FRANK MARSHALL and VICKI MARSHALL v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025*
Decided March 20, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2746
FRANK MARSHALL and VICKI
MARSHALL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 24-C-1095
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Frank and Vicki Marshall, Wisconsin voters, sued the Wisconsin Elections
Commission, alleging that it violated their constitutional rights by excluding their
preferred presidential candidate from the ballot in the November 2024 election. Of its
own accord, the district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 24-2746 Page 2
In August 2024, the Marshalls submitted nomination papers and a declaration of
candidacy for Shiva Ayyadurai to appear as an independent presidential candidate on
Wisconsin’s November 2024 ballot. Shortly after, another Wisconsin voter challenged
the nomination, see WIS . A DMIN . C ODE EL § 2.07(2)(a), (3)(a), alleging that Ayyadurai
was not a natural-born citizen of the United States and was therefore disqualified from
the presidency. The challenger relied on Ayyadurai v. Garland, No. CV 23-2079 (LLA),
2024 WL 2015287, at *1 (D.D.C. May 7, 2024), a case during which Ayyadurai admitted
that he was born in Mumbai, India, to non-citizen parents.
After a hearing, which Frank Marshall and Ayyadurai attended, the Commission
found that because Ayyadurai is not a natural-born U.S. citizen, the declaration of
candidacy accompanying his nomination papers was invalid. WIS . STAT. § 8.21(2)(b).
The Commission voted to reject his nomination papers, WIS . S TAT. § 8.30(4), and so
Ayyadurai’s name did not appear on the ballot.
The Marshalls then filed the current action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the Commission violated their rights to ballot access and due process under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by arbitrarily excluding Ayyadurai from the ballot when
it lacked the authority to do so. The Marshalls also moved for an injunction requiring
the Commission to put Ayyadurai on the ballot.
The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint, concluding that the
Marshalls’ claims were legally frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Hoskins v. Poelstra,
320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003). The court explained that Ayyadurai “is not qualified to
hold the office of president of the United States and [the Commission] had all the
statutory authority necessary to reject his placement on the ballot.”
On appeal, the Marshalls reassert their argument that the Commission did not
have the authority to prevent Ayyadurai from being on the ballot. They contend that
the Constitution does not give states the authority to impose qualifications on
presidential candidates and that the Commission can review the eligibility of a
candidate’s pledged electors, but not the candidate.
We must first address the Commission’s argument that this case is moot because
the election is over, and Ayyadurai is ineligible to run again. Although it is a close case,
we conclude that the exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet
evading review, applies here. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 24-2746 Page 3
449, 462 (2007). This exception applies when “(1) the challenged action is in its duration
too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same
action again.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). Challenges to election
laws, or election-board decisions, are among the quintessential categories of cases that
often fit into this exception. Hero v. Lake Cnty. Election Bd., 42 F.4th 768, 773
(7th Cir. 2022). Here, even though the election is over, the legal issue presented—
whether the plaintiffs can pledge their electoral college votes to a presidential candidate
who is ineligible—will persist when the relevant statutes are applied in future elections.
See Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Scholz, 872 F.3d 518, 522 n.4 (7th Cir. 2017). The Marshalls
intend to remain Wisconsin voters and, even if Ayyadurai does not try to run again,
they will be subject to the Commission’s interpretation of its authority if they support
another candidate whom the Commission deems ineligible.
On the merits, the Marshalls did not state a claim that the Commission violated
their federal constitutional rights by denying Ayyadurai placement on the ballot. “It is
well-settled that ‘[t]he impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates
basic constitutional rights’ to associate politically with like-minded voters and to cast a
meaningful vote.” Stone v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for City of Chi., 750 F.3d 678, 681 (7th
Cir. 2014). Such rights, however, are not absolute. The Constitution confers upon the
states “broad authority to regulate the conduct of elections,” Tripp v. Scholz, 872 F.3d
857, 863 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004)),
such as by imposing “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on access to the
ballot.” Ind. Green Party v. Morales, 113 F.4th 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2024). Further, a state has
an interest in protecting, if not a duty to protect, the integrity of its political processes
from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); see
also Tripp, 872 F.3d at 863.
Here, Wisconsin law guards that interest by giving state election agencies
authority to refuse ballot access for a candidate if it “conclusively appears … by
admission of the candidate or otherwise, that the candidate is ineligible to be nominated
or elected.” WIS . S TAT. § 8.30(1)(b). And because Ayyadurai is not a natural-born citizen,
he was not a valid candidate. U.S. C ONST. art. II, § 1; WIS . S TAT. § 8.21(2)(b). The
Commission was required to reject his nomination papers. W IS . S TAT. § 8.30(4). And
given Ayyadurai’s plain and admitted ineligibility, the Marshalls’ complaint does not
plausibly suggest that this action was an unreasonable or discriminatory restriction on
ballot access. Morales, 113 F.4th at 742.

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 24-2746 Page 4
The Marshalls also provide no support for their argument that the Commission
may review only the eligibility of the candidate’s pledged presidential electors. They do
not explain how determining the candidate’s eligibility could violate, rather than
enforce, the Constitution, which disqualifies persons who were not American citizens at
birth from holding the office of president. (The argument that a state must allow
someone ineligible to hold an office to run for it nonetheless is specious.) Finally, the
relevant Wisconsin code provisions expressly regulate “the candidate,” which further
undermines the Marshalls’ argument that the Commission could not review
Ayyadurai’s eligibility for the presidency.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --