Benjamin Ritchie v. Ron Neal

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 18, 2025
Decided May 18, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1852
BENJAMIN RITCHIE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
RON NEAL,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:08-cv-00503-RLY-MJD
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
In September 2000 Benjamin Ritchie shot and killed police officer William Toney
in Beech Grove, Indiana. In 2002 an Indiana jury convicted Ritchie of murder and
unanimously recommended imposition of the death penalty. The trial judge imposed a
sentence of death, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on direct
appeal. Ritchie v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 828 (2005).
With the assistance of new counsel, Ritchie sought postconviction review in state court;
the trial judge denied relief and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Ritchie v. Indiana,
875 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. 2007).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1852 Page 2
In 2008 Ritchie petitioned for federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with
the assistance of the same attorneys who had represented him in state postconviction
proceedings. The district court denied relief in 2014. Ritchie moved to alter or amend
the judgment, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 59(e), but the judge denied the motion and declined to
issue a certificate of appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). We likewise denied a
certificate of appealability. Ritchie v. Neal, No. 15-1925 (Feb. 24, 2016), and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Ritchie v. Neal, 581 U.S. 920 (2017). That concluded Ritchie’s
§ 2254 proceedings.
In mid-September 2024—seven years later—Ritchie’s attorneys returned to the
district court and moved to withdraw, advising the judge that counsel from the Capital
Habeas Unit of the Federal Community Defender Office in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania would be requesting appointment as Ritchie’s counsel. The judge granted
the withdrawal motions. On October 4, 2024, counsel from the Federal Defender’s
Capital Habeas Unit in Philadelphia sought appointment to represent Ritchie in any
further habeas litigation. The judge granted that motion on October 10, 2024.
On November 1 Ritchie’s state public defender filed a motion in the state
supreme court seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition. On April 15,
2025, the Indiana Supreme Court denied the motion and granted Indiana’s motion to set
an execution date; the court set an execution date of May 20, 2025, at sunrise. Ritchie v.
Indiana, 254 N.E.3d 1064 (Ind. 2025).
On May 7, 2025—three weeks later and less than two weeks before the scheduled
execution date—Ritchie’s counsel filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reopen the final judgment in the § 2254 case. The
motion centered on new claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and sought to
pursue these claims under the exception to procedural default established in Martinez v.
Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013). Eight years ago, we
held that the Martinez-Trevino doctrine is available to Indiana prisoners seeking to
litigate procedurally defaulted claims in § 2254 proceedings. See Brown v. Brown, 847
F.3d 502, 517 (7th Cir. 2017). As grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), counsel argued
that Ritchie’s prior federal habeas attorneys could not have been expected to raise a
Martinez-Trevino-type argument in his initial § 2254 petition because they had a conflict
of interest. More specifically, they argued that because Ritchie’s prior federal habeas
counsel had represented him in state postconviction proceedings, they were burdened
by a conflict of interest and could not be expected to argue their own ineffectiveness, a
predicate for the Martinez-Trevino exception to procedural default.

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No. 25-1852 Page 3
Together with their Rule 60(b)(6) motion, counsel filed an emergency motion to
stay the execution. The judge set an expedited briefing schedule on the motion to stay;
briefing was completed at noon Eastern Time on May 15. On May 17 the judge issued a
comprehensive and thoughtful decision denying the stay motion.
An applicant for a stay must establish the following elements: (1) a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) irreparable injury in the absence
of a stay; (3) the issuance of a stay will not substantially injure other parties; and (4) the
public interest favors a stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). The judge’s
decision turned on the first factor. He concluded that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was
unlikely to succeed because it was untimely. Ritchie v. Neal, 1:08-cv-00503 (S.D. Ind. May
17, 2025). As relevant here, a Rule 60(b) motion must be filed “within a reasonable
time.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(c)(1).
Drawing on the reasoning of Clark v. Davis, 850 F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2017), a
materially similar case, the judge determined that the starting point for evaluating the
timeliness of Ritchie’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was February 1, 2017—the date on which
we issued our decision in Brown holding that the Martinez-Trevino doctrine is available
to Indiana prisoners. Alternatively, the judge said the “reasonable time” clock might
have started on April 17, 2017, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Ritchie’s
federal § 2254 case. Either way, the Rule 60(b)(6) motion—filed more than eight years
later—was “extremely belated.” The judge also addressed the alternative argument that
the “reasonable time” limit should be measured from October 2024, when Ritchie’s new
federal habeas counsel stepped in. Even under that more recent start date, the judge
held that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely because the seven-month filing delay
was not reasonable. Ritchie’s state public defender had raised essentially the same
arguments in November 2024 in his petition in the state supreme court seeking leave to
file a successive postconviction motion. Under the circumstances nothing prevented
Ritchie’s federal habeas counsel from filing the Rule 60(b)(6) motion in the § 2254 case
more promptly.
Ritchie appealed, and we expedited briefing. The parties filed their briefs, and
Ritchie moved for leave to file a reply brief. We grant the motion and accept the reply.
We review the district court’s decision denying a stay deferentially, for abuse of
discretion. Bourgeois v. Watson, 977 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We
find no abuse of discretion. The judge determined that the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was
unlikely to succeed because it was untimely under any possible starting point for the

