Da Vonte Love v. Daniel La Voie

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 13, 2025*
Decided February 14, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2351
DA VONTE LOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL LA VOIE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 23-C-1537
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Da Vonte Love, a Wisconsin prisoner whom doctors have treated for depression,
carpal tunnel syndrome, and vision problems, contends that the defendants have
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under both
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132–12133, and the Rehabilitation
Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 794–794a. He appeals the denial of his motion for a preliminary
injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The district court denied preliminary relief
because, among other reasons, Love failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits. Because the district court reasonably exercised its discretion, we affirm.
Dissatisfied with the medical care that he was receiving at Green Bay
Correctional Institution, Love sued for relief. The district court screened his verified
complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed him to proceed on three claims. The first
alleges that Dr. Daniel La Voie (the prison’s medical director) and an advance-practice
nurse violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by discontinuing Love’s
prescription for pregabalin, a pain reliever, for his carpal tunnel syndrome. (Love had
refused to complete blood tests required to assess whether he was taking the drug as
prescribed because, he said, his carpal tunnel symptoms made blood tests too painful.)
The second claim alleges that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections,
in his official capacity, violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by refusing to allow
Love to provide a urine sample, instead of a blood sample, to test for the amount of
pregabalin in his system. The third claim alleges that two doctors violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment by treating him with different antidepressants for three
years even though, he says, the drugs were ineffective and blurred his vision.
Love moved for a preliminary injunction. He asked the district court to order the
defendants (1) to accommodate his request for urine, rather than blood, testing to assess
his use of pregabalin; (2) to treat Love’s depression with “brain stimulation treatment”;
and (3) to house Love in a single cell in light of blurred vision from his antidepressant.
The defendants opposed the motion and submitted declarations regarding
Love’s medical treatment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Dr. La Voie attested that the Department
requires prisoners to submit to blood testing to monitor for misuse of drugs like
pregabalin, and he discontinued Love’s prescription because he refused to comply with
that requirement. Dr. La Voie also attested that a urine test is not an adequate substitute
for a blood test because the former shows only whether pregabalin is present, not
whether its level is proper. Next, Dr. Todd Hamilton, supervisor of psychological
services at the prison, attested that, based on his review of Love’s records, “brain
stimulation” was not appropriate for Love. He explained that Love had persistent
depressive disorder, a condition for which different drug options were still available;
brain stimulation, by contrast, is a treatment for severe depression, such as major
depressive disorder, which Love did not have. He also stated that Love was no longer

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No. 24-2351 Page 3
taking the antidepressant drug that blurred his vision, and therefore a single cell was
not necessary. Love did not contest these statements.
The district court denied Love’s motion, concluding that Love was not likely to
succeed on the merits of his claims under the Eighth Amendment, ADA, or
Rehabilitation Act. It first explained that the decisions to require blood testing for
pregabalin and to forgo brain-stimulation therapy were based on uncontested medical
judgment; therefore, Love was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claims under the
Eighth Amendment. As for Love’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the
court ruled that urine testing was not a reasonable accommodation for blood testing
because, as was undisputed, it did not allow the Department to assess whether Love
was taking his medication as prescribed. And because medical records showed that
Love had not recently complained about blurred vision from his current drugs, the
court ruled that a single cell was not a needed accommodation. The court added that
Love was unlikely to suffer irreparable harm if the court denied his request for relief.
Love challenges the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. We review
legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and denial of injunctive relief
for an abuse of discretion. See GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield, 922 F.3d 357, 364
(7th Cir. 2019). He first challenges the conclusion that he failed to show a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits—one of the requirements for obtaining a preliminary
injunction. See Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020). Because, as we are about
to explain, Love cannot show any likelihood of success on the merits, we need not
address the other prerequisites to obtain a preliminary injunction. See GEFT Outdoors,
922 F.3d at 364.
We begin with Love’s argument that the Eighth Amendment entitled him to
brain-stimulation therapy. We understand him to argue that the defendants deliberately
ignored his depression because they continued to prescribe antidepressant drugs even
though his depression is not resolved. To have a chance of success on this claim, Love
must present evidence suggesting that the defendants persisted in treatment that they
knew was ineffective or refused treatment that they knew was proper. See, e.g., Goodloe
v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020). But he did not do so. As Dr. Hamilton
explained without contradiction, Love had not yet exhausted all of the options for
antidepressant drugs that could alleviate his symptoms of depression. Further, Love
did not contest the medical opinion that his condition of persistent depressive disorder
was not severe enough to warrant brain-stimulation therapy. Finally, Love produced no
evidence that the defendants knew that all drug options would be ineffective or that

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drug therapy was such a substantial departure from accepted professional standards
that it was not even the exercise of medical judgment. See Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th
545, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2022). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying
his request for brain-stimulation therapy.
The district court also correctly ruled that Love had no chance of success on his
claims, under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, seeking a urine-test alternative to
monitor his pregabalin levels and single-occupancy cell for his blurred vision. In Love’s
view, the court should not have credited the statements from Dr. La Voie (that a urine
test could not detect pregabalin levels) and from Dr. Hamilton (that Love was no longer
taking the antidepressant drug that had blurred his vision). But Love failed to offer any
medical evidence to contradict Dr. La Voie’s statement about urine testing. And,
although Love stated in his verified complaint that his vision had once been blurry, he
did not contest Dr. Hamilton’s statement that, after a change in drugs, Love no longer
reported blurred vision. Finally, even if the evidence had conflicted, in evaluating a
motion for a preliminary injunction the court was not required to give Love the same
benefit of the doubt on evidence as it would at summary judgment. See Doe v. Univ. of
S. Ind., 43 F.4th 784, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022). Thus the district court reasonably denied
him preliminary relief on these claims.
We have considered Love’s other arguments, and none has merit.
Finally, we discuss the matter of Love’s fee status on appeal. The district court
granted Love in forma pauperis (IFP), relying on its earlier ruling from the onset of this
case that Love had satisfied the imminent-physical-danger exception to the three-strikes
rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). But the district court did not consider whether—at the time
Love appealed and based on the record the court had developed—Love continued to
satisfy the exception. By then, as discussed above, the undisputed evidence showed that
Love was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Thus the grant of IFP
status on appeal was incorrect.
We AFFIRM the district court’s order and REVOKE Love’s IFP status in this
appeal. Love must pay the filing and docketing fees for this appeal. Campbell v. Clarke,
481 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2007); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1997). The
clerk of the district court shall collect the appellate fees from the prisoner's trust fund
account using the mechanism of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

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