United States of America v. Brandon Shoffner

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025
Decided March 18, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1891
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BRANDON SHOFFNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 16-CR-20062-001
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Brandon Shoffner appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). A defendant who
appeals a revocation order does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel,
so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
788–90 (1973). Even so, our practice is to apply them. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d
392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses
issues that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s
analysis of those issues appears thorough, and Shoffner did not respond to the motion,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1891 Page 2
see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Shoffner twice violated the conditions of his supervised release after serving time
in prison for possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At a revocation
hearing in November 2023, he admitted to possessing and using cocaine, marijuana
(twice), and methamphetamine while on supervised release from his firearm conviction.
Shoffner was released before his revocation sentencing but while on that release he was
arrested for residential burglary. At the revocation-sentencing hearing, based on his
earlier admissions and his admission to the burglary, the district court revoked
Shoffner’s supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison, with
18 months to be served consecutive to his state sentence for his state crimes.
See 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2), 5/12-3.2(a)(2).
In his Anders brief, counsel confirms that Shoffner wishes to challenge the
decision to revoke his supervised release. Thus, counsel first considers whether
Shoffner could challenge the district court’s decision to accept his admissions to the
violations and revoke his release. Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir.
2016). Because Shoffner did not attempt to withdraw his admissions in the district
court, we would review the acceptance of those admissions for plain error. United States
v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2019). Counsel correctly concludes that any
procedural challenge to the decision to accept his admissions and revoke would be
frivolous. First, the court provided him with the necessary procedural safeguards, such
as the right to counsel and the opportunity for allocution. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 32.1(b)(2).
Also, based on Shoffner’s admissions to the drug violations and residential burglary,
the court properly revoked his term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Finally, as counsel rightly points out, revocation was mandatory because Shoffner
admitted to possessing a controlled substance. See id. § 3583(g)(1).
Counsel next considers possible procedural challenges to the sentence and
rightly concludes that they would be frivolous. The district court correctly ruled that
Shoffner’s violations were Grade B violations under the policy statement of the
Sentencing Guidelines because they were offenses normally punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2), and made revocation of
supervised release mandatory, see id. § 7B1.3(a)(1). Based on his Grade B violations—
and adopting the court’s previous and uncontested calculation of a criminal history
category of IV—the court correctly calculated that Shoffner’s policy-statement range
was 12 to 18 months of reimprisonment. See id. § 7B1.4(a). Finally, Shoffner’s 24-month

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No. 24-1891 Page 3
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum term of 5 years based on his original
offense being a Class A felony. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), 3559(a)(1), 3583(e)(3). And the
judge adequately explained the sentence by appropriately referencing the § 3553(a)
factors.
Counsel next considers an attack on the substantive unreasonableness of his
prison term of 24 months, but correctly concludes that the attack could not prevail.
Counsel recognizes that Shoffner’s prison term is six months above the top of the
policy-statement range. But counsel advances no argument, and we cannot conceive of
any, that might overcome the “highly deferential” standard under which we reverse
only if the sentence was “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th 941,
944–45 (7th Cir. 2022). As counsel acknowledges, the district court correctly identified
the relevant sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and reasonably balanced Shoffner’s
serious criminal history (including prior convictions for aggravated battery and
aggravated battery with a firearm), his propensity to recommit crimes before
sentencing, and the need to protect the public from further crimes.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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