DAVID VANCE GARDNER and GARY MERCHANT v. Me-Tv National Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1290
DAVID VANCE GARDNER and GARY MERCHANT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ME-TV NATIONAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Delaware limited
partnership,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 CV 5963 — Lindsay C. Jenkins, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 28, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and KOLAR, Cir-
cuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. When Robert Bork’s nomina-
tion to the Supreme Court was defeated in 1987, his name be-
came aUached not only to a political strategy (“Borking”) but
also to a statute, 18 U.S.C. §2710 (the “Bork Act”). This law,
more formally called the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA
or “the Act”), was the result of bipartisan revulsion against

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2 No. 24-1290
the ease with which reporters discovered what Bork and his
family had rented on video tapes. The reporters did not turn
up any dirt (Bork and his family watched Hitchcock myster-
ies, John Hughes comedies, British costume dramas, and spy
thrillers) but the ready availability of rental information
caused consternation in Congress, some members of which
may have had other viewing predilections.
Using terminology that is now obsolete, the Act forbids
the disclosure, by any “video tape service provider”, of “per-
sonally identifiable information concerning any consumer of
such provider” without the consumer’s consent. 18 U.S.C.
§2710(b)(1). Section 2710(a)(4) defines “video tape service
provider” to include any entity that sells, rents, or delivers
“prerecorded video casseUe tapes or similar audio visual ma-
terials”; the “similar” clause and the reference to “delivery”
as well as rental makes the statute relevant to video that is
streamed over the Internet. Under §2710(a)(1) “the term ‘con-
sumer’ means any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or
services from a video tape service provider”. This suit pre-
sents the question what it means for a person to be a “sub-
scriber”, a term that the Act does not define.
MeTV operates a web site <hUps://www.metv.com> at
which people can watch classic video programming—princi-
pally TV shows from the 1930s through the 1990s. Anyone can
watch without providing personal information—though the
site does need the viewer’s Internet Protocol address, which
is essential to deliver the video. A web browser supplies the
IP address automatically. MeTV invites people to sign up in
order to personalize their experience. In exchange for a per-
son’s email address and zip code (plus a self-selected user
name and password), MeTV lets a person select TV shows to

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No. 24-1290 3
follow, receive reminders about when they come on (like an
over-the-air station, MeTV shows programs on a schedule ra-
ther than on demand), use a “channel” finder feature, post
comments about the programming, and receive notices about
newly available programs.
MeTV does not charge the viewers; like over-the-air TV it
makes money by selling ads. If someone just watches on the
web site, advertisers cannot do much to target their pitches by
viewers’ (likely) preferences. The more person-specific infor-
mation MeTV and its advertisers possess, the more closely
they can target ads—and targeted ads sell for more than oth-
ers. An email address and zip code help with targeting. And
MeTV benefits when it can link a viewer to a Facebook ac-
count. Facebook collects lots of information that is available
to someone who knows the user’s Facebook identification
number (FID). That number can be derived when someone al-
ready signed into Facebook uses the same browser to access
MeTV. Plaintiffs allege that MeTV embeds in the videos a
“Meta pixel” (named after the business that operates Face-
book) that facilitates this linking. According to the complaint
this lets Facebook know what the person is watching so it too
can sell ads targeted to video preferences, and it improves
MeTV’s ability to promote its business on Facebook.
Plaintiffs allege in this case that they have “signed up” for
MeTV, providing their email addresses and zip codes, and
that they watch programming over MeTV while signed into
Facebook in the same browser. This enables linking of ac-
counts and beUer (from advertisers’ perspective) targeting of
ads on both MeTV and Facebook. The complaint asserts that
neither Facebook nor MeTV has plaintiffs’ consent to provide
the information in the Meta pixel. Section 2710(c) provides

