United States of America v. Bashiek Stovall

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025
Decided March 17, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1717
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BASHIEK STOVALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-CR-00136(1)
Joan H. Lefkow,
Judge.
O R D E R
After a jury trial, Bashiek Stovall was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
commit sex trafficking of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c); two counts of sex trafficking of a
minor, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c); and one count of transportation of child
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1). He was sentenced to 268 months’ imprisonment
and seven years’ supervised release, and he was ordered to pay $225,600 in restitution.
Stovall has appealed, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 2
appeal like this could involve. Because the analysis appears thorough, and Stovall has
not responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects
that counsel raises, United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Mindful of the
large number of potential issues, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Stovall and his daughter, Shawnea Mathews-Stovall, ran a sex-trafficking
business in Chicago from 2018 to 2020. Stovall trafficked multiple minors including
Janiyah, Lamariyae, Diamond, Janie, Charity, and Angel. The minors sent sexually
explicit photos of themselves to Stovall, and he or Shawnea posted the photos online,
accompanied by advertisements for sexual services. After customers contacted Stovall
for “dates” with the minors, he drove them to the agreed-upon location, waited for
them to complete their “dates,” and collected payment based on the length of each date.
In 2022, a grand jury issued a superseding indictment. One of the sex-trafficking
counts (Count 2) named Minor E (later identified as Lamariyae) as the victim, and
another (Count 3) named Minor D (later identified as Janiyah). The indictment also
included a forfeiture allegation under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)(1) and (2), for a money
judgment of $225,600.
Stovall filed pretrial motions. First, he moved to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 3 under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that the prosecution of
these counts depended on whether he had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the
victim; that standard, he thought, was vague and improper. The district court denied
the motion. Stovall also moved in limine to bar use of the terms “victim” and “minor”
during trial and to exclude any evidence that Stovall trafficked victims not mentioned
in the indictment. The court allowed the government to use the terms “victim” and
“minor” (because they did not necessarily implicate Stovall) and to offer evidence that
Stovall trafficked victims unnamed in the indictment (because the government had
charged conspiracy in Count 1, which applied to minors other than those named).
The jury trial came next. FBI agents testified about Stovall’s interactions with the
minors, the customers, and Shawnea. An agent testified that officers recovered from
Stovall’s residence phones that contained messages with the minors and postings to a
website advertising sexual services. Messages between Stovall and the minors matched
the photos or timing of the posts advertising the sexual services. Officers also recovered
text messages between Stovall and persons who replied to the advertisements; they
showed that Stovall sent pictures of the minors to some of these responders.

-- 2 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 3
The agents also testified about how Stovall trafficked each minor. They explained
that Lamariyae, who was then 16 years old, sent sexually explicit photos to Stovall, who
in turn posted online advertisements for sexual services using the photos. Next, they
testified that Stovall and Lamariyae discussed the “calls” that Stovall had arranged for
her. Further, they recited how Stovall posted advertisements for sexual services using
photos of Janiyah, who was then 16 years old, in her underwear. On several occasions,
they added, Stovall and Janiyah discussed payment for calls, and she sent him more
sexually explicit photos. An agent also testified about the attempted sex trafficking of
Angel, who was then 12 years old. Stovall sent sexually explicit photos of Angel to
Shawnea, and Shawnea replied “Nah” and that “She don’t got no shape.” The agent
testified that the photos of Angel were taken at a room at an inn in Chicago, and Stovall
was listed as a guest at the inn on the day that he sent the photos.
Next, an agent testified about Stovall’s interactions with Shawnea. Stovall and
Shawnea discussed posting advertisements for the victims’ sexual services, and
Shawnea offered to post advertisements for him. Stovall later sent photos of two
different girls to Shawnea, and Stovall and Shawnea also discussed how they could
make more money with two cars instead of one.
The government also called Dr. Sharon Cooper to testify as an expert in child
sexual exploitation. Stovall sought to cross-examine her about a finding that she was a
biased witness in a 1995 case in military court. The district court sustained the
government’s objection to the questioning.
Stovall objected to some proposed jury instructions. Those instructions were
either amended to Stovall’s satisfaction or removed, except for one instruction about
criminal liability. The instruction stated that “[a]n offense may be committed by more
than one person. A defendant’s guilt may be established without proof that the
defendant personally performed every act constituting the crime charged.”
The jury found Stovall guilty on all four counts.
Stovall sought a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He argued that some victims were not minors because they had
visible tattoos, and Illinois law requires that those who receive tattoos be at least 18
years old. The court denied the motion. It concluded that the jury reasonably rejected
Stovall’s argument about the victims’ ages in light of other evidence, including their
birth certificates, which it could rely on to find that the victims were minors.

