Pablito Vega v. Rohit Rangarajan

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 1, 2025*
Decided May 5, 2025
Before
F RANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
M ICHAEL B. BRENNAN , Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR , Circuit Judge
No. 24-2790
PABLITO V EGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R OHIT R ANGARAJAN , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin.
No. 23-cv-1124-SCD
Stephen C. Dries,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
After Pablito Vega’s application for unemployment benefits was denied, he filed
this suit in federal court accusing the defendants of violating his right to due process of
law. He asserts that the state agency and its employees erroneously believed that he
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 24-2790 Page 2
was incarcerated, a belief that led to the adverse decision. The parties agreed to have a
magistrate judge resolve their dispute. 28 U.S.C. §636(c).
The judge dismissed all claims against the agency, and any state employee acting
in an official capacity, on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment entitles Wisconsin
to immunity from suit in federal court. Yet courts should avoid constitutional adjudica-
tion when possible, as it is easy and appropriate to do here. Will v. Michigan Department
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), holds that states, their agencies, and their employees
sued in an official capacity are not “persons” for the purpose of §1983 and therefore
cannot be sued for damages. This statutory issue, not the Constitution, is the right place
to start and to conclude. See Lapides v. University of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002). If
§1983 were amended to allow suits against states, the next question would be whether
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to override any state immunity. See
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Given the current text of §1983, however, that
question does not arise.
As for the defendants sued in their individual capacities, including the adminis-
trative law judge and the commissioners of the Labor and Industry Review Commis-
sion, we agree with the magistrate judge that all have absolute immunity from liability
in damages. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985); Coleman v. Dunlap, 695
F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2012). Vega’s insistence that these defendants erred in handling
his claim does not affect the scope of their immunity. An immunity from suit would be
worthless if it applied only when the defendants prevail on the merits.
Vega’s other arguments, including those raised for the first time in his reply
brief, need not be addressed.
Although the magistrate judge stated that the institutional and official-capacity
defendants possess sovereign immunity, which should have led to a dismissal without
prejudice (leaving Vega free to proceed in state court), the judge incongruously dis-
missed the entire suit with prejudice. That judgment is correct, even though some of the
reasons for it are not, and is therefore AFFIRMED.

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