Eric Golden v. Ian Cox

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 5, 2025*
Decided March 7, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2147
ERIC GOLDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
IAN COX, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 19-cv-00855-RJD
Reona J. Daly,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Eric Golden, a prisoner in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), sued
three correctional officers for violating his rights under the First Amendment by
disciplining him for discussing what he says was his religious group. See 42 U.S.C.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2147 Page 2
§ 1983. A jury found in favor of the officers, and Golden appeals. We affirm because
Golden did not preserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district
court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in the jury selection process.
While Golden was a prisoner at Pinckneyville Correctional Center in
Pinckneyville, Illinois, he had several phone calls with a Chicago man named Daryl
Abney throughout 2018. Abney was a suspected leader of the Gangster Stones, a
criminal gang and faction of the Black P. Stone gang. Sometime in 2019, Ian Cox, an
officer with IDOC’s Intelligence Unit, flagged one of these phone calls for potential
gang (“security threat group”) activity. During that call, Golden and Abney discussed
elevating someone to Assistant Grand Sheikh within the Moorish Hajars, an Islamic
faith group. Cox believed that Golden was a member of the Black P. Stones and was
discussing its leadership with Abney, so Cox wrote Golden a disciplinary ticket. Golden
appealed, and Officers Charles Heck and Marcus Myers Sr. (members of the committee
responsible for adjudicating disciplinary tickets at Pinckneyville) found that Golden
engaged in prohibited gang activity. Golden was put in solitary confinement for four
months as punishment.
Golden sued Cox, Heck, and Myers for violating his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that the Moorish Hajars were a religious group and
that the defendants had punished him for discussing his religion. The district court
screened his complaint and allowed Golden to proceed with a claim of retaliation for
engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. After the district court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial, with a
magistrate judge presiding by the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
During voir dire, the court allowed Golden’s counsel to probe the potential jurors
for bias against gang members and religious bias. No potential jurors stated that they
would be biased because of their religious beliefs. Only one juror stated that he had a
negative experience with gangs, and Golden struck that juror for cause. In total, five
potential jurors were struck for cause, and each side used its three peremptory
challenges. A six-person jury was seated.
At the trial, the jury heard testimony from Golden about his adherence to the
Moorish Hajar religion and other Islamic faith groups. Golden testified that during his
phone call with Abney, he was simply discussing elevating someone to a higher
position within the Moorish Hajars to allow that person to lead religious services in the
prison. Golden denied that he was a member of the Black P. Stones and admitted into

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No. 23-2147 Page 3
evidence a charter of the Moorish Hajars to prove that the group was a religious
organization and not a gang.
Cox testified next. He stated that he was a “Black P. Stone specialist” and had
identified Golden as a member of the Black P. Stones and Abney as a member of the
Gangster Stones. Cox believed that Golden and Abney were discussing elevating
someone within the Black P. Stones, not a religious group. He also testified that he was
unfamiliar with the Moorish Hajars and was unaware of Golden’s religion when he
wrote the disciplinary ticket. Cox testified that the Intelligence Unit views the Black P.
Stones as a gang that uses the trappings and terminology of Islamic faith groups to
mask gang activity. Heck and Myers also testified that they believed that Golden and
Abney were discussing gang activity and that they were unfamiliar with the Moorish
Hajars. Both also said that they did not believe that Golden discussed religion at all on
the phone call.
The court instructed the jury that, to succeed, Golden needed to show that the
defendants intentionally disciplined him because he discussed his religion on the call
with Abney. The jury found for the defendants. Golden did not move for judgment as a
matter of law at the close of evidence or after the verdict. He now appeals.
Golden first argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. But he
did not file a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore failed to preserve a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge for appellate review. See Collins v. Lochard, 792 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir.
2015).
Next, Golden challenges the admission of a Moorish Hajar charter he was
unfamiliar with, and he alleges that the defense withheld or destroyed two pieces of
evidence (an internal affairs interview with Golden after he witnessed excessive force,
and a “kite” found inside of Golden’s cell). As to the first argument, Golden did not
object to the admission of the charter and therefore forfeited any challenge. See Wilson v.
City of Chi., 758 F.3d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 2014). And he has not shown that extraordinary
circumstances exist for allowing plain-error review under Rule 103(e) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2017). In any case, at
trial only one charter was presented, and it was identified by Golden and admitted
without objection as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12. Golden cannot argue that he was prejudiced
by his own evidence, offered to show that the Moorish Hajars were a religious group.
See Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 251 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing F ED. R. EVID. 403).

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No. 23-2147 Page 4
With respect to the missing evidence, Golden’s argument is waived. He did not
move to compel production of these items during discovery, seek a discovery sanction,
or ask for an adverse-inference jury instruction on the basis of spoliation. We will not
review an evidentiary issue that is raised for the first time on appeal. See Bracey v.
Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, Golden provides no support for his
assertion that any evidence was withheld or destroyed, let alone intentionally and in
bad faith. See Downing v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 812 (7th Cir. 2022).
Golden further contends that the jurors had an inherent bias against “Islamic
religions” and possible gang members. But Golden did not raise any concerns of jury
bias in the district court or object during voir dire when the district court offered the
parties an opportunity to express concerns or identify problems. He has thus waived his
jury-bias argument. Ammons-Lewis v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi.,
488 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2007). Regardless, during voir dire, the district court allowed
Golden’s counsel to probe the potential jurors for bias against gang members or bias
based on the jurors’ religious beliefs. No jurors expressed that they would be biased
because of their religious beliefs. One juror stated that he had a negative experience
with gangs, and the court struck that juror for cause. Thus Golden lacks evidence that
the verdict for the defendants was a product of inherent bias.
Lastly, Golden argues that the jury composed of “all white Christians” was not a
jury of his peers. Golden, however, never previously raised any issue about the jury’s
composition. To preserve this argument, he had to object before the jury was sworn and
the venire was dismissed, see Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 714–715 (7th Cir. 2019), and
he did not. Regardless, a litigant does not have a right to a petit jury of his peers, only a
right to a jury venire that represents a cross-section of the community. Marshall v. City of
Chi., 762 F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2014). Golden did not timely object to the makeup of the
venire, see 28 U.S.C. § 1867(c), (e), and on appeal he does not point to anything in the
record to suggest that the jury pool was tainted.
AFFIRMED

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