United States of America v. Harrison R. King

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 9, 2025*
Decided May 9, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2795
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HARRISON R. KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 93-cr-30010
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Harrison King, a federal prisoner convicted of murder and multiple drug
offenses—including one for distribution of crack cocaine—appeals the denial of his
motion to have his life sentence reduced under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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by concluding that the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against a reduction,
we affirm.
In January 1993, a grand jury returned an 18-count indictment charging King
with offenses including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (Count 1), murder
in furtherance of that enterprise and in aid of racketeering (Counts 2 and 3), and
distribution of crack cocaine (Count 18). After a trial, a jury found King guilty of 17
counts (one charge had been dismissed during the trial), and the district court
sentenced him to life in prison. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal.
United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1339 (7th Cir. 1996).
In January 2021, King (through counsel) moved for compassionate release.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that there were extraordinary and compelling
reasons to reduce his sentence—among them, that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, had reduced the statutory penalties for some of his
offenses and because he qualified for relief under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018.
The district court denied this motion.
That September, King moved for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First
Step Act. Under that provision, if a defendant was convicted of a “covered offense”—
one related to crack cocaine and whose statutory penalties were modified by the Fair
Sentencing Act—he is eligible for retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.
King contended that his conviction for distribution of crack, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), was a “covered offense” and that the court should exercise its
discretion to reduce the sentence primarily because of his youth. Specifically, he argued
that, because he was between the ages of 19 and 22 during the offense conduct, his brain
had not fully developed, so he was less culpable. He added that he had made
significant efforts toward rehabilitation since his conviction.
The court denied the motion. It first determined that King’s January 2021 motion
sought relief under § 404(b) in addition to compassionate release, and therefore he
could not bring a second motion. See First Step Act § 404(c). The court also stated that
the facts underlying the conviction—namely, his calculated murder of a rival—weighed
against a reduction under the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court considered King’s
age at the time of conviction and the evidence of subsequent rehabilitation, but it
concluded these did not outweigh the egregious circumstances of the crime. And
though the court noted that his crack-cocaine conviction was a covered offense, it also
observed his guidelines range (which was largely driven by the murder) would be

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No. 24-2795 Page 3
unaffected by application of the Fair Sentencing Act, and the statutory maximum for the
most serious counts would be no lower.
On appeal, King challenges the decision not to reduce his sentence, reprising his
argument that his youth at the time of his offense, plus his subsequent rehabilitation,
were mitigating factors that called for an exercise of discretion in his favor. We construe
this as an argument that the district court did not sufficiently account for the mitigating
factors. See Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 500–01 (2022).
A motion for a reduced sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act is reviewed in
two parts: The court determines first whether the defendant is eligible for relief, and
then, if so, whether the sentence should be reduced. United States v. Clay, 50 F.4th 608,
611 (7th Cir. 2022). When deciding whether to reduce the sentence of an eligible
defendant, the court may consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, “the current
Guidelines, the defendant's post-sentencing conduct, and other relevant information
about the defendant's background.” Id. at 612. We review this determination for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Fowowe, 1 F.4th 522, 526 (7th Cir. 2021).
Even if this § 404(b) motion were King’s first, the district court acted well within
its discretion to deny it. Although Count 18 was a covered offense, the court
appropriately grounded its ruling in the relevant § 3553(a) factors, chiefly the
seriousness of the murder and the need to protect the public. Moreover, the court took
King’s youth and rehabilitative efforts into consideration but concluded that these
factors did not outweigh the ones supporting the original sentence.
The court also did not err by observing that King still would have life sentences
for Counts 1 through 3 even if the court reduced the sentence for Count 18. See United
States v. Miedzianowski, 60 F.4th 1051, 1056–57 (7th Cir. 2023) (affirming denial of
§ 404(b) motion where court considered impact of other counts of conviction on
defendant’s sentence). King insists that the court should have considered that Counts 1
through 3 might be overturned through a collateral attack,† in which case he would not
still face life sentences on those counts. But the prospect of those sentences being
† We assume he refers here to his May 2024 motion to compel production of
grand jury materials to aid in a prospective collateral attack, which the district court
denied. On appeal, we construed that motion as an unauthorized successive petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and we ordered the court to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. United States v. King, No. 24-2303, 2025 WL 40874, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 7,
2025).

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vacated through a (successive) collateral attack was speculative at best and not
mitigating.
As a final note, the government’s briefing relies on information that comes from
the verdict forms, jury instructions, and sentencing hearing transcript. When the
government filed its brief, those documents were not in the electronic record, which is
common in cases that originated before the CM/ECF system. Because the parties did not
supply these documents in an appendix, we had to order the government to
supplement the record. Parties should be aware that obtaining hard-copy documents
outside the electronic record is not a simple task for this court. We remind the parties of
their responsibility under Circuit Rule 10(a)(3): “Counsel must ensure, within 21 days of
filing the notice of appeal, that all electronic and non electronic documents necessary for
review on appeal are on the district court docket.” This is especially true when a party
bases its arguments on those documents, as the government did here.
AFFIRMED

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