew
how to change the tape of the machine’s blade, and Williams replied several times that
he did not and that it was “maintenance’s job.” Incensed by the recurrent questioning,
Williams persisted in “argu[ing] loudly” with his supervisor. Multi-Color investigated
Williams’s workplace conduct and fired him for it later that month, as it had fired other
workers when they clashed with the same supervisor.
Williams filed an administrative charge of discrimination (accusing Multi-Color
of firing him for “insubordination”), and then this suit challenging the discharge, but
the district court dismissed the suit. First, the court reasoned that Williams did not
adequately allege that Multi-Color fired him for unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory
reasons. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010). Second, the
court added, Williams did not exhaust his administrative remedies on a retaliation
claim because, as reflected in his administrative charge, Williams charged Multi-Color
only with discrimination, not retaliation. See Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
602 F.3d 852, 864–65 (7th Cir. 2010). Finally, the district court declined to give Williams

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No. 24-2263 Page 3
an opportunity to amend his complaint a second time, citing futility. See Zimmerman v.
Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022).
On appeal, Williams asks us to reinstate this case, but Multi-Color first argues
that Williams’s appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(a), which requires that an appellant provide “contentions and
the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which
the appellant relies.” FED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8)(A); see Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544,
545 (7th Cir. 2001). True, Williams’s brief is only six sentences long and does not engage
with the district court’s reasoning. But we prefer to decide cases on the merits and can
do so here. See Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th
1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021). The only basis for relief that Williams invokes in his second
suit is “retaliation.” To state a Title VII claim for retaliation, Williams must plead that he
“engaged in statutorily protected activity and was subjected to adverse employment
action as a result of that activity.” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1029
(7th Cir. 2013). But he can plead himself out of court by alleging “facts that establish an
impenetrable defense to [his] claims.” Epstein v. Epstein, 843 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.
2016) (citation omitted).
Williams has pleaded himself out of court. Under the most generous reading of
the amended complaint, Williams alleges that his supervisor subjected him to the
adverse action of maintenance work in retaliation for his first suit. But Williams is not
seeking relief in this suit from the burden of maintenance work. Rather, he seeks relief
from Multi-Color only for firing him. Yet the firing was not unlawfully retaliatory: He
alleges that his discharge occurred because, as he also stated in his administrative
charge, he quarreled with his supervisor over a work request and grew insubordinate.
Employers may discharge insubordinate workers. See Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger,
388 F.3d 1015, 1031–32 (7th Cir. 2004); Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1134
(7th Cir. 1994). And Williams was not singled out for insubordination, because, as he
also alleges, Multi-Color has fired other workers who quarreled with the same
supervisor. Thus, Williams pleaded himself out of court on his retaliatory-discharge
claim under Title VII. (Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address whether
the court was also correct in its analysis of the exhaustion defense.)
Although Williams does not challenge the district court’s refusal to allow him to
amend his complaint, we agree on plenary review that an amendment would be futile

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here. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510,
524 (7th Cir. 2015) (review is de novo when basis for denying leave to amend is futility).
A second amended complaint could not remedy the already-pleaded allegations that
are fatal to his claim—namely, that Multi-Color had a legitimate reason to fire him and
that it had fired other employees for similar behavior.
AFFIRMED

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