United States of America v. Anthony Moneyham

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 4, 2025
Decided March 3, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1763
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY MONEYHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:11-CR-00299(1)
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Anthony Moneyham admitted to violating the conditions of his supervised
release—part of his sentence for distributing heroin—and was sentenced to prison time
followed by a new term of supervised release. On appeal, he contends that the written
judgment conflicts with the district judge’s oral pronouncement of the conditions of his
new term of supervised release. There is no inconsistency. In her sentencing remarks,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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the judge imposed the written conditions proposed by the probation office; the
proposed written conditions match those contained in the judgment. We affirm.
In 2019 Moneyham began a five-year period of supervised release after
completing a lengthy prison term for heroin distribution. In 2021 he violated his
conditions of release by committing multiple new crimes in Illinois, including burglary
and aggravated battery. The probation office petitioned to revoke his supervision, but
the revocation proceedings were placed on hold while state charges on the new crimes
moved forward. In 2023 state authorities charged Moneyham with public
indecency/lewd exposure for exposing himself to female correctional staff. Later that
year Moneyham was convicted and sentenced on the burglary/battery case, and the
lewd exposure charges were then dismissed.
With the state cases resolved, the federal revocation proceedings resumed. The
probation office had filed a new violation report adding the lewd-exposure charges to
the burglary and battery charges as grounds for revocation. The probation officer
recommended that the district judge impose a three-year term of reimprisonment and
an additional four years of supervised release. The violation report included a list of
proposed conditions of supervised release, two of which are relevant here: Special
Condition 9, which required Moneyham to participate in a sex offender program and
take all prescribed medication, and Discretionary Condition 9, which required him to
participate in a drug treatment program.
The judge held a combined revocation and sentencing hearing in April 2024.
Moneyham stipulated to the violations related to the conduct underlying his burglary
and battery convictions. The judge accepted that stipulation and revoked his supervised
release; she declined to base the revocation on the lewd-exposure charges but noted that
she could consider that information for sentencing purposes. The Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a reimprisonment term of 33 to 41 months. The government argument
for a sentence of 33 months, the low end of the range, based on the violent nature of
Moneyham’s conduct, his criminal history and pattern of noncompliance on supervised
release, and the need for deterrence.
Moneyham argued for a sentence of time served, plus additional supervised
release so that he could receive programming. Referring to Discretionary Condition 9,
his attorney argued in favor of placing Moneyham in a mental health program; she
noted that his conduct during his state crimes suggested that he had mental health
problems, and Moneyham himself told the judge that he had no awareness during or
memory of the crimes. Neither he nor his attorney, however, mentioned Special

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No. 24-1763 Page 3
Condition 9. Moneyham did not object to this or any proposed condition, either in
writing or at the hearing.
The judge sentenced Moneyham to a 12-month term of reimprisonment, with
credit for time served, and an additional six months of supervised release. Regarding
the proposed conditions of release, the judge told Moneyham that upon his release from
prison, he had to report to the probation office and “follow the conditions that are in
front of you”— referring to the conditions in the probation officer’s violation report.
The judge did not read the proposed conditions verbatim but instead summarized and
commented on them. She told Moneyham that he would receive a mental health
assessment and a drug abuse assessment, that he could not commit another crime, and
that he had to comply with all the other standard conditions “that were set forth.”
The judge then turned to the discretionary conditions, paraphrasing and
commenting on them in the same manner. She excised one that pertained to job skills,
and continued down the list:
Because of your activities while you have been in custody before, the Court
is going to determine that you should participate in a sex offender treatment
program. It’s a program for you to understand why you do what you do,
why you disrespect women, why you disrespect yourself, and not to put
you in that position. We don't want it escalating. So I want you to -- there
will be a program that they will determine that you’ll get into that you need
to do that definitely before the six months is over. And if you don’t
participate, again, you will be in violation. Do you understand?
Moneyham said he did, and neither he nor counsel asked for clarification. After
finishing with the special conditions, the judge asked if there was “any objection to any
of the Court’s conditions,” and Moneyham’s attorney answered “No.”
A written judgment was eventually issued. It set forth the conditions of
supervised release (other than those the judge declined to impose) in language identical
to the proposed conditions in the probation officer violation report. With respect to
Special Condition 9, the judgment states:
[Y]ou shall participate in a sex offender treatment program. The specific
program and provider will be determined by a probation officer. You shall
comply with all recommended treatment which may include psychological

