Rakeem Harris v. Hector Melchor

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025*
Decided April 1, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2468
RAKEEM HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HECTOR MELCHOR, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-CV-1094-JES
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Rakeem Harris sued Officers Hector Melchor, Cody Followell, and Jared Roth of
the Bloomington, Illinois Police Department for allegedly violating his constitutional
rights during two traffic stops. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that no reasonable jury could find
that the officers violated his constitutional rights during either traffic stop. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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I.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Harris, the nonmoving party.
Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2018). In March 2021, Harris was
pulled over by Officer Melchor. Melchor said he pulled Harris over because Harris
failed to signal as he exited a gas station and did not have a visible registered license
plate on the back of his car—Harris had a cover over his rear license plate that read
“Traveler.” Melchor asked Harris for proof of insurance or proof of registration, but
Harris did not produce those documents. Melchor ticketed Harris for failure to
demonstrate proof of registration and insurance and then allowed Harris to drive away.
In November 2021, Melchor stopped Harris on the road for not having a license
plate attached to his front bumper. This time, however, Harris had placed the license
plate inside his front windshield. When Harris rolled down his window, Melchor
smelled marijuana. After Officer Followell arrived, Melchor ordered Harris out of the
car. Melchor searched the car and found what appeared to be marijuana—the leafy
substance turned out, later, to be a hemp product similar to marijuana—cash, and a
handgun. Upon finding the handgun, Melchor handcuffed Harris, put him in the back
of a police car, and continued to search Harris’s car. Soon thereafter Melchor learned
over police radio that Harris had a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and a
Concealed Carry License, at which point he promptly released Harris.
Harris sued Melchor, Followell, Roth, and the Bloomington Police Department
for constitutional violations arising out of the two traffic stops. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
With regard to the first stop, Harris asserted that Melchor unlawfully searched, seized,
and maliciously prosecuted him. Harris also argued that Melchor infringed on his
religious exercise. According to Harris, requiring him to have proof of registration
substantially burdened his ability to use his car to “engage in prayer.” As for the second
stop, Harris asserted that Melchor unlawfully searched and seized him, falsely arrested
him, and infringed on his rights under the Second Amendment. He also accused
Followell and Sergeant Roth of failing to intervene during his arrest.1 Lastly, he
asserted that the Bloomington Police Department maintained unconstitutional practices
of malicious prosecution, unlawful seizure, and prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
1 There is nothing in the record to support Harris’s assertion that Sergeant Roth was involved in
this case. Roth was not physically present or directly involved in either traffic stop. He was the signing
supervisor on the November police report.

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No. 24-2468 Page 3
Further proceedings ensued, and the defendants moved for summary judgment.
The court sent Harris a letter notifying him of the motion and advising him that he
needed to respond by affidavit setting forth “specific facts” showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. The notice included a copy of Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and advised Harris that, if he did not submit such
evidence, the defendants’ statement of facts would be accepted as true. Harris
responded to Melchor’s motion for summary judgment but cited no record evidence to
support his version of events.
The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. To begin, the
court deemed admitted the defendants’ statement of facts because Harris’s response to
the motion failed to comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
Central District of Illinois Local Rule 7.1(D) governing summary judgment motions. The
court then proceeded to the merits of Harris’s claims.
It first determined that none of Harris’s causes of action in connection with the
March 2021 traffic stop—unlawful seizure, malicious prosecution, and infringement of
his religious exercise – survived summary judgment. The court reasoned that no
reasonable jury could find that Melchor lacked reasonable suspicion to pull over Harris,
given Harris’s failure to signal or display a visible registered license plate. Next, the
court, acting sua sponte, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2), dismissed Harris’s federal malicious-
prosecution claim for three reasons: (1) in addition to reasonable suspicion, Melchor
had probable cause to stop Harris; (2) there were no criminal proceedings initiated
against Harris in connection with the traffic stop; and (3) Harris misinterpreted the
meaning of “motor vehicle” as relevant to Illinois laws governing vehicle registration.
The court also rejected Harris’s religious-exercise claim, finding Illinois’s traffic laws
requiring proof of registration and utilizing appropriate license plates did not
substantially burden Harris’s religious practices under the First Amendment.
The court next turned to Harris’s allegations involving the November 2021 traffic
stop. It rejected Harris’s unlawful-seizure claim finding Melchor had reasonable
suspicion to stop Harris for not affixing a license plate to the front of his car. The court
also found that, given the plausible odor of marijuana detected coming from Harris’s
vehicle, no reasonable jury could conclude that Melchor lacked probable cause to search
Harris’s car or his person. Next, it found that the officers had probable cause to seize the
green leafy substance found on Harris’s person. Lastly, concerning Harris’s false-arrest
claim and unlawful seizure of the firearm, the court found that the officers were
justified in handcuffing and detaining Harris while they determined whether he

