United States of America v. Marcus T. Dixon

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2427
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
M ARCUS T. DIXON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:21-cr-40020-SLD-JEH-1 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 17, 2024 — DECIDED M AY 7, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON , and M ALDONADO,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. In 2019 defendant-appellant
Marcus Dixon was on supervised release after a federal prison
sentence. The United States Probation Office that was
supervising him obtained a warrant to arrest him based on his
suspected involvement in a hit-and-run accident and drug
dealing. After arresting Dixon, probation officers invoked a
condition of his supervised release that authorized

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2 No. 23-2427
warrantless searches of his property under certain conditions.
On the day Dixon was arrested, officers conducted a series of
searches of a Pontiac, a cellphone, a home in Silvis, Illinois, an
Audi, and a duffel bag. Each search built on information
learned in the prior searches. The officers found text messages
discussing the distribution of cannabis, several handguns and
ammunition, and drug paraphernalia. Based on this evidence
and evidence about the earlier hit and run, Dixon was
convicted on two counts each of possessing narcotics with
intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. He moved to suppress all the evidence obtained in
the searches conducted on the day he was arrested, arguing
that the searches had exceeded the scope authorized by his
supervised release search condition. The district court denied
his motion, and Dixon challenges that decision on appeal.
Our review of the district court’s decision is complicated
by the fact that both parties failed to submit actual evidence
supporting the factual assertions in their briefs on the motion
to suppress. We therefore find significant gaps in the record.
In denying Dixon’s motion, the district court appears to have
relied substantially on the government’s unsupported
statement of facts. During oral argument before this court, the
government told us that courts in the Central District of
Illinois regularly rely on one party’s unsupported statement
of facts to decide motions to suppress, so long as those facts
are not disputed by the other party. We do not have before us
a clear and complete picture of how this practice works. But
whatever efficiency gains might be achieved by this practice,
it does not, in the absence of a clear stipulation of facts,
produce a proper evidentiary basis for a district court’s
factual findings or for appellate review.

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No. 23-2427 3
Still, although the pretrial record is less complete than we
might wish, we ultimately affirm the denial of the motion to
suppress. Dixon failed to offer evidence on the threshold issue
of his Fourth Amendment standing, i.e., that he had legitimate
expectations of privacy in the places and items searched. As a
result, he cannot challenge any of the allegedly unconstitu-
tional searches. Further, the record we have shows that at
least the searches of the Pontiac and the cellphone were rea-
sonable and permissible under the terms of Dixon’s super-
vised release.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
During the early hours of October 20, 2019, an Illinois state
trooper saw a gray Mitsubishi crash into another car. The
Mitsubishi’s driver immediately left the car and ran away.
Searches of the car found a photograph of Dixon, a rental
agreement in the name of Dixon’s mother, three guns, a box
of ammunition, three clear baggies of suspected crack cocaine,
a scale, a shoebox with several bags of suspected cannabis,
and a car key with an Audi logo. Shortly after the crash, the
state trooper identified Dixon as the driver of the car. The
Rock Island Police Department contacted the Probation Office
to report Dixon as a suspect in a hit and run.
Based on the investigation of the hit and run, the federal
Probation Office requested and received an arrest warrant for
Dixon and petitioned to revoke his supervised release. The
petition cited three violations of law: leaving the scene of an
accident, possessing a firearm, and possessing a controlled
substance. The Probation Office arranged for Dixon to meet
his probation officer on December 18 and planned to search
Dixon and his property for any contraband during the
appointment. On December 18, officers saw Dixon arrive at

