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24-2676•Kevin D. Motykie v. Gary Motykie
24-2676Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitApr 15, 2025
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 14, 2025
Decided April 15, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2676
KEVIN D. MOTYKIE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GARY MOTYKIE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01779
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
O R D E R
This appeal contests the district court’s August 28, 2024, decision granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
which precludes federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court
judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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No. 24-2676 Page 2
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Supreme Court restated that doctrine in
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).1
Before the district court’s decision here, this court sitting en banc considered the
scope and applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Gilbank v. Wood County
Department of Human Services, 111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024). This court decided Gilbank
on August 1, 2024.
In the district court, after the parties had completed briefing of the motion to
dismiss, some of the defendants on August 26, 2024 moved for leave to cite Gilbank.
Dist. Ct. DE 71. The district court issued its decision granting the motion to dismiss on
August 28, 2024, and on the same day granted the motion to cite Gilbank. Dist. Ct. DE
73.
Although the motion to cite our court’s decision in Gilbank was granted, the
district court’s decision to dismiss the amended complaint does not reveal that Gilbank
was considered. Gilbank is not cited in the district court’s decision. That decision
references fraud allegations, and Gilbank eliminated the “fraud exception” to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 111 F. 4th at 760. The district court’s decision also references the
“inextricably intertwined with state court proceedings” standard from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil, which this court agreed should no longer be relied
upon. 111 F.4th at 761.
Because this court’s decision in Gilbank controls the scope and application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this circuit, we think it best that the district court consider
defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of Rooker-Feldman with the benefit of
Gilbank. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s order and judgment dismissing
this case and R EMAND this case for further proceedings.
1 In April 2024, the district court dismissed the original complaint as barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Dist. Ct. DE 50. The plaintiffs were permitted to and did
amend their complaint. Dist. Ct. DE 53. The defendants again moved to dismiss the
amended complaint as barred by Rooker-Feldman, which the district court granted. Dist.
Ct. DE 73. Judgment was entered, Dist. Ct. DE 74, and we have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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