Rickey A. Holleman v. Russell Olmstead

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 1, 2025*
Decided May 5, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2713
RICKEY A. HOLLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RUSSELL OLMSTEAD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
South Bend Division.
No. 3:23-CV-800-PPS-AZ
Philip P. Simon,
Judge.
O R D E R
After receiving allegedly inadequate medical treatment for a knife wound while
he was a pretrial detainee in the Saint Joseph County Jail in South Bend, Indiana, Rickey
Holleman sued jail employees and medical staff, as well as the jail’s private healthcare
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2713 Page 2
contractor, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
district court dismissed his complaint at screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). But after our
review, we conclude that Holleman’s complaint states a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment against the individual defendants. We vacate the judgment with respect to
that claim and those defendants and remand for further consideration. Otherwise, we
affirm.
We recite the facts as stated in Holleman’s amended complaint (and his brief on
appeal if consistent with his complaint), taking them as true and drawing reasonable
inferences in his favor. Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 557 (7th Cir. 2023). In December
2021, Holleman arrived at the Saint Joseph County Jail with a knife wound: a three-to-
four-inch long cut on the back of his left hand. The cut was at least a half-inch wide and
deep, and his tendons were severed and exposed. He told nurses about his wound, but
they refused to send him to the hospital for further care, and the wound healed
improperly. Further, they did not appropriately change his bandages and the wound
became infected. According to Holleman, he filed a grievance about the care of his
wound and he received a response acknowledging that jail staff needed better training.
In August 2023, Holleman, who was by then a state prisoner, sued the jail’s
warden, the county sheriff, and the medical staff (although he was unable to name the
individuals who allegedly denied him care). The district court screened this complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it, ruling that Holleman had plausibly alleged
that he had an objectively serious medical need but had not specified that medical staff
acted in an objectively unreasonable way.
Holleman amended his complaint. This time, he removed the sheriff as a
defendant and added two defendants: “Nurse Megan Last Name Unknown” and her
presumed employer, “Well Path Medical” (a.k.a., Wellpath LLC). He reiterated his
previous allegations, adding that he had told Nurse Megan about his wound, and she
denied his request for additional treatment.
The district court again dismissed the complaint, ruling that Holleman had not
sufficiently pleaded that staff had acted in an objectively unreasonable way. The district
court explained that simply alleging his need for stitches or surgery did not state a
constitutional claim because detainees have no right to specific care. Holleman timely
moved to alter the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). He also
moved for limited discovery to learn the names of the unknown staff members so that
he could further develop his claims. The district court denied his motions, and
Holleman appeals those rulings as well as the underlying judgment.

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No. 24-2713 Page 3
Holleman now contends that dismissal was improper because he alleged facts
giving rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. At screening, pro se plaintiffs
need only plead a “plausible claim for relief,” which is “not an exacting standard.” Balle,
73 F.4th at 557 (citation omitted). The plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that
[his] claim has substantive plausibility” but a court may not dismiss a complaint “for
imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of
Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11–12 (2014).
Holleman’s amended complaint stated a claim that he received objectively
unreasonable medical treatment, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v.
County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 400 (2015) (“[M]edical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth amendment are subject only to the objective reasonableness inquiry
identified in Kingsley.”). He alleges that he had a large, gaping wound on his hand and
that a nurse and other jail staff ignored his requests for care: Nurse Megan denied his
request to go to the hospital, and she and others refused to change his bandages, despite
being aware of a severe cut. He further alleges that his wound became infected and did
not heal properly, which we can reasonably infer resulted from either the denial of care
or the inadequacy of the care that he received.
Although the district court correctly observed that detainees are not entitled to
demand specific care, that does not preclude a claim that it was objectively
unreasonable for staff members to ignore the wound. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 354
(properly instructed jury could have found that the defendants purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly disregarded consequences of not sending detainee to hospital
sooner). And not using the words “objectively unreasonable” in describing the
defendants’ actions is immaterial; plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories in
their complaints or “match[] facts to legal elements” that they must prove at the
summary judgment phase. Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335, 1337–38
(7th Cir. 2024) (“All the complaint need do is state a grievance.”); Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11.
Holleman’s allegations that his hand became infected and healed improperly after jail
staff refused to give him medical treatment, if true, exceed mere negligence and are
therefore sufficient for his complaint to survive screening. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353
(mere negligence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
Holleman also contends that he could have developed his claim further had the
district court allowed him limited discovery to identify “Nurse Megan” and other
members of the medical staff who treated him. He correctly asserts that he followed the

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proper procedure to do so when he named the warden as a placeholder defendant until,
with the assistance of the district court, he could discover the identities of the proper
defendants. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1121 (7th Cir. 2022) (“There’s nothing wrong
with suing placeholder defendants, then using discovery to learn and substitute
names …. But a plaintiff who uses placeholders must take account of the clock[.]”)
(emphasis added). On remand, the district court should permit discovery to allow
Holleman to attempt to identify appropriate defendants. See Donald, 95 F.3d at 555 & n.3
(discussing assisting pro se plaintiffs who confront barriers to identifying defendants).
But the district court properly dismissed “Well Path Medical,” the purported
employer of the jail’s medical staff. There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. And
Holleman complaint contains no allegations suggesting that “Well Path Medical” could
be held responsible based on any corporate policy, practice, or custom that led to
Holleman’s injury. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 652–54
(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978)).
Of course, we take no position on whether Holleman’s suit has factual merit. All
we decide today is that (1) Holleman stated a plausible claim that he received
objectively unreasonable medical treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and (2) the district court should assist him to identify proper defendants and serve them
with process.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment with respect to “Well Path Medical,”
VACATE the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the other
defendants, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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