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4 No. 23-2427
the Probation Office in a purple Pontiac. After Dixon entered
the building, officers arrested him on the warrant and
searched him. On his person, the officers found a key ring
with three keys: two regular keys and one electronic remote
key bearing an Audi logo.
The probation officers then invoked a condition of Dixon’s
supervised release authorizing warrantless searches of his
property. Officers searched the Pontiac that Dixon had driven
to the courthouse. They found a locked cellphone, a
marijuana cigarette, and a small scale. The officers returned to
the office and asked Dixon for the passcode for the phone. He
refused to answer, but officers correctly guessed the passcode.
They searched the cellphone’s text messages, internet search
history, social media accounts, and photo gallery. They found
two categories of incriminating evidence: (1) text messages
discussing the distribution of cannabis and telling unnamed
recipients to come to an address in Silvis, Illinois, and
(2) pictures and videos depicting Dixon with large amounts
of cannabis or a white Audi with a specific license plate.
The probation officers split up. One group searched the
East Moline house where Dixon had told his probation officer
he was living. Dixon does not challenge the legality of that
search. Another group went to the house in Silvis mentioned
in Dixon’s text messages. Officers used another key on
Dixon’s key ring to unlock the front and back doors. They also
found the white Audi pictured in the phone’s photo gallery in
a parking area behind the Silvis house and used Dixon’s car
key to unlock it. Inside the car, they found a duffel bag on the
backseat. Inside the duffel bag, they found two vacuum-
sealed bags of suspected cannabis, a handgun, and a baggie
of ammunition.

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No. 23-2427 5
Dixon was later charged with two counts of possessing
drugs with intent to distribute (counts 1 and 4), two counts of
possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
(counts 2 and 5), and two counts of being a felon in possession
of a firearm (counts 3 and 6). Counts 1, 2, and 3 arose from the
October 20 hit and run. Counts 4, 5, and 6 arose from the
December 18 searches.
Dixon has not challenged the evidence seized from the
October 20 hit and run, but he moved to suppress the
evidence seized on December 18 from the Pontiac, cellphone,
Silvis house, Audi, and duffel bag. He argued that the
warrantless searches exceeded the scope authorized by his
supervised release search condition and thus violated the
Fourth Amendment. He argued that once he was arrested,
probation officers needed a warrant to conduct the challenged
searches. Dixon also requested an evidentiary hearing. The
government argued that Dixon had abandoned any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the places and items
searched and therefore lacked standing to challenge any of
the searches. It also argued that all the warrantless December
18 searches were lawful under the search condition in Dixon’s
supervised release order.
The district court denied Dixon’s request for an
evidentiary hearing. On the merits the court denied his
motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the December
18 searches. It concluded that Dixon did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in any of the items or places searched
and that all the searches were supported by reasonable
suspicion to believe contraband connected to the October 20
hit and run would be found.

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6 No. 23-2427
Dixon went to trial. A jury found him guilty on all six
counts. The district court sentenced him to 260 months in
prison. Dixon has appealed, challenging only the denial of his
motion to suppress as it affects counts 4, 5, and 6.
II. Standard of Review
On appeal, Dixon argues that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the Pontiac, cellphone, Audi, Silvis
house, and duffel bag, and that all the December 18 searches
were unreasonable. He also challenges the district court’s
denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing.
A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress entails
mixed questions of fact and law. We “review factual
determinations for clear error and legal questions de novo.”
United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2010).
“Determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion
are normally mixed questions of fact and law, but when ‘what
happened?’ is not at issue, the ultimate resolution of whether
probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed is a question
of law which we review de novo.” Id.; accord, Bufkin v. Collins,
604 U.S. ___,___, 145 S. Ct. 728, 740 (2025), first citing Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding de novo
review applies to findings of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion under Fourth Amendment), and then citing U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Village at
Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396 n.4 (2018). We review for
abuse of discretion the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a
motion to suppress. United States v. Black, 104 F.4th 996, 1001
(7th Cir. 2024).

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No. 23-2427 7
III. Legitimate Expectations of Privacy
Fourth Amendment rights are personal. They may not be
asserted vicariously, on behalf of others. Carlisle, 614 F.3d at
756, citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). An accused
defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained from an
allegedly unconstitutional search bears the burden of
establishing that the search violated his own Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at 758, citing United States v. Salvucci,
448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980). This is a question of substantive Fourth
Amendment law, but courts often refer to it as a question of
standing. E.g., United States v. Walton, 763 F.3d 655, 658 (7th
Cir. 2014), citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133. A defendant has
standing to challenge a search only if he has a “legitimate
expectation of privacy” in the searched area. Carlisle, 614 F.3d
at 758. “A legitimate expectation of privacy exists when the
defendant exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy and the
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir.
2003). Only Dixon’s subjective expectations of privacy are at
issue in this case.
The district court gave two reasons for finding that Dixon
lacked standing to challenge the December searches. First, the
court found that prior to those searches, Dixon had made
statements disassociating himself from the Pontiac, the
cellphone, the Silvis house, and the Audi. Based on those
statements, the court held that Dixon lacked a subjective
expectation of privacy in any of the items or places searched.
Second, and independent of those statements, the court also
held that Dixon had simply failed to meet his burden of proof
on standing.

