John E. Covington v. Andrea Lynn Chasteen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025*
Decided March 21, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1429
JOHN E. COVINGTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANDREA LYNN CHASTEEN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-5083
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
John Covington appeals the dismissal of his federal complaint alleging that the
Circuit Court Clerk of Will County, Illinois, (in her individual and official capacities)
and an employee of the Clerk’s Office violated his constitutional rights and
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and we affirm the judgment because
Covington failed to state a claim for relief.
In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, we accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir.
2019). Covington had several cases before the Will County Circuit Court, including a
tort action he initiated in 2020. From November 2020 through May 2022, Covington, a
Black man, received from the Clerk’s Office letters about the case with the word
“KLAN” printed at the bottom. In July 2021, Covington tried to file with the Clerk’s
Office a fee waiver application and other documents to appeal an eviction action. An
employee, Krystal Swanberg, refused to accept the documents on four occasions—twice
through the court’s website and twice at the e-filing station in the Clerk’s Office.
Covington says that the Will County Circuit Court Clerk, Andrea Lynn Chasteen,
watched from the back of the office when Swanberg denied his filings and that
Swanberg acted “at the direction of” Chasteen.
Covington sued the Clerk’s Office, Chasteen, and Swanberg in federal district
court, raising federal and state-law claims. He alleged that sending him documents with
the racially offensive word “KLAN” on them intentionally inflicted emotional distress
and violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the
rejection of his filings deprived him of access to the courts in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He further asserted that the Clerk and
her employees had not only a racial motive but also intended to retaliate against him for
winning a foreclosure case in Will County in 2018.
Early on, Covington moved to disqualify the district judge. He asserted—with
little explanation—that the judge had political and religious affiliations that rendered
him incapable of fairly resolving Covington’s claims. The judge denied the motion as
frivolous, stating that political or religious beliefs were not grounds for disqualification.
Of its own accord, the district court ordered the defendants to file a statement
explaining whether “KLAN” was printed on correspondence with Covington, and if so,
why. The court had “questions and concerns about the authenticity” of the documents
appended to his second amended complaint. The defendants explained that
Covington’s documents were authentic, and that the Clerk’s Office had a policy of
creating computer login credentials for its staff members using the first and last letters
of their first and last names, and that “KLAN” was the login credential of an employee
assigned to his case. (Another staff member was “LAZY.”) They further explained, and

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No. 24-1429 Page 3
provided evidence, that the state judge in Covington’s tort case had told him why his
documents from the Clerk’s Office had “KLAN” printed on them. In the operative
fourth amended complaint, filed shortly before the supplemental statement, Covington
alleged that the explanation about the initials was pretext for discrimination and that
the Clerk maintained a practice that produced hate speech.
The defendants eventually moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint for
failure to state a claim. They argued that Covington’s allegations did not support a
reasonable inference that they violated his constitutional rights because he already
conceded that the use of “KLAN” was not racially motivated; he did not establish that
his inability to access the courts affected the outcome of any lawsuit; and he made only
bare assertions that the defendants had the necessary intent to cause him emotional
distress. Covington did not respond to the motion to dismiss, though the court had
advised him that failing to respond would waive any arguments against dismissal.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The court first concluded that
Covington failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that the use of “KLAN” was
intended to be hateful. In fact, the court stated, both parties confirmed that the Clerk’s
Office used the letters solely as a login credential, which was automatically printed on
certain documents. The court further determined that Covington failed to plausibly
allege that he was denied access to the courts, because rejecting a court filing is not on
its own a constitutional violation. Finally, the court relinquished supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law emotional-distress claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and
denied Covington’s motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint because further
amendment would be futile.
On appeal, Covington first argues that the district court erred by not warning
him of the consequences of failing to respond properly to a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b), however, says nothing
about warning litigants, even pro se litigants, of the consequences of failing to respond
to dismissal motions. Even so, the court here advised Covington about the risks of not
responding; when dismissing the second amended complaint, the court stated that
“failure to respond is a waiver of any arguments against dismissal.” And regardless, the
court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true when deciding a motion to dismiss,
and it cannot grant the motion solely because the plaintiff does not respond. See Marcure
v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).
Next, Covington contends that the district judge should have recused himself
under 28 U.S.C. § 455 for bias. But he cites no evidence that the judge had a

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disqualifying conflict listed in § 455(b). And, for purposes of § 455(a), a judge’s political
and religious background (about which Covington has explained little) are too
attenuated to cause a reasonable, well-informed observer to question the judge’s
impartiality in a lawsuit primarily about racial discrimination. See United States v. Barr,
960 F.3d 906, 919–20 (7th Cir. 2020); Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 456 (7th Cir. 1998)
(political affiliation). Further, adverse rulings are not, without more, grounds for
recusal. See Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 844 (7th Cir. 2022).
Covington’s arguments on the merits are also unavailing. We review the
dismissal of his constitutional claims de novo. See Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004. First, he did
not state a claim that the defendants violated his equal protection rights by treating him
unequally on the basis of his race. As the district court correctly explained, his
conclusory statements about the hateful nature of the employee’s login credential are
not enough to state a plausible claim that the defendants “treated him differently from
persons of a different race” and did so “purposefully.” Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282,
295 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The fourth amended complaint acknowledges that
the unfortunate combination of letters resulted from a practice of arranging employee
initials. And Covington did not factually support his assertions that the practice was a
pretext and that the defendants harbored racial animus when they used the login
credential. See Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Hemmelgarn, 861 F.3d 615, 625 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“general speculation” about defendants’ motives not sufficient to state claim). Nor did
he allege that the defendants treated non-Black litigants more favorably, and the
established policy on creating credentials detracts from the plausibility of such an
assertion.
Likewise, Covington’s allegations are too thin to state a plausible access-to-the-
courts claim. A litigant has a constitutional right not to be hindered in pursuit of a
non-frivolous legal claim, and to state a claim, the plaintiff must allege that the
defendants’ actions adversely affected “his effort to vindicate his rights through
litigation.” Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 2022). But Covington did not
state how his attempted filings related to any lawsuit or whether he lost the ability to
pursue any non-frivolous claim or defense. The rejection of legal filings does not itself
give rise to a denial-of-access claim, which is “ancillary to the underlying claim.”
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).
AFFIRMED

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