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and physiological testing. You shall maintain use of all prescribed
medications.
On appeal, Moneyham takes issue with the requirements that he be subject to
physiological testing and maintain the use of all prescribed medications. He argues that
those requirements impermissibly expand the orally pronounced sentence, which, he
contends, imposed only a requirement that he attend therapy. In support of this
interpretation, he points to the judge’s comments that treatment would “help him
understand the motivations for certain behaviors and prevent them from recurring.” He
explains that he did not lodge an objection because he had none as to the type of
treatment the judge discussed.
As an initial matter, the government argues that Moneyham waived this
challenge because he stated that he had no objection to “the court’s conditions.” We
disagree. Moneyham is not challenging the imposition of the condition requiring that he
participate in sex-offender treatment. He is trying to ascertain what that condition
entails because, in his view, the condition in the written judgment impermissibly
modifies the orally pronounced condition. A defendant who raises an inconsistency
between an oral pronouncement and a written judgment is not challenging “his
sentence or the manner in which it was imposed” but is instead seeking the imposition
of what he claims is the correct, orally pronounced, sentence. United States v. Harris,
51 F.4th 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2022). Moneyham is seeking to limit the scope of Special
Condition 9 to what the judge said at the hearing. The alleged error did not arise until
after the hearing, when the judgment was issued, so no objection was required. Because
there was no waiver or forfeiture, we review de novo whether the written judgment
conflicts with the oral pronouncement. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 862–63
(7th Cir. 2015).
Moneyham’s argument that the oral pronouncement and written judgment
conflict rests on the premise that the judge’s remarks about sex-offender treatment were
the extent of her oral pronouncement. But they were not. Judges are permitted to
incorporate proposed conditions by reference, United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 872
(7th Cir. 2016), and that occurred here. At the hearing, the judge specifically referred
Moneyham to the conditions “that are in front of you” before she paraphrased or
commented on the list in the probation officer’s report. She did not read them verbatim
but instead explained and commented on them. Because the judge incorporated the
proposed conditions by reference, there is no inconsistency unless the conditions
written in the judgment do not match the proposed conditions the judge adopted at the

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hearing. United States v. Strobel, 987 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2021). Here, the conditions
match.1
True, the judge did not expressly state that she “incorporated” the proposed
conditions by reference. Cf. Bloch, 825 F.3d at 868 (noting that the judge stated that he
was incorporating all proposed conditions). But what she did at the hearing—referring
to and discussing the conditions without reading them verbatim—does not make sense
otherwise. The full conditions were in the document in front of Moneyham—and in
several supplemental reports from the probation office before the hearing—and the
judge directed his attention to it so he could follow along as she discussed the
conditions. See Strobel, 987 F.3d at 751 (“[W]e [do] not demand formalism for
formalism’s sake.”). And she told him that he had to comply with the conditions “set
forth” in the report.
We have recognized that an oral sentence pronouncement will rarely be perfect,
so we will remand “only when necessary to preserve the principles of notice [of the
supervised-release conditions] and opportunity to object.” Id. Upholding the condition
as it appears in the judgment does not offend those principles. Moneyham received the
proposed conditions before the hearing, so he was on notice that sex-offender treatment
could include medication and physiological testing. If he wished to contest those
requirements, he could have objected to the proposed condition before the hearing,
when the judge incorporated the proposed conditions at the hearing, or when the judge
expressly asked for objections. Because he did not, the conditions went into the written
judgment exactly as they had been proposed and adopted, so there is no conflict that
warrants vacating the condition.
AFFIRMED
1 At oral argument, counsel for Moneyham suggested that the probation office
did not distribute a list of proposed conditions, but they were attached to each special
report on Moneyham’s violations. The four most recent supplemental reports have the
box next to Special Condition 9 checked, and the condition was set forth exactly as it
appears in the written judgment. (Doc. 241, March 2024 Report, at 11; Doc. 235, January
2024 Report, at 10; Doc. 218, September 2023 Report, at 10; Doc. 209, July 2023 Report,
at 10.) The box was unchecked only on the initial report requesting revocation and first
supplement. (Doc. 173, August 2021 Report, at 10; Doc. 181, January 2022 Report, at 9.)

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