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8 No. 23-2427
We affirm because we agree that Dixon failed to meet his
burden of proof on standing. We do not believe, however, that
the district court had evidence before it that could support its
findings that Dixon made statements disassociating himself
from the items and places searched.
A. Dixon’s Burden to Establish a Privacy Interest
Because Dixon bears the burden of establishing his
standing to challenge the December searches, he needed to
come forward with some evidence that he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the Pontiac, the Silvis house, and the
Audi. See United States v. Mendoza, 438 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir.
2006) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where
defendant failed to produce any evidence of a privacy
interest); United States v. Meyer, 157 F.3d 1067, 1080 (7th Cir.
1998) (same); United States v. Ruth, 65 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir.
1995) (same).1
As we have noted before, it is almost impossible to find a
privacy interest without an affidavit or testimony from the
1 Because Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a search is not
jurisdictional, ordinary rules of waiver and forfeiture apply. If the
government concedes that the defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the searched area, the district court may proceed directly to
evaluating the merits of the challenged search. See Byrd v. United States,
584 U.S. 395, 411 (2018) (“Because Fourth Amendment standing is
subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a
jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before
addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.”);
United States v. Cellitti, 387 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2004) (accepting
government’s concession that defendant had standing to challenge
seizure of keys). In this case, though, the government challenged Dixon’s
standing, and Dixon had an opportunity to respond if he wished with
evidence supporting his asserted privacy interest.

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No. 23-2427 9
defendant. Mendoza, 438 F.3d at 795, quoting Ruth, 65 F.3d at
605. During the pretrial suppression proceedings, Dixon
offered only a conclusory assertion that he had an expectation
of privacy in the searched properties. He did not claim to own
or to possess legitimately any of the searched properties or to
have a right to exclude others from them. He also did not
testify, submit an affidavit, or produce any other evidence
regarding his subjective expectation of privacy. Because
Dixon failed to offer evidence from which the district court
could find a privacy interest in the Pontiac, the Silvis house,
or the Audi, he failed to show that those searches intruded on
his Fourth Amendment rights. And because the cellphone
and the duffel bag were found within the Pontiac and the
Audi respectively, he also cannot challenge the searches of
those items. See Mendoza, 438 F.3d at 795 (“[A] defendant
must show a privacy interest not only in the seized good, but
also in the area where the good was found.”), citing Salvucci,
448 U.S. at 85.
Dixon might have been reluctant to provide evidence of
his privacy interest because such evidence also would have
tended to prove he was guilty of the charged offenses. It has
long been established, though, that the government cannot
use testimony given to meet Fourth Amendment standing
requirements as direct evidence against the defendant at trial
on the question of guilt or innocence. Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1968). To benefit from Simmons, a
defendant may assert his subjective expectation of privacy
and request an opportunity to testify to the facts
demonstrating his asserted privacy interest.2
2 Our case law has consistently required a defendant to show
disputed, material facts to receive an evidentiary hearing. E.g., United

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10 No. 23-2427
Dixon’s problem is that he never submitted any evidence
or requested an opportunity to testify to his standing. Instead,
he relied on the government’s argument that the December
searches were reasonable executions of Dixon’s supervised
release search condition. On appeal, he reprises his argument
that the government conceded his proprietary interest in the
items and places searched by relying on his search condition,
since that condition authorized searches of “his” property.
We disagree. Dixon cannot rely on legal theories in the
government’s brief to establish his reasonable expectation of
privacy. As other circuits have recognized, a defendant “is not
entitled to rely on the government’s allegations in the
pleadings, or positions the government has taken in the case,
to establish standing.” United States v. Zermeno, 66 F.3d 1058,
1062 (9th Cir. 1995); accord, United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d
719, 732 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Zermeno). The Ninth Circuit’s
analysis in Zermeno is persuasive on this point.
In Zermeno the defendant argued that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy based on his proprietary interest in the
searched house. 66 F.3d at 1061. Instead of presenting
evidence to support his interest, however, he relied on
statements in the indictment that he leased and operated the
searched home as a “stash house.” Id. at 1061–62. The Ninth
Circuit rejected his attempt to rely on the government’s
States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 2018). But a defendant may
testify to meet his burden of proof on standing even if an evidentiary
hearing is not otherwise necessary. As Simmons explained, a defendant’s
testimony given to meet standing requirements is “an integral part of his
Fourth Amendment exclusion claim.” 390 U.S. 377, 391 (1968). The use
immunity provided by Simmons is therefore not contingent on the
existence of disputed, material facts.

