United States of America v. Jamie Sullivan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2025
Decided May 20, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2576
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMIE SULLIVAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cr-00093-TWP-MG-4
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Jamie Sullivan pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering and was
sentenced to 24 years in prison. Sullivan appeals, but her appointed lawyer asserts that
the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). We notified Sullivan of counsel’s motion, and she did not respond with her view
of potential appellate arguments. See C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind would typically involve.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 24-2576 Page 2
Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In January 2024, Sullivan was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The government ultimately agreed to dismiss the firearm charge, and
Sullivan pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to the remaining charges.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Sullivan confirmed under oath that she
understood the charges, the penalties, and the trial rights she was waiving, and she
affirmed that her plea was voluntary. Sullivan admitted to being involved in a drug-
trafficking organization that sold large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl in
the Indianapolis area. She confirmed her role in coordinating drug couriers; receiving,
counting, and distributing fentanyl pills; directing the transfer of proceeds from drug
trafficking; transporting methamphetamine; and possessing drugs and a gun in her
home. The district judge found a sufficient factual basis and accepted her guilty plea.
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) and later a
revised report. For purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, the revised PSR created two
offense groups: one for the three drug offenses, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), and one for the
drug-conspiracy and money-laundering offenses, see id. § 3D1.2(c). It calculated a base
offense level of 38 for the drug-offense group because the scheme involved more than
90,000 kilograms of converted drug weight. See id. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1). The PSR added
two offense levels for possessing a firearm in relation to the offense, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1),
two levels for maintaining a residence to distribute drugs, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(12), two
levels for committing the offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a
livelihood, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E), and three levels for having a managing or
supervising role in the drug offenses, see id. § 3B1.1(b). These adjustments produced an
offense level of 47. For the money-laundering group, the PSR used the offense level for
the drug convictions (without counting the Chapter 3 adjustment) to arrive at a base
offense level of 44. See id. § 2S1.1(a)(1), cmt. n.2(C). It added two levels for being
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, see U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), and three levels for
managing or supervising activity related to the money laundering, see id. § 3B1.1(b),
resulting in an adjusted offense level of 49. The money-laundering group’s higher
offense level controlled for purposes of determining the applicable range. See id.

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 24-2576 Page 3
§ 3D1.4. Sullivan received a three-point decrease for accepting responsibility, see id.
§ 3E1.1, giving her an offense level of 46, which is treated as a total offense level of 43
because the sentencing table goes no higher, see id. § 5A cmt. n.2. Based on a total
offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I (Sullivan had no criminal
history), the PSR calculated a guidelines range of life in prison. See id. § 5A.
Before sentencing, Sullivan raised five objections to the proposed offense-level
increases. She argued that (1) she did not possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking offense; (2) she should therefore be considered a zero-point offender; (3) the
facts did not show that criminal activity was her livelihood; (4) the manager/supervisor
adjustment should not apply to her money-laundering offense; and (5) distributing
drugs was not a primary use of her home.
At the sentencing hearing, the district judge overruled Sullivan’s objections and
adopted the PSR’s guidelines calculations. The judge then heard Sullivan’s allocution
and the attorneys’ arguments before weighing the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The judge sentenced Sullivan to 288 months’ imprisonment on one group of
offenses and 120 months on the other, all to be served concurrently, with a total of
5 years’ supervised release to follow (the statutory minimum for the drug-conspiracy
and methamphetamine-distribution offenses). The judge also ordered Sullivan to forfeit
$3,520 and 133 rounds of ammunition and pay a fine of $2,000.
In his Anders brief, counsel first states that he consulted with Sullivan and
confirmed that she does not wish to withdraw her guilty plea, so counsel properly
omits discussion of potential arguments related to Sullivan’s plea or plea colloquy.
