United States of America v. Larry Jones

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 26, 2025
Decided April 9, 2025
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2557
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LARRY JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-cr-00309-1
Virginia M. Kendall,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Larry Jones pleaded guilty to federal narcotics conspiracy and money laundering
charges, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment, the high
end of the advisory range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal Jones
challenges the district court’s Guidelines determination of the total weight of narcotics
he trafficked during the relevant period, including for two years before the start of the
conspiracy period alleged in the indictment. He also takes issue with the district court’s
consideration of his role in certain acts of gang-related violence—including at least two
murders—that accompanied the drug dealing. Seeing no error on any front, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2557 Page 2
I
After being indicted in June 2020, Jones entered into an agreement with the
government and pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. § 846) and
to one count of money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A)). The underlying
indictment and plea agreement specified the dates of the conspiracy as between August
6, 2018 and September 3, 2019. Jones acknowledged in the agreement that he worked in
particular ways with co-defendants Marsha Fountain and Jamar Spencer to sell heroin
in Chicago. Even more specifically, the plea agreement itemized several transactions in
which Jones sold heroin to a confidential source.
Beyond acknowledging his role in those transactions, Jones agreed that “for the
purpose of computing his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines,” the government
would not be limited to relying on just those sales. Indeed, in terms of what would
constitute “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 at sentencing, he expressly
“acknowledge[d] that he met [Jamar] Spencer in the early 2000s and that, in addition to
heroin, [Jones] also sold quanti[ties] of marijuana, cocaine base, and fentanyl to Spencer
during the course of their relationship.” From there the plea agreement included the
government’s position on the total drug weight attributable to Jones—a position Jones
reserved the right to challenge at sentencing.
At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the government presented the testimony of
Jamar Spencer and Dante Dockett. A fellow member of the Black P Stones street gang,
Spencer explained that he started dealing drugs supplied by Jones in October 2016.
Spencer then estimated for the district court the total quantities of heroin, marijuana,
crack cocaine, and fentanyl he sold with and for Jones from 2016 to 2020. Though a
member of a different street gang, Dockett testified he too sold drugs supplied by Jones.
Finally, both Spencer and Dockett described particular instances of violence perpetrated
by Jones’s drug trafficking organization—including at least two occasions in which
Dockett committed murder.
The district court found Spencer’s and Dockett’s testimony credible and aligned
with the government’s estimated drug quantities for which Jones bore responsibility
from 2016 to 2020. So the district court adopted the government’s drug weight
calculations and determined Jones’s advisory sentence range to be 151 to 188 months. In
the end, the district court applied the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
emphasized the magnitude of the drug dealing and related acts of violence, and
sentenced Jones to concurrent terms of 188 months’ imprisonment.
Jones now appeals.

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No. 23-2557 Page 3
II
Drug weight matters at sentencing. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the higher
the drug quantity attributed to the defendant, the higher his base offense level and, in
turn, the higher his sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). A defendant’s base
offense level “must reflect not just the amount of drugs involved in the offense of
conviction, but also the defendant’s ‘acts and omissions … that were part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United
States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)).
“Conduct that qualifies as relevant,” we have explained, “is factored into the
Guidelines’ sentencing calculations as if the defendant had been convicted of that
conduct, even though the defendant was neither charged nor convicted of the
additional crime or crimes.” United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 347 (7th Cir. 2008).
Our review of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant and whether
uncharged drug trafficking amounts to relevant conduct is deferential. We will reverse
only upon a determination of clear error by the district court. See United States v.
Tankson, 836 F.3d 873, 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2016).
A
The government contends that Jones waived any argument that his drug
transactions with Jamar Spencer prior to August 6, 2018—the date the charged
conspiracy began—are not relevant conduct. We agree.
Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citation omitted). In his plea agreement
Jones acknowledged in no uncertain terms that, apart from the heroin, he sold
quantities of marijuana, crack cocaine, and fentanyl to Spencer during their
relationship. And “for the purpose of computing his sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines,” he further agreed this activity “constitute[d] relevant conduct under
Guideline § 1B1.3.”
No doubt this admission explains why at sentencing Jones only contested
Spencer’s estimates of drug quantities and not, more broadly, whether his uncharged
dealings with Spencer constituted relevant conduct within the meaning of the
Guidelines. Indeed, defense counsel took care to underscore that “[Jones] is not trying
to say that he did not have anything to do with these – this other person and did not
have any other drug transactions. He’s just saying that the amounts are overstated.”

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No. 23-2557 Page 4
On this record, we have no difficulty concluding that Jones waived his challenge
to the district court’s consideration of the uncharged drug transactions as relevant
conduct—even if they predated the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.
B
But Jones did not waive his right to challenge the district court’s findings with
respect to the drug weights themselves. To the contrary, he expressly reserved the
opportunity to do so. But reserving a right and convincing us that the district court’s
findings reflect clear error are two different things. And it is on the latter point that
Jones falls short on appeal.
The district court took considerable care at sentencing by holding a two-day
evidentiary hearing, which included testimony from two of Jones’s associates with
knowledge of his drug dealing activities. Finding these witnesses credible, the district
court made specific drug-quantity findings, which contributed to its calculation of
Jones’s base offense level and, ultimately, his advisory Guidelines range. These
credibility determinations, we have underscored, “can virtually never be clear error.”
United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Noble,
246 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2001)). In short, we see no clear error in any aspect of the
district court’s drug weight findings at sentencing.
III
We close with a brief word to Jones’s independent contention that the district
court erred by considering as “relevant conduct” the drug-related violence Jamar
Spencer and Dante Dockett described at his sentencing hearing. Jones does not
meaningfully develop this argument on appeal. But after undertaking our own review
of the record, the district court considered these violent acts not as relevant conduct
when calculating Jones’s base offense level but rather in evaluating the § 3553(a)
factors—specifically in connection with his history and characteristics and the need for
deterrence.
Section 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. The witness testimony here
revealed Jones held a leadership role in the Black P Stones street gang and, in that role,
had awareness of and involvement in—at least to some degree—gang- and drug-related
violence, including the murders described by Spencer and Dockett.

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No. 23-2557 Page 5
The district court committed no error by taking this violent conduct into account
and exercising its discretion to impose a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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