George P. Goodman, Jr. v. Mark Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 7, 2025*
Decided February 3, 2025
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3039
GEORGE P. GOODMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARK WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-cv-4033
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
George Goodman, an Illinois prisoner with myriad dental problems, appeals
from the denial of his request for a preliminary injunction to compel prison officials to
provide him with dental care. The district court denied the motion because Goodman
failed to show irreparable harm and likely success on the merits. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3039 Page 2
In early 2023, Goodman sued prison officials and medical professionals at Hill
Correctional Center for deliberate indifference to his broken teeth and dental
prostheses, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Goodman alleged, among other things, that he was denied dental plates (full or partial
dentures that serve as replacements for missing teeth), a dental splint (a protective
device that reduces grinding and clenching during sleep), and the treatment necessary
to fix his broken teeth, which made eating difficult. The district court screened the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Goodman to proceed with his claims
against the warden at Hill, Mark Williams; a doctor at Hill, Kurt Osmundson; a
grievance officer at Hill, Jason Garza; and Wexford Health Sources, which contracted to
provide certain medical services at Hill and other facilities within the Illinois
Department of Corrections. The court dismissed the remaining defendants, including
the former acting director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), who was
not personally involved in Goodman’s dental care—as required for liability under
§ 1983. See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017).
In April 2023, Goodman was transferred to Danville Correctional Center. There,
he was seen by a dentist and put on a list to receive a filling. Goodman was instructed
to follow up and request additional care, but he made no requests to see a dentist. (The
record does not reflect whether he received any further dental care, including the
filling.) In September 2023, Goodman filed motions for injunctive relief to compel
Wexford and the acting director of IDOC to provide him with dental care at Danville.1
In the motions, Goodman complained that he had not received dental care at Danville;
was in constant pain; and had difficulty eating, digesting, and sleeping. Because the
former acting director of IDOC was dismissed at screening, Goodman sought to
supplement his complaint to add as a defendant the new acting director.2
The district court denied both motions. It first ruled that Goodman was not
entitled to injunctive relief because his allegations about the need for dental care at
Danville did not relate to his claims in this suit regarding his dental care at Hill. And
the named Hill defendants, the court noted, did not have the ability to effectuate the
1 This was a misstep. If Goodman wished to take action to obtain dental care at
Danville, his recourse was to move to amend his complaint and add the Danville
defendants. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 15(a)(2).
2 By the time Goodman moved for a preliminary injunction, LaToya Hughes had
replaced Rob Jeffreys as acting director.

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No. 23-3039 Page 3
relief Goodman sought at Danville. The court acknowledged that Wexford was
contracted to provide dental care at both facilities, but the company was not a proper
party because only Danville’s medical staff were authorized to take the action sought by
Goodman. Further, the court explained, Goodman introduced no evidence that the
treatment he sought was prescribed, let alone that he was in danger of suffering
irreparable harm. As for Goodman’s motion to add the acting IDOC director as a
defendant, the court denied the motion because the appropriate individual who could
provide injunctive relief was Danville’s warden, not IDOC’s director.
The defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing that Goodman had
not exhausted his administrative remedies at Hill. The district court disagreed and
denied summary judgment.
Goodman appeals the interlocutory order denying his motion for preliminary
injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). As he sees it, he has shown sufficient irreparable
harm through the “ongoing denial” of adequate dental care at Hill and Danville.
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, we review
its legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its balancing of
factors for a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686,
693 (7th Cir. 2019). To obtain a preliminary injunction, Goodman must first establish (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an adequate remedy at law; and (3)
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc.,
8 F.4th 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2021). Injunctive relief under § 1983 is proper only if there is a
continuing violation of federal law. Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890, 894
(7th Cir. 2012).
Goodman has not shown irreparable harm. As the district court noted, Goodman
did not supply any evidence showing that he cannot receive his requested treatment at
Danville. What is more, the named defendants in this case are medical professionals at
Hill, and nothing in the record suggests that they are authorized to carry out
Goodman’s requested dental care at Danville.
Goodman also challenges the district court’s conclusion that Wexford was not a
proper party, asserting that the company is contracted to provide dental care at both
Hill and Danville. But he neither engages with the court’s determination that Wexford
cannot order the medical staff at Danville to take action, see F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8);
Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022), nor suggests that Wexford had a policy

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or custom of failing to provide necessary dental care to prisoners at Danville. See Shields
v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014).
Goodman next takes issue with the district court’s screening order, particularly
its dismissal of the former acting director of IDOC—the supervisory official responsible
for carrying out injunctive relief at Danville and Hill. Goodman argues that we may
exercise pendant jurisdiction over his claims dismissed in the screening order.
See Allman v. Smith, 790 F.3d 762, 763 (7th Cir. 2015). But in this interlocutory appeal, we
lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal of Goodman’s claims at
screening. The merits in this case are still being litigated in the district court, and our
jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And
even if we could review the dismissal of Goodman’s claims at screening, he has not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits because he does not make a “strong”
showing that reveals how he proposes to prove his case. Bevis v. City of Naperville,
85 F.4th 1175, 1188 (7th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation omitted). To the contrary, the
record reflects that Goodman was seen by a dentist at Danville and put on a list to
receive a filling, but he made no further requests, as instructed, to see a dentist.
AFFIRMED

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