William L. Armstrong Iii v. Boyland Auto Bgmc LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 15, 2025*
Decided April 16, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3182
WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOYLAND AUTO BGMC LLC, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 24-CV-765-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Armstrong sued several individuals and automotive businesses, alleging
that they violated state and federal law by failing to pay cash prizes they had promised
to him and others. Armstrong, proceeding pro se, sought to represent a class of
supposed prize winners. Before screening the complaint, the district court told
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Armstrong that he could not represent the putative class as a pro se litigant. The court
instructed him to obtain counsel or to amend his complaint and proceed only on behalf
of himself. Over the next several months, Armstrong ignored the court’s instructions
and filed a flurry of motions for class certification. Eventually, the court dismissed the
suit without prejudice for Armstrong’s repeated violations of its orders. Because
dismissal was reasonable, we affirm.
In June 2024, Armstrong filed his pro se complaint against the defendants,
alleging in part that they unlawfully conspired to withhold cash prizes that were
promised in a mailed notice that Armstrong and nearly one hundred thousand other
people had received. Armstrong sought to certify a class of households that received the
mailed notice. See FED. R. C IV. P. 23. He also petitioned to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). The district court deferred screening his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to
first “address a threshold issue”—his characterization of the suit as a class action. After
informing Armstrong that he could not sue on behalf of a class while proceeding pro se,
the court gave him two weeks to obtain counsel or to proceed pro se only on behalf of
himself. The court warned Armstrong that failure to timely comply with its order
would result in dismissal of his suit.
Armstrong did not comply with the district court’s order. Instead, he requested
an indefinite stay of the proceedings and for the court to recruit “interim” class counsel.
The court denied the stay and the request for recruitment of counsel (because
Armstrong had not shown that he made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
independently), and it informed Armstrong that he could (1) proceed on behalf of
himself; (2) obtain counsel and then seek class certification; or (3) renew his request to
recruit counsel. Armstrong next filed a motion containing several requests, including
for recruitment of counsel and for service of process. The court denied the motion,
ruling, among other things, that Armstrong’s previous filings showed that he was
competent to litigate his individual claims himself. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649
(7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The court also granted Armstrong’s pending motion for leave
to proceed IFP but determined that service of process should be deferred until it
screened the complaint under § 1915(e)(2). The court instructed him that his suit would
be dismissed if he did not obtain counsel or file an amended complaint on behalf of
himself alone within two months.
The next month, Armstrong—still purporting to represent the putative class—
filed another omnibus motion. The court denied each request for relief and gave
Armstrong a “final warning” that it would dismiss the suit if he filed another motion

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No. 24-3182 Page 3
before complying with the order either to file an amended complaint or to obtain
counsel to represent the putative class. When Armstrong filed another omnibus motion
the next month, the court dismissed the suit for failure to comply with its orders.
On appeal, Armstrong challenges the dismissal of his suit on that basis, a
decision we review for abuse of discretion. See McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d
926, 931 (7th Cir. 2018). District courts generally have broad authority to dismiss a suit
for failure to comply with court orders. Id.; FED. R. C IV. P. 41(b). Courts ideally should
consider several factors when determining whether to dismiss under Rule 41(b), but the
propriety of the sanction ultimately depends on the circumstances of the case.
See McMahan, 892 F.3d at 931–32 (listing factors). Accordingly, we will reverse only if
the court’s analysis was tainted by a legal error or a failure to consider an essential
factor, or if the decision “strikes us as fundamentally wrong.” Id. at 931 (quoting Moffitt
v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Armstrong argues that the court’s decision was tainted by legal error, but his
arguments lack merit. He primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he
could not represent a putative class as a pro se litigant. The court was correct, however:
it is well understood that a pro se litigant can represent only himself. See Georgakis v. Ill.
State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A nonlawyer can’t handle a case on
behalf of anyone except himself.”). This limitation extends to class actions.
See United States ex rel. Lu v. Ou, 368 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other
grounds by United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009). The
court gave Armstrong multiple explanations and, importantly, multiple warnings that
he needed to take one of its suggested actions to remedy the defect. Dismissal was no
abuse of discretion.
Armstrong also argues that the court erred by refusing to order service of process
on the defendants before it screened his complaint. But the district court exercised its
considerable discretion over case management in a reasonable way, declining to screen
the complaint—i.e., to determine whether there was a nonfrivolous and legally viable
claim—until the threshold issue of Armstrong’s representation of other plaintiffs was
resolved. Further, it was appropriate for the court to delay service of process until after
screening the complaint on the merits. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) directs the court to dismiss
a case filed by an indigent plaintiff at “at any time” if the action fails to state a claim, is
frivolous, or seeks relief from defendants who have immunity. A court need not order
service of process at government expense before completing this step. This would
defeat the purpose of screening complaints: to spare the targets of unviable lawsuits the

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expense of responding. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681
(7th Cir. 2012). Further, it would not have been an efficient use of the court’s time when
the possibility remained that counsel would appear (and presumably amend the
complaint).
We have considered Armstrong’s remaining arguments, including that the
district court should have deputized him to serve as an attorney for the class, but none
is sufficiently developed to merit discussion.
AFFIRMED

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