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possessed the firearm lawfully. In the court’s view it was reasonable, in light of the
circumstances, to seize the firearm during the inquiry. Without an underlying
constitutional violation, the court then found Harris’s failure to intervene claim against
the officers failed as a matter of law.
Finally, turning to Harris’s claim against the City of Bloomington under Monell v.
Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the court rejected this claim for several
reasons: (1) there was no underlying constitutional violation; (2) Harris did not present
evidence of a policy or practice that inflicted a constitutional injury; and (3) Harris
failed to name the City as a defendant.
II.
We begin with several procedural challenges. Harris first argues that the district
court erred when, based on his failure to comply with the local and federal rules, it
deemed Melchor’s facts admitted. Harris points out that the court did not send him a
copy of the Central District of Illinois’s Local Rules, and he contends that this oversight
prevented him from knowing that he had to support his claims with citations to the
record.
The court’s ruling was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. Even if Harris
were not given a copy of the related Local Rules, the letter sent to him by the court
warned that his failure to properly support his facts—or contest Melchor’s statement of
facts—would result in the “defendants’ statement of facts . . . be[ing] accepted as true
for purposes of summary judgment.” See FED. R. C IV. P. 56(e). The court here adequately
justified its ruling, explaining that Harris failed to support his factual assertions with
specific record citations. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2024).
Harris also asserts that the district judge—whose father was a police officer—has
often sided with law enforcement officers, and that this bias is reflected in his
procedural rulings (i.e., granting an extension of time to Melchor, treating all of
Melchor’s facts as admitted). But adverse judicial rulings do not provide a valid basis
for questioning a judge’s impartiality. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
And Harris has not identified any of the limited circumstances that might suggest
judicial bias. See United States v. Williams, 949 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 2020).
Harris next challenges a narrow ruling early in the proceedings—the court’s
decision to grant Melchor an extension of time to answer the complaint. Harris asserts

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that Melchor never justified his need for additional time. But this ruling also fell within
the court’s discretion. The court treated Melchor’s delay as one of excusable neglect, a
“somewhat ‘elastic concept.’” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship,
507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993); Mayle v. State of Illinois, 956 F.3d 966, 968–69 (7th Cir. 2020).
Here, the court appropriately found Melchor’s circumstances persuasive: Melchor
seemed to have acted in good faith, his motion missed the deadline by only two days,
the delay had minimal impact on the proceedings, and Harris’s charge of prejudice was
outweighed by the court’s “strong policy preference for deciding cases on the merits.”
See Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2009).
We turn, then, to Harris’s substantive arguments. Harris contends, with regard
to the first traffic stop, that he possessed an exculpatory video—showing his use of a
turn signal—which he did not know how to introduce into the record. But we see
nothing in the record to suggest that Harris notified the court that he was having
difficulty presenting his case. A court cannot help a litigant resolve a procedural
problem that the court is unaware of. See FED. R. C IV. P. 56(d) (permitting nonmoving
party to request more time for discovery, if he explains by affidavit or declaration why
he cannot present essential evidence at the time); Alicea v. Cnty. of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209,
1219 (7th Cir. 2023). Regardless, Harris’s argument fails. His failure to signal was only
one of the reasons that supplied reasonable suspicion for Melchor to stop him; Melchor
had also reported Harris’s failure to have a visible license plate. An officer has a
sufficient basis to stop a driver if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver
has committed a minor violation of traffic law, see United States v. Jackson, 962 F.3d 353,
357 (7th Cir. 2020), and a driver’s failure to have a visible license plate violates Illinois
law, see 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b). Given these circumstances, no reasonable jury could find
that Melchor lacked reasonable suspicion to carry out the stop.
As for the March 2021 traffic stop, Harris argues that the district court
misunderstood Illinois law by presuming that Illinois requires a person to signal when
exiting a private parking lot. But this is incorrect. Illinois law does require drivers to
signal when they make a turn, see 625 ILCS 5/11-804(a); see also City of Highland Park v.
Kane, 991 N.E.2d 333, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), so Melchor had reasonable suspicion to
pull Harris over for a minor traffic violation.
As for the November 2021 traffic stop, Harris argues that the district court
misapplied Illinois’s vehicle-and-title registration statute, 625 ILCS 5/3-413(a), when it
determined that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Harris did not commit a
traffic violation when he displayed the license plate in his car’s front windshield. He

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maintains that Melchor lacked probable cause to pull him over because the statute does
not explicitly state that he must display the license plate on his car’s front bumper and
not in the front windshield. But the state’s vehicle-and-title registration law prohibits a
driver from displaying the license plate in the front windshield of the car. See 625 ILCS
5/3-413(a); People v. Parker, 820 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Harris also contends that the court overlooked a material dispute about whether
Melchor smelled marijuana or a hemp product coming from the car. But this dispute is
immaterial. First, Melchor had a sufficient basis to stop Harris because Melchor
reasonably suspected that Harris had committed a minor traffic stop. See Jackson,
962 F.3d at 357. Second, while Illinois has legalized marijuana for recreational use, the
state still restricts the use of marijuana while driving and requires marijuana to be
packaged properly. See United States v. Jackson, 103 F.4th 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2024). And
regardless of whether Melchor smelled marijuana or hemp (and Harris admits that the
two have a very similar odor and appearance), the smell of what Melchor believed to be
marijuana supplied probable cause for him to direct Harris to step out of the car for a
search, see id. at 490—even if that belief turned out to be mistaken, see Muhammad,
900 F.3d at 909.
Harris next argues that the court overlooked another material dispute over
whether he posed a danger to the officers when they discovered that he had a firearm.
But because he did not inform the officers that he had a gun or a valid Firearm Owner’s
Identification Card and a Concealed Carry License, the officers—understandably
concerned about their safety—were justified in detaining Harris for ten minutes while
they determined whether his possession of the gun was lawful. See Rabin v. Flynn,
725 F.3d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 2013).
Finally, Harris asserts that the district court overlooked evidence that the City of
Bloomington had a policy or pattern of training its officers to unconstitutionally stop
drivers for not having registration plates on their cars. But he does not identify any such
evidence to support a claim under Monell. 436 U.S. 658. As we have explained, the
officers here had reasonable suspicion to conduct both traffic stops, so there was no
underlying constitutional violation to support a Monell claim. See Deeren v. Anderson,
72 F.4th 229, 237 (7th Cir. 2023).
We have considered Harris’s other arguments, and none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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