Macs Bell v. State of Indiana

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2025*
Decided March 31, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2791
MACS BELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-00144-MPB-KMB
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2791 Page 2
O R D E R
Macs Bell, an Indiana prisoner serving sentences for several sex offenses, appeals
the judgment dismissing his complaint, which challenged the constitutionality of
Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). I ND. C ODE §§ 11-8-8-1 to -23. We
affirm.
Bell sued the State of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that SORA violates
the separation of powers doctrine, the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article 1 of the
Constitution, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and that state-court judges have conspired to commit fraud by ruling that
SORA was constitutional. The district court screened Bell’s complaint and dismissed it
for failure to state a claim. The court explained that the named defendant—the State of
Indiana—was not a suable “person” under § 1983; that this court already had ruled that
SORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto or Equal Protection clauses, see Hope v. Comm’r
of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.4th 647, 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2023); and that Bell did not allege
facts that would lead to a plausible inference that SORA violates his due process rights
or any other constitutional rights. The court then ordered Bell to show cause why his
suit should not be dismissed.
Bell responded by filing an amended complaint that reprised his constitutional
challenges to SORA and his assertion that Indiana state-court judges conspired to
commit fraud by continuing to rule that SORA was constitutional. He also named as
defendants the Indiana Department of Correction and its commissioner.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court
concluded that Hope controlled the outcome of this case. It added that the outcome
would not change even if Bell had named the proper defendants, such as state-court
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, who Bell believes are responsible for SORA’s
alleged unconstitutionality, given (1) the immunity afforded to judges and prosecutors
for actions performed in their professional capacity and (2) the inapplicability of § 1983
to lawyers when they perform their traditional role as counsel.
On appeal, Bell does not engage the district court’s reasons for dismissing the
suit and instead continues to argue that SORA is unconstitutional. But the district court
correctly ruled that the State of Indiana—and by extension its agency, the Department
of Correction—is not a not a suable “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); de Lima Silva v. Dep’t of Corr., 917 F.3d 546, 565

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No. 23-2791 Page 3
(7th Cir. 2019). Bell also named as a defendant Christina Reagle, commissioner of the
Department of Correction, but liability under § 1983 requires personal involvement,
see Gonzalez v. McHenry County, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022), and Bell does not allege
that Reagle was personally involved in any constitutional violation against him.
AFFIRMED

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