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No. 25-1852 Page 4
rule’s “reasonable time” requirement—even the starting point most favorable to Ritchie.
That ruling was sound, and we have nothing to add to the district judge’s careful
analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED

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No. 25-1852 Page 5
JACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit Judge, dissenting. Our Constitution and laws entitle
Ritchie to habeas lawyers who are conflict-free and represent him through “all available
post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of execution” until a court
grants a motion to withdraw. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e); see also Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S.
373, 377 (2015); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994). Ritchie’s circumstances
satisfy the definition of a conflict under our caselaw, and his prior two lawyers admit
they didn’t even discuss the conflict with each other or him. See Christeson, 574 U.S. at
377 (“A significant conflict of interest arises when an attorney’s interest in avoiding
damage to his own reputation is at odds with his client’s strongest argument.”
(cleaned)); cf. Griffin v. McVicar, 84 F.3d 880, 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1996) (identifying a
conflict of interest where counsel could not “advanc[e] plausible arguments” even
where those arguments were “unpromising”). When an execution is imminent, we owe
a “correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny” to the condemned, the victims, and the
public to ensure an error-free round of federal habeas review. California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983); cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996).
The district court denied Ritchie’s motion to stay his execution pending the
consideration of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment. Although we afford
this decision great deference, “a factual or legal error may alone be sufficient to
establish that the court abused its discretion.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir.
2020) (cleaned). I would find the district court abused its discretion in three ways.
First, the district court erred in treating a habeas petitioner represented by
conflicted counsel as pro se. As the district court sees it, Ritchie was obligated to
uncover and address the conflict and potential excuse for procedural default in his case.
But this was not a self-evident, uncomplicated legal question. And Ritchie, a petitioner
on death row with cognitive limitations, had no reason to know he was not being
adequately represented. In fact, his conflicted counsel assured him that they would
continue to protect his interests. Were we to adopt the district court’s logic, Rule 60(b)
would never be available to petitioners with conflicted counsel, so long as the conflict
lasts long enough. This logic is at odds with Supreme Court precedent and the practice
of supplementing or replacing counsel to remedy such conflicts. See Christeson, 574 U.S.
at 375, 380 (allowing for the appointment of conflict-free counsel to file a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion seven years past the statute of limitations because the motion could be timely
and meritorious); see also Mendoza v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 203, 203 (5th Cir. 2015); Juniper v.
Davis, 737 F.3d 288, 290 (4th Cir. 2013) ( “[Q]ualified and independent counsel is
ethically required .... without regard to whether the underlying motion identifies a
‘substantial’ ineffective assistance claim under Martinez.”).

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No. 25-1852 Page 6
Second, the district court committed factual and legal error in determining that
Ritchie’s new counsel was not reasonably timely in filing Ritchie’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
To start, his new counsel took less than seven months to file the motion, not seven or
eight as the district court found. While there is no bright line as to what constitutes
reasonable timeliness, less than seven months is well under the one-year timeframe
Rule 60 contemplates for other motions. F ED. R. C IV. P. 60(c). There is, however, a
“mandatory right to qualified legal counsel” in habeas proceedings. Christeson, 574 U.S.
at 377. The district court would have us supplant the right to qualified counsel,
reasoning that newly appointed counsel could have filed much earlier by relying on the
same claims Ritchie’s state counsel advanced before the Indiana Supreme Court. Rather
than clone state counsel’s work, Ritchie’s new counsel was tasked with conducting an
independent review of Ritchie’s case to assert his strongest and final case in federal court.
New counsel’s timeline was not only reasonably timely, but akin to the number of
months Ritchie’s state counsel needed for their own efforts. The single case the district
court cited in support of its conclusion is also inapposite. See Tamayo v. Stephens, 740
F.3d 986, 990–91 (5th Cir. 2014) (involving a filing by the same counsel eight months
after a change in decisional law, as opposed to newly appointed, conflict-free counsel
reviewing for the first time a death penalty case dating back 22 years).
Third, the district court erred in narrowly focusing on promoting finality and the
State’s interest in executing Ritchie—although the State was able to wait seven years to
seek a death warrant—over the irreparable injury the court identified (death) and the
public interest in habeas proceedings untainted by error. The Supreme Court has
identified Rule 60(b) as a provision whose “whole purpose is to make an exception to
finality,” and one with “an unquestionably valid role to play in habeas cases.” Gonzalez
v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529, 534 (2005). The point one of my colleagues on this panel
made in writing for our court in a non-habeas case 40 years ago has equal force here: “A
court ought not let the interests of finality lead it to decline to afford the sort of review
Rule 60(b) authorizes.” Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 831 (7th Cir.
1985).
As a final thought, this was not, as the State proposes, an eleventh-hour attempt
to delay execution. After all, the Indiana Supreme Court did not set Ritchie’s execution
date until mid-April. Seeing how divided that court was, Ritchie is simply requesting
that at least one court review the merits of his claims before he is killed.

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No. 25-1852 Page 7
For these reasons, and for additional reasons Ritchie identifies in his briefs on
appeal, on this record I would find that he meets the requirements for a stay of his
execution as outlined in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009). I respectfully
dissent.

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