John Nawara v. COOK COUNTY and THOMAS J. DART

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
JOHN NAWARA,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
C OOK C OUNTY and THOMAS J. DART,
Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-02393 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 17, 2023 — DECIDED A PRIL 1, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, SCUDDER , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
LEE, Circuit Judge. John Nawara, a former correctional of-
ficer at Cook County Jail, initiated several altercations with
other county employees. The Cook County Sheriff’s Office de-
termined that Nawara needed to undergo a fitness-for-duty
examination before returning to work. And, as part of this
process, it required Nawara to sign two medical information
release forms. Nawara resisted at first but eventually relented.
But before he did, he sued Cook County and Sheriff Thomas

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2 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
Dart in his official capacity (collectively “the Sheriff”), alleg-
ing that the examination requirement and inquiry into his
mental health violated § 12112(d)(4) of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Nawara prevailed at trial, but the jury awarded him zero
damages. Nawara then filed a post-trial motion, requesting
equitable relief in the form of back pay and lost pension ben-
efits as well as restoration of his seniority.1 The court granted
the latter, but denied the former concluding that the Sheriff’s
violation of Nawara’s rights under § 12112(d)(4) cannot sup-
port an award of back pay.
Nawara now appeals the district court’s denial of his re-
quest for back pay. In turn, the Sheriff cross-appeals the
court’s order restoring Nawara’s seniority. We affirm the dis-
trict court’s restoration of Nawara’s seniority, but because the
ADA defines a violation of § 12112(d)(4) to be discrimination
“on the basis of disability,” we reverse the district court’s de-
nial of Nawara’s request for back pay and remand for further
proceedings.
I
John Nawara joined the Cook County Sheriff’s Office in
1998. He was working as a correctional officer in 2016 when
he had a series of heated altercations with his superior officer,
Superintendent Karen Jones-Hayes. Several weeks later, he
engaged in another contentious interaction with Rebecca Rei-
erson, a human resources manager, and Winifred Shelby, an
1 Because there is no reason to differentiate between back pay and lost
pension benefits for the purpose of this appeal, we will refer to both
simply as “back pay.”

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 3
occupational health nurse. As a result, Reierson and Shelby
required Nawara to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination
before returning to work, and the Sheriff placed Nawara on
paid leave.
To initiate the examination process, Shelby instructed Na-
wara to submit two signed medical information authorization
forms—one allowing medical providers to send his infor-
mation to the examination company, and the other permitting
the Sheriff’s Office to collect his information from medical
providers to send to the company expediting the process. De-
spite repeated requests, Nawara refused to submit the exe-
cuted forms, and the process stalled.
Nawara’s paid leave ended on April 25, 2017, and he was
placed on unpaid leave, during which he worked other jobs.
Nawara eventually decided to return to the Sheriff’s Office
and provided the authorization forms in August 2017. After
undergoing the fitness-for-duty examination, he was declared
fit for duty and returned to work as a correctional officer on
September 26, 2017. In September 2019, Nawara became a
Cook County Sheriff’s police officer.
While on leave, Nawara filed this lawsuit, alleging that the
Sheriff’s actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). After a trial,
the jury agreed with Nawara that the examination require-
ment and related requests for medical records violated
§ 12112(d)(4)(A). That provision prohibits an employer from
requiring a medical examination or inquiring about an em-
ployee’s disability status unless it is job-related and consistent
with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The jury,
however, awarded no damages.

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4 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
Nawara then filed a post-trial motion requesting equitable
relief in the form of back pay and the restoration of his senior-
ity. After reviewing the pertinent statutory provisions, the
district court determined that a plaintiff, like Nawara, must
have a disability or perceived disability for a violation of
§ 12112(d)(4) to constitute discrimination on account of disa-
bility. Nawara v. County of Cook, 570 F. Supp. 3d 594, 600–01
(N.D. Ill. 2021). And because the remedy provision applicable
here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, bars a court from awarding back
pay where an employee suffers an adverse employment ac-
tion “for any reason other than discrimination” on account of
disability, the court denied Nawara’s request and entered
judgment accordingly. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(g)(2)(A)). The court also declined to issue an order restoring
his vacation days, holidays, sick days, and seniority.
Nawara subsequently moved to amend the judgment un-
der Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the district court had
failed to fully evaluate his request for the restoration of his
seniority. Upon closer examination, the district court agreed
and granted Nawara’s request to restore his seniority based
on the Supreme Court’s allowance of such relief in Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 770 (1976). See Na-
wara v. County of Cook, No. 17 C 2393, 2022 WL 3161805, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2022), corrected, 2022 WL 3161838 (N.D. Ill.
July 29, 2022).
At that point, the Sheriff moved to amend the judgment
restoring Nawara’s seniority. According to the Sheriff, the
court had ignored a prior stipulation stating that seniority
would be restored to Nawara “if the Court awards back pay.”
In the Sheriff’s view, because the district court denied back
pay, Nawara was not entitled to his seniority. The district