-- 3 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 4
Ahead of sentencing, a probation officer filed a presentence investigation report
(PSR). The officer placed the offenses into three groups: Group 1 included the
conspiracy (Count 1) and the sex trafficking of Lamariyae (Count 2); Group 2 included
the conspiracy (Count 1) and the sex trafficking of Janiyah (Count 3); and Group 3
included the transportation of child pornography (Count 4).
Groups 1 and 2 had the same calculations. After assigning a base offense level of
30, see U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2), the officer added two levels because Stovall unduly
influenced a minor to engage in sex, see id. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B); two levels because the
offense involved the use of a computer, see id. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A)–(B); two levels because
the offense involved commission of a sex act, see id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A); two levels because
the victims were vulnerable, see id. § 3A1.1(b)(1); and two levels based on Stovall’s role
as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the offense, see id. § 3B1.1(c). The
resulting adjusted offense level for Group 1 and Group 2 was 40.
For Group 3, the base offense level was 22. See id. § 2G2.2(a)(2). The officer added
two levels because Stovall distributed child pornography, see id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F); five
levels because of his pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a
minor, see id. § 2G2.2(b)(5); two levels because he used a computer during the offense,
see id. § 2G2.2(b)(6); and two levels because the offense involved at least ten images,
see id. § 2G2.2(b)(7). The resulting offense level for Group 3 was 33. The Guideline for
multiple-count adjustments yielded a final adjusted offense level of 43. See id. § 3D1.4.
With an offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of V (based on 10
history points), Stovall’s guidelines range was life in prison. Stovall objected to several
offense-level adjustments, but the court adopted the PSR’s calculations and overruled
Stovall’s objections. After weighing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it imposed 268
months in prison on Counts 1 to 3, 60 months in prison on Count 4 (all concurrent),
seven concurrent years of supervised release, and $225,600 in restitution.
1. No nonfrivolous challenge to rulings on pretrial motions
a. Motion to dismiss
Counsel first considers challenges to the rulings on the pretrial motions. Counsel
rightly rejects arguing that the court erred by denying Stovall’s motion to dismiss the
indictment. Stovall argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) was unconstitutionally vague, but all
circuit courts to have reached the issue have held the opposite. See United States v. Koech,
992 F.3d 686, 688–91 (8th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1331

-- 4 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 5
(11th Cir. 2019). We apply the same “ordinary person” standard as those courts to
decide if the statute provides adequate notice, see United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 872
(7th Cir. 2020), and Stovall’s challenge to that standard itself is foreclosed by the
Supreme Court, see, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010).
b. Motions in limine
Counsel next considers but rightly rejects any challenge to the rulings in limine,
which we would review for abuse of discretion. See Stegall v. Saul, 943 F.3d 1124, 1127
(7th Cir. 2019). The court reasonably ruled that the government could say “victim” and
“minor” because those terms do not necessarily implicate Stovall; and it could refer to
trafficked minors not named in the indictment because the conspiracy count rendered
them relevant. Finally, any challenge to the decision to prevent Stovall from questioning
the victims would be pointless because they did not testify, and any error would thus
be harmless. See United States v. Medrano, 83 F.4th 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 2023).
2. No nonfrivolous challenge to conviction
a. Sufficiency of evidence
We agree with counsel that any argument that the evidence was insufficient to
convict would be frivolous. We reverse only if no rational jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 998
(7th Cir. 2017). But the government introduced sufficient evidence: Shawnea and Stovall
discussed money, customers, transporting the victims, and advertising their services
(Count 1); Stovall posted sexually explicit photos that he received from Lamariyae and
Janiyah—who he knew were minors—on a site advertising sexual services, discussed
prices with customers, and transported the two victims to dates (Counts 2 and 3); and
he sent sexually explicit photos of Angel—who he knew was a minor—to Shawnea
(Count 4).
b. Jury instructions
Counsel next discusses a potential challenge to the jury instructions but correctly
concludes that it would be pointless. Stovall withdrew his objections to all jury
instructions except for one. And that instruction mirrored the pattern jury instruction
on joint ventures, see Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit § 5.05
(2023), and we presume that pattern jury instructions accurately state the law,

-- 5 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 6
see United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2019). Counsel does not see any
ground for rebutting that presumption, nor do we.
c. Confrontation Clause
Counsel tells us that Stovall proposes to argue that the government’s decision
not to call the victims to testify violated the Confrontation Clause, which generally bars
the testimonial statements of witnesses who do not appear at trial. United States v.
Graham, 47 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–
54 (2004)). But counsel correctly observes that the only statements from the victims
admitted at trial were phone messages that Stovall received from them. Because those
messages were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, they are not hearsay,
see United States v. Lewisbey, 843 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2016), and their admission does
not implicate Stovall’s confrontation right, see Graham, 47 F.4th at 567. Counsel thus
correctly concludes that any argument to the contrary would be frivolous.
d. Cross-examination about previous finding of Dr. Cooper’s bias
Counsel also considers but rightly rejects any challenge to bar cross-examination
about the finding that Dr. Cooper was biased in a 1995 case. Although evidence of a
witness’s bias is typically relevant, see United States v. Ozuna, 674 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.
2012), a court has “wide latitude to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination
based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues or interrogation
that is only marginally relevant,” United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir.
1999). We agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to challenge a discretionary
ruling to bar cross-examination about a 30-year-old finding of bias in a different case.
e. No other nonfrivolous challenges to conviction
Counsel mentions that Stovall would like to argue that his trial attorneys were
ineffective but correctly notes that any challenge to Stovall’s criminal judgment based
on ineffective assistance of counsel is best saved for collateral review, where a record
can be fully developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003).
3. No nonfrivolous challenge to sentence
a. Calculation of guidelines range
Counsel next correctly concludes that the district court properly calculated the
guidelines range. The court correctly calculated a base offense level of 30 and an

