Christopher Croom v. Joshua Schoenbeck

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2025*
Decided March 31, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1875
CHRISTOPHER CROOM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 21-cv-896-SMY
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Croom, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the summary judgment
rejecting his claim that prison officials violated his rights under the Fourteenth
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1875 Page 2
Amendment by subjecting him to disciplinary segregation without due process.
Because the district court correctly concluded that Croom’s time in segregation did not
implicate a liberty interest, we affirm.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Croom, the party opposing
summary judgment. Moore v. W. Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 590 (7th Cir. 2023). In late
2020, while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, Croom was written up in a
disciplinary ticket after he received mail from his girlfriend that tested positive for
synthetic cannabinoids. Croom then tried to send a letter to the adjustment committee,
asking that his entire recent email correspondence with his girlfriend be placed in
evidence and that a correctional officer appear at the hearing as a witness.
At his hearing, Croom asked the committee members if they had received his
letter and was told that they had not. Croom pleaded not guilty, denying that he had
requested drugs from his girlfriend or knowing that she was sending them. The
committee found Croom guilty and sanctioned him with three months in segregation,
three months of commissary restriction, and six months of restrictions on in-person
visits.
In segregation Croom was confined to a small cell, limited to recreation twice a
week, denied access to a tablet or television, prohibited from purchasing commissary
food, and not given cleaning supplies. At one point during his time in segregation, an
incident broke out in which several inmates kicked on doors, set fires, and caused
floods. During the melee, Croom later testified, he was severely assaulted by several
unknown prison staff members.
Croom sued the officers involved in his disciplinary hearing along with five
unnamed defendants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened his complaint,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and permitted him to proceed on a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim against the officers involved in his disciplinary proceedings. The court
also identified two Eighth Amendment claims against unnamed defendants who
allegedly had used excessive force during the assault; later, upon the defendants’
motion, the court severed those claims because they involved “a separate occurrence
and different defendants.”
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining due process
claim. The district court granted this motion, agreeing with the defendants that Croom’s
three months in segregation and the conditions alleged did not trigger a constitutionally

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No. 24-1875 Page 3
protected liberty interest. The court explained that the alleged constraints, even in
combination, were not so atypical or harsh to create a protected liberty interest.
On appeal, Croom argues that the district court overlooked his allegations
regarding the assault and thus erred in finding that he had not suffered an “atypical
and significant hardship.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 US. 472, 484 (1995). Croom
acknowledges that the defendants were not personally involved in the alleged assault
but insists that they bear responsibility for his hardship because the purported due
process violations during his disciplinary proceedings led to his placement in
segregation, where the assault occurred.
But the district court correctly differentiated between Croom’s allegations
regarding the assault and those concerning due process violations during his
disciplinary proceedings. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
separate lawsuits. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). Croom’s
allegations over the assault relate to a theory of excessive force against him; his
allegations of due process violations concern his placement in segregation without
receiving the process he believed he was due. Indeed, Croom’s allegations regarding
the assault are being litigated in a separate case under the Eighth Amendment, which is
the primary source of substantive protection where the deliberate use of force is
challenged as excessive. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). To the extent
Croom seeks to challenge the district court’s decision to sever his claims, he does not
develop any meaningful argument that we can consider.
Our review is thus limited to facts relevant to the district court’s due process
ruling, in which we find no error. The district court rightly found that the conditions of
Croom’s segregation (three months, with recreation twice a week, no tablet or
television, no commissary food, and no cleaning supplies) insufficient to implicate a
liberty interest. See, e.g., Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743–45 (7th Cir. 2013).
AFFIRMED

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