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No. 23-2427 11
position about his guilt for the charged crime. The court
explained that the “government’s assertions in its pleadings
are not evidence” and did “not relieve Zermeno of his burden
to establish standing.” Id. at 1062; see also United States v.
Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming
denial of motion to suppress where defendant relied on
government’s argument at bail hearing that he resided at
searched property and failed to present any evidence
supporting his standing).
So too here. It was Dixon’s “obligation to present evidence
of his standing, or at least to point to specific evidence in the
record which the government presented and which
established his standing.” Zermeno, 66 F.3d at 1062. The
government’s argument that the December searches were
reasonable executions of Dixon’s search condition is a
litigating position, not evidence that Dixon had a proprietary
interest in the items and places searched. The government’s
argument did not relieve Dixon of his burden to produce
evidence showing his standing. Because he failed to meet that
burden, he cannot challenge the December searches.3
3 For the first time on appeal, Dixon also asks us to recognize “a
limited form of standing where, as here, the Government derives its
authority to search third-party property from a supervisee’s release
conditions.” We decline to consider this novel theory of standing, which
was not presented to the district court.
Like the district court, we recognize the tension between the courts
saying that Dixon failed to establish standing to challenge the searches
while saying at the same time that searches were justified under the
supervised release condition allowing searches of “his” property.
Nevertheless, we think the better analytic path is to keep questions of
standing and reasonableness separate because of the different burdens of

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12 No. 23-2427
B. Dixon’s Supposed Statements Denying Links to Searched
Locations and Items
Dixon’s failure to produce any evidence from which the
court could find a privacy interest was a sufficient basis for
denying his motion to suppress. See Mendoza, 438 F.3d at 795.
The district court went further to address alternative grounds
and found that Dixon had made statements disassociating
himself from the Pontiac, the cellphone, the Audi, and the
Silvis house during his appointment at the Probation Office.
Based on those supposed statements, the court held that
Dixon lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in any of the
searched properties. Such statements of disassociation can
indeed support a district court’s finding that a defendant
lacks standing to challenge a search. See United States v.
Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of
motion to suppress based in part on defendant’s statements
to officers that he did not own bag that was searched); see also
United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir.
2007) (similar where defendant denied knowledge of car or
bag inside).
The problem in this case is that there is no actual evidence
in the pretrial record showing that Dixon made the alleged
statements. To make its factual findings, the district court
appears to have relied on the government’s unsupported
statement of facts.4
production and persuasion and the potential for factual variations posed
by, for example, issues of abandonment or disclaimers.
4 Dixon did attach the February 6 Revised Petition for Mandatory
Revocation of Supervised Release to his Additional Argument/Briefing
Motion to Suppress. Like the government’s brief, the February 6 Petition

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No. 23-2427 13
The district court erred by relying on the government
lawyers’ unsupported statement of facts to make factual
findings. The unsupported assertions of attorneys are not
evidence, so they cannot support a district court’s factual
findings. E.g., United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir.
2008); Campania Management Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290
F.3d 843, 852–53 (7th Cir. 2002). Although evidentiary
standards are relaxed in pretrial proceedings, Fed. R. Evid.
104(a), both the government and the defendant are entitled to
“procedures sufficient to ensure a reliable determination of
the facts underlying a motion to suppress.” United States v.
Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds,
447 U.S. 667 (1980), citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376–
77 (1964); United States v. Watson, 87 F.3d 927, 928 n.1, 932 (7th
Cir. 1996) (remanding for new suppression hearing where
district court “deprived the government of a fair hearing, and
therefore ruled on an incomplete record”). Relying on
unsupported assertions from either party fails to clear that
bar.5
Because the government lawyers’ assertions about what
Dixon said during his appointment at the probation office
asserted that Dixon made statements disassociating himself from the
objects of the December searches. Because those assertions by government
lawyers were also unsupported by evidence, they do not fill the evidence
gaps.
5 For the same reason, we reject Dixon’s argument that the facts
known to the district court at the time of the pretrial suppression
proceeding were sufficient to establish his standing. Those facts were also
presented in the government’s unsupported statement of facts. It would
also have been erroneous for the district court to rely on the government’s
statement of facts to find that Dixon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the searched property.

