Johnnie Flournoy v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 16, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1465
JOHNNIE FLOURNOY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.
and ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 20-cv-01357-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
In this second suit about his medical treatment and accommodations, Johnnie
Flournoy, an Illinois prisoner, accuses defendants of depriving him of his constitutional,
federal statutory, and Illinois common-law rights. The district court dismissed claims
against the two individual defendants for lack of alleged personal involvement. And it
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1465 Page 2
entered summary judgment for Wexford Health Sources, Inc., ruling that Flournoy had
previously released Wexford “from all claims” against it. Because Flournoy failed to
assert that the two individual defendants participated in the alleged unlawful conduct,
and because the release of Wexford was broad and enforceable, we affirm.
For a decade, Flournoy has sought treatment and accommodations for glaucoma
and a throat condition. In an earlier suit, he settled with Wexford on November 10,
2021. In exchange for payment, Flournoy promised to “release” Wexford “from all
claims … of every name and nature … through the date of this General Release.” Also
in the release, Flournoy, who had counsel, said that he understood it and signed it
“voluntarily and freely, without duress and as my own free act….”
Before he signed this release, in December 2020, Flournoy brought this case. He
sued Wexford again, plus the warden and health care administrator of his facility. In his
amended complaint, he alleged that the three defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to treat his glaucoma and throat condition. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Regarding the two prison officials only, Flournoy asserted that they also
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
213, and the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 794–94e, by failing to accommodate his
glaucoma. He brought a common-law medical negligence claim against Wexford only.
Finally, he raised constitutional claims about coronavirus and race discrimination.
The court reviewed the complaint for legal sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. It
limited the suit to Flournoy's glaucoma and throat condition claims, severing his
coronavirus and race-discrimination claims into a separate suit. Then, the court
dismissed the individual prison officials. It reasoned that, for his claims under the
Eighth Amendment regarding his glaucoma and throat condition, Flournoy failed to
allege the personal involvement of those officials. For the statutory failure-to-
accommodate claim against those officials, the only proper defendant was the relevant
state department or agency, see 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); accordingly, the court
substituted the Illinois Department of Corrections on that claim.
The district court later entered summary judgment for Wexford based on the
release. Because the release discharged Wexford from all claims about conduct
occurring before November 10, 2021, and Flournoy’s allegations concerned events
before August 29, 2021 (when he amended his complaint), the court ruled that the
release barred this suit. Flournoy contested the release’s validity, arguing that Wexford
fraudulently induced him to sign it and that he had not read it. But the court ruled that
Flournoy presented no genuine dispute of fact regarding the release’s validity.

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No. 24-1465 Page 3
This appeal followed, but we first address our jurisdiction. Before he appealed,
Flournoy moved to dismiss his claim against the Illinois Department of Corrections.
See F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(a)(2). The court granted dismissal without prejudice. The appellees
initially argued that we lack jurisdiction because the non-prejudicial dismissal meant
that the district court did not issue a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; West v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 920 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2019). But in this court, Flournoy has
explicitly disavowed his right to refile his voluntarily dismissed claim against the
Illinois Department of Corrections. This concession effectively renders the dismissal
with prejudice; thus, our jurisdiction is secure. See Nat'l Inspection & Repairs, Inc. v.
George S. May Int'l Co., 600 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2010).
Flournoy first challenges the dismissal of the two prison officials from his
constitutional claims about his glaucoma and throat treatment. To withstand dismissal
on these claims, Flournoy must allege that they were personally involved in treating
those conditions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). But Flournoy did not allege in
his amended complaint (nor does he argue on appeal) that the warden and healthcare
administrator participated in that treatment. Instead, Flournoy alleges that, by blocking
his request to change cells after his cellmate contracted coronavirus, the warden caused
Flournoy to contract coronavirus. But the court severed his claim involving coronavirus
into a separate suit. And Flournoy does not argue that severance was an abuse of
discretion. See UWM Student Ass’n v. Lovell, 888 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2018). Nor does
he contend that coronavirus worsened his glaucoma or throat condition. Thus, the court
properly dismissed these defendants from the constitutional claims.
Flournoy next contends that the district court erred by dismissing the prison
officials from his claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and substituting the
Illinois Department of Corrections on this claim. But the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
mandate that the appropriate defendant in a suit under these laws is the pertinent state
department or agency. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of
Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 670 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, the substitution was proper.
That brings us to Flournoy’s challenge to the district court’s order entering
summary judgment for Wexford based on the release. Flournoy argues that he
presented a fraud defense to the enforceability of the release. We review the record in
the light most favorable to Flournoy and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
See Cannon v. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1088 (7th Cir. 2014). To survive summary judgment
on this defense, Flournoy had to furnish evidence that Wexford made a material
statement of fact that it knew was false, or did not believe to be true, to induce Flournoy

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No. 24-1465 Page 4
to sign the release. See id. at 1093 (citation omitted). But Flournoy presented no such
evidence. Instead, he relies on a complaint against his attorney from the prior suit to
show his attorney’s malpractice. But that complaint implicates only his counsel, not
Wexford. And "[w]hen lawyers fail, the remedy is … not more litigation against an
innocent adversary." Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 2015).
Last, to the extent Flournoy contests the decision to decline to recruit counsel, we
let the decision stand. Beyond a general assertion of error, Flournoy does not give a
reason to question this discretionary ruling; nor does he explain how counsel might
have affected the outcome. Thus, we will not overturn the ruling. See Dewitt v. Corizon,
Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 657–59 (7th Cir. 2014).
AFFIRMED

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