United States of America v. David T. Odom

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025*
Decided March 18, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1319
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID T. ODOM,
Defendant,
KIMBERLY B. ODOM,
Third-Party Petitioner-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17 CR 476
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1319 Page 2
O R D E R
After her husband’s conviction for a fraud conspiracy, Kimberly Odom asserted
a third-party interest in property—the family home—that was subject to the forfeiture
order in her husband’s criminal case. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). The government opposed
the claim, and the district court concluded that Kimberly could not satisfy the statutory
requirements to be a third-party claimant. See id. § 853(n)(6). Because the undisputed
evidence shows that her interest in the property did not precede the criminal activity
and that Kimberly was not a bona fide purchaser for value, we affirm.
In 2002, David and Kimberly Odom obtained a mortgage from Northern Trust
Company to purchase a home in Naperville, Illinois. Several years later, Northern Trust
foreclosed on their home and purchased it at the ensuing foreclosure sale. The state
court confirmed the sale in February 2011. Then, in April and May 2011, David’s film
production company obtained funds from Blue Rider Finance based on David’s
fraudulent representation that millions of dollars already had been invested. David then
repurchased the home from Northern Trust with some of the fraud proceeds.
Later, Blue Rider sued the Odoms in Illinois state court, seeking damages and a
constructive trust on the Naperville property. Blue Rider also recorded a lis pendens on
the property, advising that the property was the subject matter of litigation and so
interests in the property acquired during the lawsuit were subject to its outcome.
The Odoms and Blue Rider settled the lawsuit in January 2014. The parties
agreed that the Odoms would pay money—which David obtained from the separate
fraudulent scheme of a colleague (and future codefendant)—and transfer the rights to
the screenplay for the film that Blue Rider had tried to finance. In exchange, Blue Rider
would dismiss its suit against the Odoms and release the lis pendens on the property.
In March 2017, David pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 1349, in a Maryland district court. The court sentenced him to 30 months’
imprisonment, imposed restitution of $700,000 to Blue Rider, and entered a preliminary
order of forfeiture on David’s interest in the Naperville property.
In June 2019, Kimberly filed a petition claiming a third-party interest in the
Naperville property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). She stated that she and David had
maintained uninterrupted possession of the home since before David’s criminal acts
and that they had paid what they owed to Northern Trust to redeem it when they were
in default. Kimberly moved for summary judgment on her third-party claim and asked

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No. 24-1319 Page 3
the court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois, where the property is
located. The government also moved for summary judgment to deny Kimberly’s claim.
In October 2023, the district court in Maryland transferred the case to the Northern
District of Illinois for resolution of the cross-motions.
The district court in Illinois entered summary judgment for the government and
denied Kimberly’s petition. The court ruled that Kimberly failed to show that she had a
third-party interest in the property under § 853(n)(6). First, she had no interest in the
property when David committed the criminal acts in April and May 2011, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n)(6)(A), because Northern Trust owned the property at the time. Second, she was
not a “bona fide purchaser for value” of the property as a result of the settlement with
Blue Rider resolving the lis pendens. See id. § 853(n)(6)(B). The court concluded that
Kimberly did not pay “value” to settle because the Odoms paid Blue Rider with fraud
proceeds. Indeed, the court explained, the Odoms owned the property (subject to the
government’s pending interest in it under § 853) when they settled with Blue Rider, and
Kimberly could not pay value to Blue Rider to obtain property that was hers already.
After denying Kimberly’s petition, the court entered a final order of forfeiture.
Kimberly now challenges the summary judgment decision, which we review
de novo. See United States v. Funds in Amount of One Hundred Thousand One Hundred &
Twenty Dollars ($100,120.00), 730 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2013). Kimberly argues that she
satisfies either prong under § 853(n)(6) for a petitioner to successfully claim a third-
party interest in property subject to criminal forfeiture. Both arguments are meritless.
First, Kimberly is incorrect that she had a “prior right, title, or interest” in the
Naperville property that was superior to David’s interest at the time of his fraud in
2011. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Any interest Kimberly had in the property—and any
right to “redeem”—was terminated, as a matter of Illinois law, when the judicial sale of
the property to Northern Trust was confirmed. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey,
999 N.E.2d 321, 330 (Ill. 2013) (citing 735 ILCS 5/15-1404); see also United States v.
Grossman, 501 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying state property law to determine
property interests). After the foreclosure sale, Kimberly did not regain any right, title, or
interest in the property until the Odoms repurchased it from Northern Trust in May
2011 with proceeds from David’s fraud. And, at that point, the government already had
an interest in the property that had vested upon David’s commission of the crime
earlier the same year. See United States v. Guerrero, 37 F.4th 1215, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)).

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No. 24-1319 Page 4
Second, Kimberly did not become a “bona fide purchaser for value of the right,
title, or interest in the property” in 2014 when Blue Rider terminated the lis pendens as
part of the settlement of its lawsuit against the Odoms. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B).
According to Kimberly, she purchased Blue Rider’s right, title, or interest in the
property (a lien) in exchange for value—money and the rights to the screenplay. In her
view, whether Blue Rider had any interest in the property that it could sell to her is
immaterial: giving value was sufficient to make her a bona fide purchaser for value.
This is incorrect. Any value that Kimberly provided to Blue Rider under the
settlement agreement was in exchange for its promise to dismiss its suit, which sought
damages and a constructive trust on the property. The only potential interest Blue Rider
had in the property was a lis pendens. But that was not yet any encumbrance on the title;
it merely provided public notice that a lawsuit could affect good title to the property.
See Chicago Title Ins. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 996 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ill. App. 2013). The
Illinois lis pendens statute did not give Blue Rider a lien or other true “interest.”
See Matter of Leonard, 125 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 735 ILCS 5/2–1901).
Kimberly insists that she was a bona fide purchaser even if Blue Rider had nothing to
sell, but the statute requires that she was a purchaser of something concrete: title, right,
or interest in the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B). Because she failed to show that
she acquired any such interest, summary judgment for the government was proper.
AFFIRMED

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