William Fulgham v. Beau Admire

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 27, 2025*
Decided May 28, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2986
WILLIAM FULGHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BEAU ADMIRE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-cv-4218-JBM
Joe Billy McDade,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Fulgham, an Illinois prisoner, filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that a correctional officer used excessive force against him and so violated his
rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district judge dismissed the suit as untimely,
determining that the statute of limitations was not tolled while Fulgham exhausted his
administrative remedies because he did not exhaust them properly. But that is a
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2986 Page 2
separate issue from timeliness. Further, taking the allegations in the complaint as true,
administrative remedies were unavailable to Fulgham. We thus vacate the judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
For purposes of this appeal, we assume the truth of Fulgham’s allegations and
draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004
(7th Cir. 2019). On May 21, 2018, Fulgham argued with correctional officer Beau
Admire. In response, Admire handcuffed Fulgham, slammed him onto the ground, and
“pounded his knees” on Fulgham’s back and neck.
The day after the altercation, Fulgham filed a grievance against Admire, but the
grievance was returned because it did not include a copy of “the Disciplinary Report
and the Adjustment/Program Committee Final Summary.” Fulgham maintained, in
response to the motion to dismiss this case, that these documents were not required to
initiate grievances relating to a correctional officer’s excessive use of force but that he
nonetheless resubmitted the grievance along with the requested documents. According
to the complaint, after he did not receive any response, Fulgham sent letters to prison
officials seeking guidance. Fulgham continued sending letters to various officials
throughout the next three years—to no avail. The complaint states that Fulgham “did
not receive responses to most of his mailings” concerning the incident with Admire; he
attached copies of his letters to the complaint but no responses.
Fulgham then sued Admire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Admire used
excessive force when he slammed Fulgham onto the ground. The defendants responded
by moving to dismiss on the basis that the statute of limitations barred Fulgham’s suit.
The district judge agreed with the defendants: he determined that Fulgham’s claim
accrued on May 21, 2018, and that Fulgham did not file his complaint until December
29, 2021, well past the applicable two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 suits in
Illinois. And the judge concluded that Fulgham’s pursuit of administrative remedies
did not toll the statute of limitations because Fulgham did not exhaust administrative
remedies properly.
Fulgham moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, contending that he had resubmitted his grievance with the requested
documents and that the grievance office failed to respond, resulting in administrative
remedies being unavailable. Fulgham requested an evidentiary hearing under Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), to resolve the question. The district judge denied
Fulgham’s motion, reasoning that, even if the grievance process was unavailable,

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No. 23-2986 Page 3
Fulgham should have filed suit in May 2018 instead of waiting until after the statute of
limitations expired.
On appeal, Fulgham challenges the district judge’s ruling that his suit was barred
by the statute of limitations. As Fulgham sees things, his time for filing suit did not start
until he could exhaust administrative remedies, but no remedies were available.
Viewing the allegations in Fulgham’s complaint as true, we agree with him that
dismissal was inappropriate at this stage.
Although a plaintiff need not anticipate or rebut a statute-of-limitations defense
in his complaint, see Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc),
dismissal is appropriate if the allegations in the complaint show that the statute of
limitations is an impenetrable bar to recovery, Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th
814, 822 (7th Cir. 2022). But dismissal (rather than judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment) for untimeliness is the exception, not the rule: “Rarely will the face
of the complaint so clearly prove the opponent’s affirmative defense that immediate
dismissal, prior to the filing of an answer, will be proper.” Luna Vanegas v. Signet
Builders, Inc., 46 F.4th 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2022).
Aside from the procedural issue, there are two problems with the district judge’s
conclusions that Fulgham’s suit was untimely and that tolling did not apply. First,
proper exhaustion is an independent prerequisite for federal litigation. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90–91, 93 (2006). If the district judge is correct
that Fulgham failed to exhaust properly, then judgment on that ground is appropriate.
Yet if administrative remedies were unavailable, as Fulgham alleges, then exhaustion
was not required. Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2022). The judge did not
resolve the latter question, which would likely require a Pavey hearing or some measure
of discovery.
Second, “a federal court relying on the Illinois statute of limitations in a § 1983
case must toll the limitations period while a prisoner completes the administrative
grievance process.” Terry v. Spencer, 888 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Johnson v.
Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001)). Fulgham asserts that his efforts to exhaust went
nowhere because no one responded after he resubmitted his grievance and followed up
numerous times. Exhaustion is not required when there is no “available” remedy,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), including when the system is so opaque that no ordinary prisoner
can discern or navigate it or the procedures are a guaranteed “dead end.” Ross v. Blake,

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578 U.S. 632, 642–44 (2016). The failure of prison officials to respond to a grievance can
be one such circumstance. See Reid v. Balota, 962 F.3d 325, 329, 331 (7th Cir. 2020).
At this stage, we must take Fulgham’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor. Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004. We take no position on the outcome of
either the exhaustion or timeliness issues. A more complete examination of the facts
might show that administrative remedies were in fact available to Fulgham and that his
failure to properly exhaust requires dismissal. But that is not an issue that can be
resolved on the pleadings in this case. See Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742–43. We therefore
VACATE the dismissal of Fulgham’s complaint and REMAND for further proceedings.

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