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4 No. 24-1290
that persons injured by the un-consented disclosure of per-
sonally identifiable information may collect damages and at-
torneys’ fees.
MeTV moved to dismiss the complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), contending that plaintiffs are not “consumers” cov-
ered by the Act. The district court granted this motion, 681 F.
Supp. 3d 864 (N.D. Ill. 2023), but allowed plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint. They did so, but the district court dis-
missed that complaint too. 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36631 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 15, 2024).
Here again is the definition of “consumer” in §2710(a)(1):
“any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services
from a video tape service provider”. Plaintiffs do not claim to
be renters or purchasers, but they describe themselves as sub-
scribers.
One possible response by MeTV would be that a “sub-
scription” is something that costs money. A person who sub-
scribes to Netflix pays a monthly fee. Someone who sub-
scribes to the New York Times likewise pays a periodic fee to
receive paper copies or to access news behind a paywall on
the Internet. We assume that, as a maUer of common usage, a
“subscriber” gives value in exchange for goods or services.
But MeTV does not contend that money is the only way to give
value. In an Information Age, data can be worth more than
money. If paying $1 a year to use MeTV would produce a sub-
scription, then providing $1 worth of information must do so
too. Every court of appeals that has considered the Act has
reached this conclusion. See Salazar v. National Basketball Asso-
ciation, 118 F.4th 533, 550–53 (2d Cir. 2024); Yershov v. GanneC
Satellite Information Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 487–89 (1st Cir.
2016); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255–57

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No. 24-1290 5
(11th Cir. 2015). Cf. Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d
1336, 1341–44 (11th Cir. 2017).
What MeTV argues instead is that plaintiffs subscribed to
an information service (TV schedules and newsleUers), not to
a video service. Anyone can watch videos on the web site with-
out supplying information (other than an IP address). This
fact puts plaintiffs outside the statutory definition of “con-
sumer”, MeTV contends. And this is what the district court
held. 681 F. Supp. 3d at 869–71; 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36631 at
*8–10.
Back to the definition of “consumer”, for a third time: “any
renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a
video tape service provider”. This does not say “subscriber of
… video services”; it says “subscriber of … services from a video
tape service provider”. The complaint adequately alleges that
MeTV is a video tape service provider. What more is re-
quired? If plaintiffs had signed up and never watched a video,
but had purchased a Flintstones sweatshirt or a Scooby Doo
coffee mug or a Superman action figure or a Bugs Bunny puz-
zle (MeTV’s web site offers all four), then they would have
purchased “goods” from a “video tape service provider”.
Nothing in the Act says that the goods or services must be
video tapes or streams.
The Act is aimed principally at information about videos;
public disclosure of his rentals is what happened to Judge
Bork. And what happened to Judge Bork has some overlap
with what plaintiffs allege; after all, the Meta pixel encodes
the name of each video that they stream from the website. But
as far as the statute is concerned, this connection lies in the
definition of “video tape service provider” rather than the
definition of “consumer”. Any purchase or subscription from

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6 No. 24-1290
a “video tape service provider” satisfies the definition of
“consumer”, even if the thing purchased is clothing or the
thing subscribed to is a newsleUer. So the Second Circuit re-
cently held. Salazar, 118 F.4th at 546–50. We agree.
MeTV’s argument is based more on notions about what
Congress was trying to achieve than on the meaning of the
words Congress selected. Yet statutes often overshoot or un-
dershoot their goals; linguistic imprecision is part of the hu-
man condition. The Supreme Court insists that it is the lan-
guage—the only thing on which Congress and the President
have agreed—that controls the meaning of legislation. See,
e.g., Thompson v. United States, No. 23–1095 (U.S. Mar. 21,
2025).
Our case is almost identical to Salazar. The decisions from
the First Circuit and Eleventh Circuit (Ellis, Yeshov, and Perry)
ask whether a person becomes a “subscriber” by download-
ing and using an application (“app”) that offers videos, with-
out necessarily providing the app’s creator with personal in-
formation such as a name or email address. The First Circuit
and Eleventh Circuit have reached incompatible conclusions
about how the definition in §2710(a)(1) works for that situa-
tion. We do not address it here. It is enough to hold that, when
a person does furnish valuable data in exchange for benefits,
that person becomes a “consumer” as long as the entity on the
other side of the transaction is a “video tape service pro-
vider”. Plaintiffs’ complaint survives a motion to dismiss un-
der Rule 12(b)(6).
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case
is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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