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14 No. 23-2427
were not supported by record evidence, the district court
should not have considered them. Nonetheless, the district
court’s error was harmless because we agree that Dixon failed
to meet his burden of proof on standing.
IV. Reasonableness
We also affirm the district court’s denial of Dixon’s motion
to suppress evidence found during the searches of the Pontiac
and the cellphone on the alternative ground that those
searches were reasonable. Both searches were authorized by
Dixon’s supervised release search condition and supported
by probable cause. It is less clear that the searches of the Silvis
house, the Audi, and the duffel bag were authorized by
Dixon’s search condition, but because he failed to show
standing, we need not resolve definitively the reasonableness
of those searches. Before reaching the reasonableness of the
December searches, we first address the government’s failure
to produce evidence supporting the reasonableness of the
searches.
A. The Government’s Burden to Support the Warrantless
Searches.
Because the December 18 searches were executed without
warrants, the government bears the burden of proving the
searches were reasonable. United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d
411, 417 (7th Cir. 1985), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 455 (1971). Instead of submitting affidavits, officer
testimony, or other evidence, the government relied on
unsupported factual assertions in its brief. The district court
relied in part on those unsupported facts to hold that the
December searches were reasonable. For the reasons
explained above, the government lawyers’ unsupported

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No. 23-2427 15
assertions simply did not provide a sufficient basis for the
court’s factual findings.
It is especially problematic for courts to rely on a
government lawyer’s unsupported statement of facts to hold
that a warrantless search is reasonable. Requiring the
government to prove the reasonableness of warrantless
searches is one way that courts enforce the Fourth
Amendment’s “strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Longmire, 761 F.2d at 417.
A warrant must be supported by probable cause, an oath,
and particularity. United States v. Castetter, 865 F.3d 977, 978
(7th Cir. 2017). These requirements are typically satisfied
through an officer’s warrant affidavit. United States v.
McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013). It is inconsistent
with the constitutional preference for a warrant to allow the
government to justify a warrantless search without producing
at least evidence comparable to what would have been
required to obtain a warrant. An attorney’s unsworn, second-
hand account is not an adequate substitute for the sworn
statement of the officers who gathered the information
justifying a search. Cf. United States v. Gibbs, 26 F.4th 760, 766
(7th Cir. 2022) (in sentencing, a prosecutor’s representation
about what the defendant said during the proffer session was
not “a substitute for calling the official who was present at the
proffer session and obtaining that person’s testimony”).
Although the government failed to meet its burden to
prove that the December searches were reasonable, we can
use the evidence presented at trial to evaluate the
reasonableness of the searches. As we explained in United

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16 No. 23-2427
States v. Howell, 958 F.3d 589, 597 (7th Cir. 2020), we may
exercise our discretion to consider trial evidence when
reviewing a motion to suppress. Our decision in any
particular case must strike a balance between two interests:
“avoiding a windfall reversal of a conviction while also
steering clear of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 596.
In Longmire, we relied on trial evidence to sustain the trial
court’s decision in similar circumstances. During the
suppression hearing in that case, the government did not call
the officer who gathered the facts justifying the challenged
Terry stop. 761 F.2d at 416. At trial, however, the officer
testified to the facts supporting the Terry stop. Id. at 418. His
testimony established by a preponderance of the evidence
that the challenged search was supported by reasonable
suspicion. Id. Because the defendant did not challenge the
trial testimony or attempt to show that it unfairly prejudiced
her, we relied on the officer’s trial testimony to affirm the
denial of the motion to suppress. Id.; accord, Howell, 958 F.3d
at 596.
Our considering the trial evidence here poses even less
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant than in Longmire,
where the government did not identify any of the relevant
facts during the suppression proceedings. 761 F.2d at 413–16.
Here, the government’s briefs identified all the facts it
believed were pertinent to the reasonableness of the
December searches. The trial evidence did not reveal new
material facts but only provided actual evidence to support
them. Further, Dixon had a strong incentive to contest the
relevant facts during trial because those facts also tended to
prove that he was guilty of the charged offenses. Cf. Howell,
958 F.3d at 597 (declining to consider officer’s testimony at