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 5
court, however, disagreed and denied the Sheriff’s motion.
Nawara, 2022 WL 3161838, at *3. Both sides have appealed the
respective rulings.
II
A. § 12112(d) and Back Pay
In his appeal, Nawara contends that the district court
erred by construing the relevant statutes in a way that renders
him ineligible for back pay. Thus, this case presents a question
of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. United
States v. Patel, 778 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2015). And, as in any
case of statutory construction, “a court’s proper starting point
lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning and
structure of the law itself.” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Me-
dia, 588 U.S. 427, 436 (2019). If “that examination yields a clear
answer, judges must stop.” Id. For where “the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.’” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
Our analysis starts with the statutory provision giving rise
to Nawara’s claim—42 U.S.C. § 12112. This section begins
with a broad proscription: “No covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job

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6 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).2
Later in subsection (d), the statute provides that “[t]he
prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection
(a) shall include medical examinations and inquiries.” Id.
§ 12112(d)(1). And, as applied to current employees, this
means:
[An employer] shall not require a medical examination
and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to
whether such an employee is an individual with a disability
or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity.
Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
Based on this language, we have held that an employee
may invoke § 12112(d)(4)(A) even if he is not disabled or per-
ceived to be disabled. See Kurtzhals v. County of Dunn, 969 F.3d
725, 730 (7th Cir. 2020). And that is what we have here. Na-
wara has never claimed that he was disabled or that the
2 The ADA defines “covered entity” as an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee, 42
U.S.C. § 12111(2), and a “qualified individual” as an “individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires,” id. § 12111(8). Unless it matters, we will refer to the former as “em-
ployer” and the latter as “employee.” In addition, the term “disability”
means: (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” or (3)
“being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(1)(A)–(C).

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 7
Sheriff perceived him to be disabled. This is helpful to keep in
mind as we review the remedies available under the ADA.
The ADA’s enforcement provision, § 12117, incorporates
the “powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [42 U.S.C.]
sections 2000e–4, 2000e–5, 2000e–6, 2000e–8, and 2000e–9.”
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). In so doing, it makes available to ADA
plaintiffs the same remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs.
See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Subsection 2000e–5(g) addresses the availability of back
pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g). It begins with the general rule
that a “court may … order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay[,] …
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”
Id. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (emphasis added); see Vega v. Chi. Park Dist.,
12 F.4th 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Title VII affords wide lati-
tude to fashion an award that fits the circumstances peculiar
to the case[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
The next subsection, however, contains a substantial limi-
tation: “No order of the court shall require … the payment to
[a plaintiff] of any back pay, if such individual was … sus-
pended, … or discharged for any reason other than discrimina-
tion on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(2) (emphasis added).
Recall that the jury found that the Sheriff had violated
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) by requiring Nawara to undergo a fitness-
for-duty examination and disclose his medical records. But
the jury did not find (because it was not asked to) that Nawara

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8 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
had a disability or a perceived disability. Accordingly, as the
Sheriff sees it, the unlawful conduct, as determined by the
jury, was for a “reason other than discrimination on account
of” disability, and § 2000e–5(g)(2) precludes Nawara from re-
covering back pay.
Pushing back, Nawara offers two arguments. First, he
points out that § 2000e–5(g)(2) does not mention “disability”
at all; thus, Nawara posits, the provision applies only to cases
involving Title VII claims and not ADA claims. Alternatively,
Nawara contends, the ADA counts a violation of
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) as a form of “discrimination on account of
disability” and, thus, § 2000e–5(g)(2)’s bar does not apply. We
believe that Nawara is wrong on the first point but right on
the second.
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1). While the ADA addresses other “major spheres
of public life” such as public services and public accommoda-
tions, see Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2018),
“Title I of the ADA … is devoted to eliminating employment
discrimination,” Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831,
834 (7th Cir. 2005).
To that end, § 12112(a) prohibits “discrimination … on the
basis of disability” as to the “terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). And § 12117(a) incor-
porates § 2000e–5 in its entirety, including all the “powers,
remedies, and procedures” attendant to it. Id. § 12117(a).
Thus, § 12117(a) requires us to replace in § 2000e–5(g)(2)(A)
the phrase “discrimination on account of race … national
origin” with “discrimination on account of disability” while