See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Next, counsel rightly concludes that Sullivan cannot plausibly challenge her
sentence on procedural grounds. We review a judge’s application of the Guidelines
de novo and findings of fact for clear error. E.g., United States v. Shehadeh, 127 F.4th 1058,
1064 (7th Cir. 2025).
Here, as counsel explains, the judge correctly calculated a “range” of lifetime
imprisonment under the Guidelines, based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal
history category of I. See U.S.S.G. § 5A. Counsel considers whether Sullivan could
plausibly reprise on appeal any of her five objections, but we agree that such challenges
would be frivolous. First, Sullivan could not raise any nonfrivolous argument that the
district judge clearly erred in finding that she possessed a firearm in connection with
drug trafficking. Because Sullivan conceded that she possessed the firearm, the burden

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 24-2576 Page 4
shifted to her “to show that it was clearly improbable that [s]he possessed the weapon
in connection with the drug offense.” United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687, 692 (7th Cir.
2022); see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). She did not make this showing. Instead, the
judge reasonably found that the firearm was related to Sullivan’s drug trafficking.
“[G]uns found in close proximity to drug activity are presumptively connected to that
activity,” United States v. Corral, 324 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2003), and officers found
Sullivan’s loaded gun in her bedroom near the drugs. Second, because the judge found
that Sullivan possessed the firearm in connection with the offense, she could not qualify
as a zero-point offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(7).
Third and fourth, Sullivan could not raise any nonfrivolous arguments that the
judge clearly erred in finding that she engaged in a criminal livelihood and acted as a
manager within the money-laundering scheme. The evidence showed that Sullivan was
not meaningfully employed during the conspiracy but had paid substantial sums for
expenses. And the judge properly applied the aggravating-role adjustment to her
money-laundering offense based on a “commonsense judgment about [Sullivan’s]
relative culpability given [her] status in the criminal hierarchy.” United States v. Craft,
99 F.4th 407, 414 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. House, 883 F.3d 720, 724
(7th Cir. 2018)). This, contrary to Sullivan’s objection, was not a “double counting” of
her aggravating role because her function in the money-laundering scheme—directing
individuals to transfer funds to specific accounts—was independent of her function in
the drug-trafficking scheme—coordinating couriers to transport drugs.
Fifth, Sullivan could not raise any nonfrivolous argument that the judge clearly
erred in finding that Sullivan maintained her home as a “stash house.” For this two-
level increase to apply, (1) Sullivan had to have a possessory interest or control of the
property, and (2) drug trafficking must have been a primary use (but not necessarily the
sole one) of the premises. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. Here, Sullivan conceded that
she controlled the residence, so the government needed to show only that the
residence’s use in trafficking was “more than incidental or collateral.” United States v.
Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494,
497 (7th Cir. 2016)). At the sentencing hearing, an investigating officer testified that he
saw suitcases filled with drugs delivered to Sullivan’s residence on a weekly basis,
sometimes on back-to-back days. The judge therefore reasonably found that drug
trafficking was one of the primary uses of the residence based on the frequency and size
of those deliveries. See id. at 284.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 24-2576 Page 5
As for substantive reasonableness, we agree with counsel that any challenge to
Sullivan’s below-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. A below-guidelines sentence
is presumptively reasonable, and Sullivan bears “a particularly onerous burden” to
rebut that presumption by showing that the sentence is unreasonably high in light of
the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the
judge invoked the factors when explaining the sentence, highlighting “the very serious
nature and circumstances of the offense” (serving as an “organizer, a manager, in a very
large-scale, major drug trafficking organization” involving a “staggering” amount of
drugs) and the need to promote respect for the law (passing up “many opportunities to
withdraw” from the illegal activities and not being deterred by the arrests and deaths of
those around her). Balancing these factors against Sullivan’s lack of prior criminal
convictions, difficult upbringing, and sincere remorse, the judge settled on a below-
guidelines sentence of 288 months. We do not reweigh a sentencing judge’s assessment
of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and that is all an appellate argument could
ask us to do. See United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 5 of 5 --