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No. 23-2427 17
trial because it revealed a new material fact that the defendant
may have had sound strategic reasons for not challenging at
trial). Because the trial evidence supports the district court’s
denial of Dixon’s motion to suppress and we see no risk of
unfair prejudice to Dixon, considering the trial evidence
strikes the right balance between the interests at stake in this
case.
B. The Searches of the Pontiac and the Cellphone
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118
(2001). Warrantless searches of parolees, probationers, and
their property are evaluated under the general Fourth
Amendment approach of examining the totality of the
circumstances, including sharply diminished privacy
interests during parole and probation. See Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. White, 781
F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2015). We balance the degree to which
a search intrudes on individual liberty against the degree to
which it promotes legitimate governmental interests. White,
781 F.3d at 862, citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999). Dixon’s status as a federal supervisee affects both sides
of the scales. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. His legitimate
expectation of privacy was significantly diminished while the
government’s law-enforcement interest in supervising
probationers was substantial. Id. at 119–20; White, 781 F.3d at
862.
Balancing these interests, the Supreme Court has held that
a warrantless search of a probationer’s home or property
satisfies the Fourth Amendment if it is “supported by
reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of
probation.” United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498, 502 (7th Cir.

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18 No. 23-2427
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Knights, 534
U.S. at 122; United States v. McGill, 8 F.4th 617, 621–22 (7th Cir.
2021) (applying Knights’ reasonable-suspicion standard to
person on federal supervised release).
Dixon’s search condition reads in relevant part:
The defendant shall submit to search of his
person, property, residence, adjacent structures,
office, vehicle, papers, computers … and other
electronic communications or data storage
devices or media, conducted by a U.S. Probation
Officer. … An officer may conduct a search
pursuant to this condition only when
reasonable suspicion exists that the defendant
has violated a condition of his release and/or
that the area(s) or item(s) to be searched contain
evidence of this violation or contain contraband.
Dixon argues that his search condition did not authorize any
of the December searches for two independent reasons. First,
he argues that the probation search team lacked sufficient
reason to believe that the cellphone, Audi, duffel bag, or Silvis
house were “his” within the meaning of his search condition.
Second, he argues that the team lacked reasonable suspicion
that evidence of the October hit and run would be found in
any of the items and places searched. We take each argument
in turn.
1. The Pontiac and Cellphone
First, we agree with Dixon that his search condition
authorizes searches of only “his” property. Its language does
not authorize warrantless searches of third-party property,
nor could it. The government’s “overwhelming interest” in

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No. 23-2427 19
supervising parolees and probationers “warrant[s] privacy
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the
Fourth Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (internal
quotation marks omitted), quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998). People
outside of the parole and probation systems cannot be
subjected to the same kinds of warrantless intrusions on their
privacy without their consent.
We have not before addressed what the government needs
to show to establish that the items and places searched were
sufficiently controlled by the supervisee to be searched
without a warrant. Dixon argues that we should join the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that an “officer must
have probable cause to believe a dwelling is the residence of
a parolee in order to initiate a warrantless search of a
residence not known to be the home of a parolee.” United
States v. Thabit, 56 F.4th 1145, 1151 (8th Cir. 2023); accord,
Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth
Circuit also requires lower levels of suspicion for other kinds
of property searched pursuant to a supervised release order.
See United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2020)
(vehicles); United States v. Bolivar, 670 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.
2012) (items inside a residence). The government does not
take a position on whether some version of a sufficient
certainty requirement exists. It argues that if such a
requirement exists, the probation officers satisfied it here
under either a reasonable suspicion or a probable cause
standard.
We agree that when the government invokes a supervised
release order to justify a warrantless search, it bears the
burden of showing that the items or places searched were

