William Gardner v. Domenica Stephenson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 16, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2753
WILLIAM GARDNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DOMENICA STEPHENSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 C 0582
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2753 Page 2
O R D E R
William Gardner, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
civil rights action based on the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). We affirm.
Gardner was convicted in Illinois state court of multiple offenses. While his
criminal case was pending before the state appellate court, Gardner filed this lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that several officials and state entities violated his
rights under the Due Process Clause by commencing his criminal proceeding without a
proper indictment, not allowing him a trial by jury, changing the counts by judicial
order after the jury verdict, and refusing to acknowledge his post-sentencing motions.
In response to Gardner’s initial pleadings, the district court informed him that
the proper vehicle to challenge his state criminal conviction would be a habeas corpus
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court advised Gardner that he could move to
withdraw his case and petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or he could amend his
complaint to avoid requesting relief that falls within the scope of habeas corpus.
Gardner chose to amend his complaint. In it, he clarified that he sought not to
overturn his criminal conviction, but rather to obtain a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to halt the continuation of his case through the state’s appellate
process.
The district court, acting sua sponte, dismissed Gardner’s case without prejudice
under Younger. The court explained that federal courts must abstain from deciding
cases that would interfere with ongoing state proceedings, including criminal appellate
proceedings. Gardner’s claims, the court added, fell within the scope of Younger
abstention, and he did not argue that extraordinary circumstances warranted an
exception.
On appeal, Gardner argues that the district court wrongly denied the temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, given that he will experience irreparable
harm, is likely to succeed on the merits, and has no available state remedy for his
injuries. But Younger abstention applies. At its core, Younger prevents federal courts
from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54. Gardner’s claims involve constitutional issues that he can
litigate in his ongoing state case, and the federal courts should not interfere with that
process. Although Gardner argues that he will experience irreparable harm if his state

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No. 23-2753 Page 3
court proceedings are allowed to continue, he does not elaborate on the nature of the
harm he alleges he will suffer. Nor can he show that his circumstances are
extraordinary, as injuries incidental to criminal charges do not qualify as irreparable
harm for the purpose of Younger. Id. at 46 (“[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be
considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal sense of that term.”).
To the extent that Gardner’s claims concern alleged constitutional violations in
the state appellate process (rather than at his criminal trial), Younger abstention still
applies. Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED

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