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 9
leaving the remainder of the subsection intact. This is the most
natural reading of § 12117(a).
Nawara’s preferred construction, on the other hand,
would lead to nonsensical results. He argues that the district
court erred “when it rewrote the statute and added the term
‘disability’ to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A).” But if we were to
maintain the language of § 2000e–5(g)(2) as is (as Nawara pro-
poses), § 12117(a)’s incorporation of § 2000e–5 would mean
that no ADA claimant would be able to recover back pay even
if he or she were able to prove discrimination due to disabil-
ity. But see Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.,
883 F.3d 595, 608 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming the award of back
pay where a jury found discrimination due to disability);
Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 865 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2017),
as amended (Aug. 8, 2017) (same); E.E.O.C. v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 480 F.3d 724, 731 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). More-
over, Nawara’s interpretation would place § 2000e–5(g)(2) at
odds with subsection (g)(1), which expressly permits the
court to award back pay in ADA cases. Therefore, we agree
with the district court that, in the context of the ADA, § 2000e–
5(g)(2) precludes back pay when an employer acts unlawfully
for any reason other than “discrimination on account of disa-
bility.”
But our analysis does not end there. This construction of
§ 2000e–5(g)(2) leads to the second question—does the Sher-
iff’s violation of § 12112(d)(4)(a) count as discrimination on
account of disability even absent evidence that Nawara had a
disability or a perceived disability? Our examination of the
statutory text leads us to answer yes.
We return to the general rule—§ 12112(a) prohibits “dis-
crimination … on the basis of disability” as to the “terms,

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10 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). In turn, § 12112(d)(1) explains that “[t]he prohibi-
tion against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a)
shall include medical examinations and inquiries.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(1). In the district court’s view, these two provisions
taken together merely add “medical examinations and inquir-
ies” to the various ways, enumerated in § 12112(a), that an
employer might discriminate against a disabled individual.
Under this reading, being subject to medical examinations
and inquiries is a means of discriminating, not discrimination
in and of itself. This interpretation, however, suffers from sev-
eral flaws.
First, reading § 12112(d)(1) merely to add medical exami-
nations and inquiries as additional examples of unlawful dis-
crimination under § 12112(a) would render § 12112(d)(1) sur-
plusage because a medical examination and inquiry will al-
ways be a job application procedure or a term or condition of
employment. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012) (“If a provi-
sion is susceptible of (1) a meaning that gives it an effect al-
ready achieved by another provision … and (2) another mean-
ing that leaves both provisions with some independent oper-
ation, the latter should be preferred.”).
Furthermore, incorporating § 12112(d) wholesale into
§ 12112(a) is an odd fit, because the latter requires the ADA
claimant to have a disability or perceived disability, see
§ 12102(1)(A)–(C), while the former permits an individual to
file a claim even though he may not. See Kurtzhals, 969 F.3d at
730 (noting § 12112(d)(4)(A) “applies to all employees, with or
without an actual or perceived disability”); see also Griffin v.
Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 594 (10th Cir. 1998) (“It makes little

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 11
sense to require an employee to demonstrate that he has a dis-
ability to prevent his employer from inquiring as to whether
or not he has a disability.”) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tation omitted). Nor is it satisfactory to say that subsection
(d)(1) operates entirely separately from subsection (d)(2), (3),
or (4), because (d)(1) sets forth the “general” rule as the title
indicates. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 540 (2015)
(stating that, although “headings are not commanding, they
supply cues” as to Congress’s intent).
The better construction of § 12112(d)(1) can be gleaned
from its text. It refers to the “prohibition against discrimina-
tion referred to in subsection (a).” Employing the “nearest-
reasonable-referent” canon of construction, Scalia & Garner,
Reading Law, at 152, we take “referred to in subsection (a)”
as modifying “discrimination.” And the “discrimination” ref-
erenced in § 12112(a) is “discrimination against a qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability.” Thus, returning to the language
in § 12112(d)(1), § 12112(a)’s prohibition on discriminating
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability “shall
include” § 12112(d)’s prohibition on requiring a medical ex-
amination or inquiry as described in § 12112(d)(4)(A). Put an-
other way, to prove a violation of § 12112(d)(4) is to prove dis-
crimination on the basis of disability under § 12112(a). Accord
Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The
ADA ban of ‘discriminat[ion] ... on the basis of disability’ thus
encompasses medical examinations and disability inquiries
involving employees.”).
The Sheriff disagrees with such a construction, arguing
that it goes against the commonly understood meaning of
“discrimination.” But the colloquial use of a word does not
necessarily bind its meaning in a particular statute. See Bostock