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20 No. 23-2427
sufficiently controlled by or connected to the defendant to fall
within the terms of his supervised release order and the
parolee/probationer exception to the warrant requirement.
We leave more precise mapping of the contours of that
requirement for future cases, perhaps with better evidentiary
records.
Under any standard, the probation officers were
sufficiently certain that Dixon possessed or owned the Pontiac
and the cellphone. Dixon drove the Pontiac alone to his
appointment with his probation officer, indicating that he
controlled it. Regarding the cellphone found in the Pontiac,
Dixon did not have a cellphone on his person when he was
searched. More important, the officers managed to unlock the
phone by using information they had about Dixon from
independent sources, including his tattoos. Based on these
facts, a reasonable person could easily find a “fair probability”
that the cellphone belonged to Dixon. United States v. Simon,
937 F.3d 820, 833 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013); see
also United States v. Wood, 16 F.4th 529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2021)
(applying parolee exception to warrant requirement to search
cellphone found on a “junk pile” in defendant’s home);
Bolivar, 670 F.3d at 1092–93 (officers had reasonable suspicion
to believe that backpack lying in closet of defendant’s shared
one-bedroom apartment was controlled by defendant).
2. The Silvis House, the Audi, and the Duffel Bag
The Silvis house, the Audi, and the duffel bag present a
different story. It is unlikely that the officers were sufficiently
certain that Dixon resided at the Silvis house. Dixon’s
reported residence was in East Moline, Illinois, not Silvis. The
only connections between Dixon and the Silvis house were

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No. 23-2427 21
text messages discovered on the cellphone telling unnamed
recipients to come to the Silvis house. Although the text
messages revealed a connection between Dixon and the Silvis
house, they did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe
Dixon resided at the Silvis house. Since homes are the
preeminent focus of the Fourth Amendment’s protections,
e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir.
1991), a lower standard may not adequately protect the
relevant privacy interests. See Thabit, 56 F.4th at 1151–52;
Motley, 432 F.3d at 1079–80.
The officers discovered the Audi only after searching what
lawyers call the curtilage of the Silvis house, the land
immediately surrounding the house. The Audi was parked
behind the Silvis house and not visible from the street. “When
‘the Government obtains information by physically
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search”
within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has
‘undoubtedly occurred.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6
(2013) (holding that officers conducted a search when they
physically entered and occupied curtilage of defendant’s
house to gather information by conducting a dog sniff),
quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 n.3 (2012).
Evidence from the searches of the Audi and the duffel bag
would therefore be admissible only if the search of the Silvis
house and its curtilage was itself reasonable. See Utah v.
Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016) (“the exclusionary rule
encompasses … ‘evidence later discovered and found to be
derivative of an illegality,’ the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous
tree.’” (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804
(1984)).

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22 No. 23-2427
Because Dixon lacks Fourth Amendment standing, we
need not definitively resolve the needed level of certainty for
the search of the Silvis house. When, as here, both the
defendant and the government had the opportunity to submit
evidence and failed to do so, the defendant bears the adverse
consequences of the failure to adduce proof. If the officers
unlawfully entered the Silvis home or its curtilage, it may be
that other persons, such as owners or residents, have civil
claims for damages against the officers. United States v.
Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009). But Dixon cannot
vindicate those persons’ Fourth Amendment rights in this
proceeding.
3. Reasonable Suspicion for the December Searches
For the searches of the Pontiac and the cellphone to be
authorized by Dixon’s search condition, they also had to be
supported by reasonable suspicion. Dixon’s arguments
assume that the officers needed both (1) reasonable suspicion
that Dixon violated a condition of his release and
(2) reasonable suspicion that the area(s) or item(s) to be
searched contained evidence of this violation or contraband.
We read the “and/or” language of his search condition
differently. Because the language included the disjunctive
“or” between clauses, reasonable suspicion that Dixon
violated a condition of his release was sufficient to invoke his
search condition. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (“When an
officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to
a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is
enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an
intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished
privacy interests is reasonable.”).