-- 6 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 7
adjusted offense level of 40 for Groups 1 and 2. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2). The court
correctly added two levels because Stovall unduly influenced a minor to engage in
sexual conduct. See id. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B). The Guidelines create a rebuttable presumption
that the adjustment applies if the defendant, like Stovall, was more than 10 years older
than the victims, see id. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.3(B), and Stovall failed to rebut it. The court
correctly added two levels for the use of a computer, see id. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A)–(B),
because Stovall used the internet to post photos and advertisements for the victims’
sexual services. Further, the court properly added two levels because the offense
involved the commission of a sex act. See id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). Stovall argued that he was
unable to have sex because of his health conditions. But the Guidelines do not require
that Stovall needed to have sex himself, and ample evidence showed that Stovall led the
victims to engage in sex. See id. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.1 (adopting definition of “sexual act”
under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)). The court also correctly added two levels because Stovall
knew or should have known that the victims were vulnerable based on their ages and
unstable homes. See id. § 3A1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.2 (defining “vulnerable victim”).
Also, the court correctly added two levels for Stovall’s role as an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor in the offense. See id. § 3B1.1(c). Stovall had opposed the
adjustment, arguing that Shawnea was not a criminally responsible participant. See id.
§ 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (defining “participant”). But the government produced evidence that
she knowingly aided the enterprise, which suffices. See United States v. Tate, 97 F.4th
541, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2024).
As for Group 3, counsel correctly concludes that the court accurately calculated
the guidelines range. It properly calculated a base offense level of 22. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(a)(2). It rightly added two levels for distributing child pornography because
Stovall sent the images he took of Angel to Shawnea. See id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). The court
next correctly added five levels because Stovall transported minors to engage in sex on
two or more separate occasions. See id. § 2G2.2(b)(5) & cmt. n.1. It correctly added two
levels for using a computer because Stovall used his phone to send the photos of Angel
to his daughter, see id. § 2G2.2(b)(6), and two levels because the offense involved at least
ten images, see id. § 2G2.2(b)(7). We thus agree with counsel that any challenge to the
adjusted offense level of 33 for Group 3, or to the multiple-count-adjustment Guideline,
see id. § 3D1.4, that yielded final offense level of 43, would be frivolous.
Counsel next considers challenging the use of the criminal history category of V,
but Stovall rightly received three points for each of three convictions—armed robbery in
2003, theft in 2017, and burglary in 2017. For each conviction, Stovall was (1) sentenced

-- 7 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 8
to more than a year and a month in prison and (2) incarcerated within 15 years of the
current offense. See id. §§ 4A1.1(a), 4A1.2(k)(1). The court also correctly added one more
point (for a total of 10) because Stovall received seven or more criminal history points
and committed the instant offense while on probation. See id. § 4A1.1(e).
b. Substantive reasonableness
We also agree with counsel that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness
of Stovall’s below-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. The district court adequately
justified the 268-month prison term based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2024). The court
reasonably balanced Stovall’s personal history and characteristics (observing his
extensive criminal history and difficult upbringing), the seriousness of the offense
(noting Stovall’s shocking and horrifying conduct), and mitigating factors (Stovall’s age
and poor health). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Therefore, Stovall could not overcome the
presumption that his below-guidelines sentence was reasonable. See United States v.
Holder, 94 F.4th 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2024).
c. Forfeiture allegations
Counsel next tells us that Stovall would like to argue on appeal that he was
entitled to a jury trial on the forfeiture allegations in this case. As counsel points out, the
district court entered a preliminary forfeiture order but did not enter a final judgment
of forfeiture against Stovall or impose forfeiture at sentencing. Therefore, any argument
about a final judgment of forfeiture would be frivolous.
d. Restitution
Counsel next considers but correctly rejects any challenge to Stovall’s restitution
order for $225,600. Restitution was mandatory, see 18 U.S.C. § 1593, and Stovall did not
object to its imposition. Further, as counsel explains, it would be frivolous to argue that
the district court abused its discretion by imposing a mandatory restitution order that
relied on the government’s calculations. See United States v. Dickey, 52 F.4th 680, 687
(7th Cir. 2022) (district courts have broad discretion in calculating restitution).
e. Supervised release
Finally, counsel considers whether Stovall could make a nonfrivolous challenge
to the conditions of supervised release. Counsel correctly rejects any argument that the
district court erred in imposing concurrent seven-year terms of supervised release on

-- 8 of 9 --

No. 24-1717 Page 9
each count. The court’s reasons for imposing the term of imprisonment are sufficient to
justify the term of supervised release. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–70
(7th Cir. 2016). And counsel correctly concludes that Stovall waived any appellate
challenge to the conditions of probation because he told the district court that he had no
objections to them. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 9 of 9 --