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12 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 665–67 (2020) (“[C]onversa-
tional conventions do not control … legal analysis.”). After all,
Congress can define “discrimination … on the basis of disa-
bility” however it likes. And here, Congress effectuated the
broad remedial purpose of the ADA by including medical ex-
aminations and inquiries into an employee’s disability status
within the definition of “discrimination … on the basis of dis-
ability.”
Nor is this unique to § 12112(d). For example,
§ 12112(b)(6) prohibits “using qualification standards, em-
ployment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out an individual with a disability.” Similarly,
§ 12112(b)(3) forbids “utilizing standards, criteria, or methods
of administration … that have the effect of discrimination on
the basis of disability; or … that perpetuate the discrimination
of others who are subject to common administrative con-
trol[.]” Moreover, § 12112(b)(4) proscribes “excluding or oth-
erwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual
because of the known disability of an individual with whom
the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or as-
sociation[.]” And § 12112(b) expressly includes all of this con-
duct—whether or not the target individuals are disabled—
within the phrase “discriminate against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b).3
In sum, read together, § 12112(a) and § 12112(d)(1) define
3 This construction is also consistent with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission’s own definition of “discrimination” in its regula-
tions governing the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(2) (defining the term
“discrimination” to include requiring medical examinations and inquir-
ies).

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Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451 13
a violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) to constitute discrimination on
the basis of disability under § 12112(a). Consequently,
§ 12117(d)—drawing as it does on Title VII’s remedial struc-
ture—authorized Nawara to recover back pay for the Sheriff’s
ADA violation.4
B. Restoration of Seniority
That leaves the Sheriff’s cross-appeal. The Sheriff contends
that we must vacate the award of restored seniority as moot
because, starting in 2019, Nawara ceased to work as a correc-
tional officer and became a police officer in a separate depart-
ment within the Sheriff’s Office.
“A case that becomes moot at any point during the pro-
ceedings is no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of
Article III, and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 385–86
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party assert-
ing mootness bears the burden of persuasion.” Wis. Right to
Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 491 (7th Cir. 2004).
To the Sheriff’s point, after Nawara transferred to the
Cook County Sheriff’s police department, he joined a differ-
ent union and his seniority clock was reset for police assign-
ments. The Sheriff, however, has made no attempt to show
that Nawara’s increased seniority would be useless to him as
a police officer in the Sheriff’s Office. This failure of proof
alone is fatal to the Sheriff’s position.
4 We take this opportunity to commend the United States for its ami-
cus brief which provided a helpful discussion of the relevant statutory
provisions.

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14 Nos. 22-1393, 22-1430, 22-2395, & 22-2451
In any event, we note that the relevant collective bargain-
ing agreements between the Sheriff’s Office and the police of-
ficers’ union (which are publicly available government docu-
ments) provide that, in the event of a tie in seniority in the
police department, the employee’s seniority in the Sheriff’s
Office will be used to break the tie.5 Thus, it appears that the
restoration of Nawara’s seniority could benefit him even in
his current employment. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s invocation
of mootness fails.
III
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment to the extent
that it restores Nawara’s seniority but REVERSE the judg-
ment as to Nawara’s ability to request back pay. This case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
5 See Collective Bargaining Agreement § 4.2, effective December 1,
2017 through November 30, 2020, https://opendocs.cookcountyil.gov/hu-
man-resources/labor-agreements/2017-2020/2017-2020_FOP_County_ Po-
lice_Officers.pdf; Collective Bargaining Agreement § 8.1, effective Decem-
ber 1, 2020 through November 30, 2025, https://opendocs.
cookcountyil.gov/human-resources/labor-agreements/2020-2025/2020-
2025_FOP_OPR_CBA.pdf.

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