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No. 23-2427 23
Before searching the Pontiac and the cellphone, the
probation officers clearly had reasonable suspicion that Dixon
had committed multiple federal crimes in violation of his
supervised release order. Reasonable suspicion requires
“specific and articulable facts” suggesting criminal activity
under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Uribe,
709 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The Rock
Island Police Department’s investigation of the October hit
and run found a rental agreement tying the car to Dixon’s
mother, three guns, ammunition, and distribution quantities
of suspected cannabis and cocaine. Shortly after the accident,
the state trooper who saw it identified Dixon as the driver of
the car, and another investigator discovered a photo of Dixon
in the car. Further, a judge independently found probable
cause that Dixon had committed multiple violations of law
based on the October hit and run. These facts, and the judge’s
independent finding of probable cause, more than satisfy the
reasonable-suspicion standard in Dixon’s search condition.
In sum, because the probation officers were sufficiently
certain that the Pontiac and the cellphone belonged to Dixon
and had reasonable suspicion to believe he had committed
multiple violations of law, the searches of the Pontiac and the
cellphone were reasonable. Although it is less clear on this
record whether the searches of the Audi, the Silvis house, and
the duffel bag fell within Dixon’s search condition, Dixon’s
failure to produce evidence of his standing is decisive without
our needing to decide whether those searches were
reasonable.

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24 No. 23-2427
V. No Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, Dixon argues that the district court erred by
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion
to suppress. Dixon requested a hearing to elicit testimony
from the probation officers who conducted the December
searches. He urged that “without any evidentiary hearing the
Court does not have any facts to support findings relative to
the Motion.”
As we have explained, the lack of evidence in the pretrial
record was a problem, but it was a problem for both sides.
Neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor our case
law require district courts to receive evidence in a particular
way or order when deciding a motion to suppress. To the
contrary, district courts have discretion to choose procedures
when deciding a motion to suppress. As the Supreme Court
explained in Byrd v. United States, district courts may address
Fourth Amendment standing and reasonableness in whatever
order best serves the interests of the case. 584 U.S. 395, 411
(2018). Rule 12 places few restrictions on the procedures
district courts may employ or the evidence they may consider
when deciding pretrial motions.
If there are no material factual disputes, district courts
may, and often do, decide pretrial motions to suppress on the
paper record. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 47(b) (authorizing use of
affidavits to establish facts in pretrial proceedings). If the
record is insufficient to support a fact material to the district
court’s decision, the court can require the parties to
supplement the record before ruling. See, e.g., United States v.
Sims, 879 F. Supp. 883, 889 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (district court
ordered government to provide evidence supporting its
version of facts before relying on those facts to deny

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No. 23-2427 25
defendant’s motion to suppress). Alternatively, the defendant
and the government can stipulate to some or all facts material
to a motion to suppress. Our bottom line is simply that a
district court’s factual findings must be supported by record
evidence.6
While a district court may hold an evidentiary hearing to
fill gaps in the record, it is not required to do so. A district
court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing only if “a
substantial claim is presented and there are disputed issues of
material fact.” United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350, 353 (7th
Cir. 2018), quoting United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564
(7th Cir. 2011). To receive an evidentiary hearing, the
defendant’s “allegations and moving papers must be
‘sufficiently definite, specific, non-conjectural and detailed’”
to show that his claim is substantial and that there are
material factual disputes. Curlin, 638 F.3d at 564, quoting
United States v. McGaughy, 485 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2007).
Dixon conceded in his moving papers that there “may not
be ‘significant’ disputed facts regarding the Motion.” That
concession defeats his argument on appeal that he met his
burden to establish disputed material facts. Although Dixon
identified fourteen unsupported factual assertions in the
government’s brief, he never provided his own account of the
December searches. Questioning the evidentiary basis for the
government’s factual assertions is not the same as identifying
6 In the absence of an agreement between the parties, even an
undisputed factual assertion ordinarily must be supported by record
evidence for a court to consider it, as in civil summary judgment practice.
Cf. Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033–35 (7th Cir. 1993) (in summary
judgment proceedings, district courts may consider an undisputed fact in
a party’s statement of facts only if it is also supported by record evidence).

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26 No. 23-2427
specific, disputed facts. See United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d
927, 933 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Moreover, the series of questions
Harris raises in his brief concerning the circumstances of his
confession are just that—a series of questions. Not a single
contention is backed up by clearly articulated factual charges.
None is worthy of a hearing.”).
Because Dixon did not identify any disputed, material
facts, he did not establish the need for an evidentiary hearing,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
his request.
AFFIRMED.

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